The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ambrose, Chief District Judge
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
The factual and procedural details of this case are well known to the parties, and I need not repeat them in detail here. In short, Plaintiff, Helen Totty ("Plaintiff" or "Totty"), seeks payment under a homeowners' insurance policy issued to her by Defendant Great Northern Insurance Company ("Defendant" or "Great Northern") for damage to her home allegedly caused by a vibratory compactor which the City of Pittsburgh used to repave the road outside her home in July 2002. Plaintiff claims that vibratory waves from the compactor caused densification of sand layers in the underlying soil, resulting in the alleged damage.
Defendant offers the expert testimony of Randal L. Exley of ARCCA Inc. ("Exley") with respect to the causation issue. Exley disagrees with the causation theories of Plaintiff's experts and opines, inter alia, that much of the alleged damage to Plaintiff's home was instead caused by "creep." Pending is Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (Docket No. 51) seeking to exclude Exley's testimony at trial on various grounds. I held a Daubert hearing on this issue on December 19, 2006. After careful consideration of the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, as well as the parties' pre- and post-hearing submissions and attachments thereto, the Motion in Limine is denied.
A. Daubert Standard and Rule 702
In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that: [f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, ... the trial court judge must determine at the outset ... whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). More recently, in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999), the Supreme Court clarified any confusion regarding the intended reach of the Daubert decision, by declaring that the trial judge must perform this "basic gatekeeping obligation" to all expert matters, not just "scientific" matters. In the Third Circuit, the trial court's role as a "gatekeeper" announced in Daubert requires: (1) proof that the proffered witness is qualified as an expert; (2) the expert must testify about matters requiring scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge; and (3) the expert's testimony must "fit" the facts of the case. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus, pursuant to Daubert, the gatekeeping function requires the court to ensure that the expert testimony is both reliable and relevant. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147.
As to the first requirement - qualification - the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has "eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements of expertise and [has] been satisfied with more general qualifications." Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741. "Rule 702's liberal policy of admissibility extends to the substantive as well as the formal qualification of experts." Id. Thus, an expert can qualify based on a broad range of knowledge, skills, training and experience.
The second inquiry focuses on methodology. The inquiry into methodology is designed to ensure that an expert's opinions are based upon "'methods and procedures of science' rather than on subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Id. at 742. Factors used to assess reliability include whether: (1) the theory or technique can be tested; (2) the theory or technique has been peer reviewed; (3) there is a high rate of known or potential error; (4) there are standards of control; (5) the theory is "generally accepted"; (6) there is a sufficient relationship between the technique and methods which have been established to be reliable; (7) the expert's qualifications are sufficient; and (8) the method has been put to non-judicial uses. See Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 594 (D.N.J. 2002), aff'd, 68 F. App'x 356 (3d Cir. 2003). "Some courts also consider additional factors relevant in determining reliability, including: (i) whether the expert's proposed testimony grows naturally and directly out of research the expert has conducted independent of the litigation . . . ; (ii) whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion. . . ; (iii) whether the expert has adequately accounted for alternative explanations . . . ; (iv) whether the expert is being as careful as he would be in his professional work outside of the litigation context . . . ; and (v) whether the field of expertise asserted by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion proffered by the expert . . . ." Id. at 594-95 (citations omitted).
Although this list of factors is lengthy, not each factor will be relevant to every reliability analysis. The "test of reliability is 'flexible.'" Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. According to the Supreme Court, "Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts." Id. The relevance of the Daubert factors depends "on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." Id. at 150 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Finally, Daubert and Rule 702 require that the expert's testimony "fit" the facts of the case. "'Fit' requires that the proffered testimony must in fact assist the jury, by providing it with relevant information, necessary to a reasoned decision of the case." Magistrini, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (citing Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743).
B. Exley's Qualifications
Plaintiff does not argue that Exley is unqualified to testify as an expert in this case, and I find, based on the record before me, that Exley is sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 with ...