The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ambrose, Chief District Judge.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
The parties have been involved in years of litigation relating to a Surety and Guaranty Agreement. Defendant seeks the dismissal of this action based upon both lack of subject matter jurisdiction and claim preclusion. I agree that neither the United States Constitution nor "national banking laws" give me subject matter jurisdiction over what are essentially claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Additionally, I agree with the Defendant that even if I were able to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff's claims would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Plaintiff Stephen Kuznetsov ("Kuznetsov") was founder and chief executive officer of PSM Technologies, Inc. ("PSM"). In 1988, Kuznetsov and his wife agreed to serve as sureties and guarantors on a loan to PSM in the amount of $900,000.00 from Equibank, Defendant National City Bank of Pennsylvania's ("the Bank") predecessor-in-interest. Ultimately PSM defaulted on the loan and went into bankruptcy. During bankruptcy proceedings, the Bank sold its claim against PSM to Kovalchick Corporation and assigned its contractual rights under the Surety and Guaranty Agreement ("the Agreement") to Kovalchick. Kovalchick eventually confessed judgment against PSM on the promissory note and against Kuznetsov on the personal guaranty.
In 2001, Kuznetsov then filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania against the Bank, Kovalchick Corporation and Joseph Kovalchick.*fn1 As against the Bank, Kuznetsov claimed that it had breached the Agreement and breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by selling the PSM loan to Kovalchick instead of to him. The trial court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank.
Kuznetsov appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Again, Kuznetsov argued on appeal that he had a "right to pay" as surety and that the Bank's refusal to allow him to repay constituted a material breach of the Agreement. The Superior Court rejected Kuznetsov's arguments and affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Undeterred, Kuznetsov filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Petition. Kuznetsov subsequently filed an Application for Reconsideration of Denial of Allowance of Appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied this Application as well.
On April 26, 2006, Kuznetsov then initiated this action against the Bank. In the Complaint, though Kuznetsov does not reference the extensive litigation history between the parties, he does reference the Agreement. Specifically, he contends that the Agreement gave him the right to immediately repay the loan in the event that PSM defaulted. See Complaint, ¶ 4. According to Kuznetsov, when the Bank refused to permit Kuznetsov to repay the defaulted loan, it not only breached the Agreement but it breached the duty to act in good faith.
The Bank has filed a Motion to Dismiss and / or Motion for Summary Judgment. See Docket No. 3.*fn2 According to the Bank, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the matters raised in the Complaint. In the alternative, the Bank argues, Kuznetsov's claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. After careful consideration, and for the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
In deciding a Motion to Dismiss, all factual allegations, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, must be accepted as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1988). I may dismiss a complaint only if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). In ruling on a motion for failure to state a claim, I must look to "whether sufficient facts are pleaded to determine that the complaint is not frivolous, and to provide the defendants with adequate notice to frame an answer." Colburn, 838 F.2d at 666.
While a court will accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it will not accept legal or unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1977). Moreover, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claims or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(2)(a) and Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Matters outside the pleadings should not be considered. This includes "any written or oral evidence in support of or opposition to the pleadings that provides some substantiation for and does not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings." Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1366 (West 1990).