The opinion of the court was delivered by: (Judge Conner)
Presently before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) by petitioner, Hairon Wilfort ("Wilfort"). Wilfort asserts that the United States Parole Commission ("Commission) violated his due process rights. The petition will be denied.
Wilfort was convicted in the District of Columbia Superior Court in 1995, of carrying a pistol without a license and sentenced to eighteen to fifty-four months imprisonment. (Doc. 11-2, p. 4). He was paroled on March 18, 1997. (Doc. 11-2, p. 9).
On September 26, 1997, the District of Columbia Board of Parole issued a warrant charging Wilfort with a number of parole violations, including failure to obey all laws based upon a September 9, 1997 arrest for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (Doc. 11-2, p. 11). Because he was in federal custody, the Board of Parole warrant was lodged as a detainer. (Doc. 11-2, p. 12). (Id.). Wilfort eventually pled guilty to the possession of a firearm charge and was sentenced to a non-parolable term of imprisonment of ninety-six months. (Doc. 11-2, pp. 15, 28).
On August 2, 2000, pursuant to the transfer of authority established by the National Capital Revitalization & Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub.L.No. 105-33, sec 11231(a)(1), 111 Stat. 712, 745; D.C. Code § 24-1231, jurisdiction over the warrant was transferred from the District of Columbia Board of Parole to the United States Parole Commission ("Commission"). (Doc. 11-2, p. 20). While serving his sentence he sent two letters to the Commission regarding the detainer. In response, Wilfort was advised as follows:
You are now serving a non-parolable sentence. The detainer will be executed upon completion of your current sentence. The Bureau of Prisons will then notify the Commission and you will be scheduled for a revocation hearing.
You asked why you still have a detainer. You must request in writing for a review of your detainer and submit mitigating information or comments to the Commission with your request so that this information may be considered. (Doc. 11-2, p. 28). Wilfort never submitted a written request for review of the detainer.
He completed service of his federal sentence on November 4, 2004, which resulted in the execution of the warrant. On February 17, 2005, the Commission concluded that there was probable cause to believe that he had violated conditions of his parole and scheduled a revocation hearing. (Doc. 11-2, p. 21). The hearing was held on April 13, 2005 and Wilfort's parole was revoked. Wilfort received no credit for time on parole, and he was continued until the expiration of his parole violator term. (Doc. 11-2, p. 26).
Wilfort filed the present petition contending that his due process rights were violated. Specifically, he argues that his rights were violated because: (1) he did not receive a dispositional review hearing and (2) his revocation was untimely.
A. Right to a Dispositional Review Hearing
In the case of an incarcerated parole violator, an otherwise constitutionally-mandated preliminary hearing is not needed because the parolee's subsequent conviction would serve as probable cause for a parole violation, and, more importantly, because the issuance of a detainer does not immediately deprive the parolee of liberty. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 86 (1976). The mere prospect of future incarceration from the parole violation itself does not have any "present or inevitable effect" upon the individual in question and no "right" exists to force a decision or hearing prior to the end of incarceration. Id. at 87-88.
When the Commission revokes a District of Columbia offender's parole, as in this case, 28 C.F.R. § 2.100 applies. When a District of Columbia parolee is convicted of a new crime warranting imprisonment, a parole violation warrant may be placed against that individual as a detainer. 28 C.F.R. § 2.100(a). Additionally, if the parolee is serving a new sentence, and is currently ineligible for parole under that sentence, the Commission will conduct a review of the detainer at the request of the parolee and may, at its discretion, exercise options which include "let[ting] the detainer ...