AND NOW, this 13th day of March, 2006, upon consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) plaintiff's claims, brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400--1491o, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101--12213, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 790--794e, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981--1996(b), and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, arguing that plaintiff has not exhausted IDEA administrative remedies,*fn1 that the IDEA claims were not filed within the limitations period, and that relief is not available under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses, and it appearing that the complaint requests relief for which the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required,*fn2 see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (stating that exhaustion of available administrative remedies is required "before the filing of a civil action . . . seeking relief that is al so available under" the IDEA); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495-96 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that compensatory damages are not available under the IDEA, and hence exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required); see also C.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Union County Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 128 F. App'x 876, 880 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that compensatory and punitive damages are available in § 1983 suits brought to enforce IDEA), that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are not subject to the exhaustion requirement, see Jeremy H. by Hunter v. Mtn. Laurel Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 727, 281-82 & n. 17 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that § 12132 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act "are not . . . subject to any exhaustion requirements"); see also Smith v. City of Phila., 345 F. Supp. 2d 482, 487 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (same), that the instant suit was commenced within the applicable limitations period (see Doc. 1 at 1), see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985) (stating that, although IDEA does not contain statute of limitations, court must look to law of state); Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1996) (reviewing state statutes and holding that two year limitations period for IDEA claims is appropriate); Susavage v. Bucks County Sch. Intermediate Unit, No. 99-CV-6217, 2002 WL 109615, at *22-23 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2002) (holding that IDEA limitations period is tolled until plaintiff obtains age of eighteen); Andrew P. v. Bucks County Intermediate Unit, No. 99-CV-5255, 2001 WL 1716993, at *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2001) (same); McKellar v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., No. 98-CV-4161, 1999 WL 124381, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1999) (same); Jeffrey Y. v. St. Mary's Area Sch. Dist., 967 F. Supp. 852, 855 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (same); see also Carver v. Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 101 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that two-year limitations period is reasonable for § 1983 claim), and that plaintiff is not pursuing Due Process or Equal Protection Clause claims*fn3 (see Doc. 11 at 12), see Spence v. Straw, 54 F.3d 196, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal of equal protection and due process claims as "the Rehabilitation Act provides the exclusive means by which a litigant may raise claims of discrimination on the basis of handicap), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is DENIED.