The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ambrose, Chief District Judge.
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife" or "Defendant") has filed a Motion in Limine (Docket No. 50) seeking to exclude at trial evidence regarding the Pennsylvania Report of Market Conduct Examination of MetLife ("Pennsylvania Report"), the Florida Report of Investigation into Sales Practices of MetLife ("Florida Report"), and the Connecticut Market Conduct Report ("Connecticut Report"). Defendant's Motion is granted in part and denied in part as follows.
A. THE PENNSYLVANIA MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION
MetLife's sales practices during the early 1990s were the focus of an investigation by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, which issued a Market Conduct Examination Report on February 11, 1994. (Docket No. 50, Ex. A). The report defined the scope of the investigation as follows:
A targeted market conduct examination has been performed on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as "MetLife", at their Johnstown, Pennsylvania office and through interviews conducted with various consumers, insurance agents and MetLife employees located principally within a six (6) county Western Pennsylvania Region, and a Report thereon is submitted as follows:
The examination covered the period January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1992, unless otherwise noted. The purpose of the examination was to review MetLife's management, marketing and sales practices and procedures in Western Pennsylvania. Western Pennsylvania was defined as the counties of Armstrong, Allegheny, Beaver, Butler, Westmoreland, and Washington. However, some areas of review were expanded beyond Western Pennsylvania when initial findings indicated the activities appeared to occur throughout Pennsylvania.
In order to obtain a thorough perspective on MetLife's marketing practices, the examination was conducted in three (3) phases:
(1) MetLife's Johnstown, Pennsylvania office was visited by examiners to review copies of requested applications and consumer complaint files, as well as securing additional data relative to the examination.
(2) Interviews were conducted with various consumers, agents and MetLife employees in Western Pennsylvania concerning MetLife marketing practices and procedures.
(3) Interviews were conducted with principal MetLife corporate officials having management or supervisory responsibilities for the insurer's marketing and sales operations.
Pennsylvania Report at 4-5.
The investigation stemmed from complaints made in March 1993 that MetLife customers had been induced through misrepresentations to replace existing MetLife policies, thereby incurring additional costs and fees. Id. at 8. There also were customer allegations of deceptive marketing of insurance policies as retirement and savings plans. Id. The report details numerous interviews, and includes copies of the marketing materials utilized in several individual cases.
Defendant asserts that this report is "classic hearsay" which should not be admitted at trial. Plaintiff responds that the report may be admitted as an "official record" under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C). Rule 803(8)(C) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for "[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 803(8); see also, e.g., Goodman v. Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 293 F.3d 655, 669 n.10 (report of Legislative Budget and Finance Committee not inadmissible hearsay).
Defendant argues that Rule 803(8)(C) does not apply because there are several indicia of untrustworthiness in the Pennsylvania Report, including that: (1) MetLife was not given the benefit of a hearing before an impartial trier of fact; (2) there were no evidentiary rules; (3) none of the policyholders referred to in the report were subject to cross-examination; and (4) neither Plaintiff nor ...