The opinion of the court was delivered by: SYLVIA RAMBO, Senior District Judge
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 25-1). The parties have briefed the
issues, and the matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons
stated below, the court will grant the motion in part and deny it
Plaintiff Charles Dyche filed a Complaint on August 18, 2005.
(Doc. 1-1.) Plaintiff's Complaint asserted that Defendant Linda
Bonney, an employee of the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP"), in
concert with two John Doe Defendants, participated in a violation
of Plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff contended that while he was
applying for a trooper position with the PSP, Defendants
conducted an unwarranted polygraph examination that resulted in
Plaintiff admitting to a sexual tryst with a minor that occurred
12 years before. (Id. ¶¶ 12-15.) Plaintiff asserted that this
information was used to remove him from the PSP Academy, where
Plaintiff was training to be a trooper. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff
argued that because Defendants knew of the sexual tryst, yet still admitted Plaintiff to the Academy, their
subsequent removal of Plaintiff from the Academy without a
hearing was done in violation of his rights of privacy and due
process. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 20-21, 23.) Plaintiff's Complaint survived
a motion to dismiss. (See Doc. 13.)
After conducting discovery, Plaintiff filed for leave to amend
his Complaint on July 11, 2005, asserting that he obtained new
information through the discovery process. (Doc. 25-1.)
II. Applicable Legal Standards
Once a responsive pleading has been served, "a party may amend
the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Whether to grant or
deny the motion is within the court's discretion. Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 182 (1962). A court may deny a motion for leave
to amend if "(1) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay,
bad faith, or dilatory motives; (2) the amendment would be
futile; or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party."
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.
2003). Mere delay will not warrant the denial of a motion for
leave to amend "absent a concomitant showing of undue prejudice
or bad faith." Zygmuntowicz v. Hospitality Invs., Inc.,
151 F.R.D. 53, 55 (E.D. Pa. 1993). "Amendment of the complaint is
futile if the amendment would not cure the deficiency in the
original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a
motion to dismiss." Massarsky v. General Motors Corp.,
706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983). B. Motion to Dismiss
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
12(b)(6), the court is required to accept as true all of the
factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the face of the complaint.
Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir.
2003). "The complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient
facts if it adequately put[s] the defendant[s] on notice of the
essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action." Nami v.
Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). The court will not
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "unless it
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief."
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Port Auth. of New
York & New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir.
"To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only
the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to
the complaint and matters of public record." Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Additionally, the court may
consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant
attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's
claims are based on the [attached] document[s]." Id. Moreover,
"documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose
authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically
attached to the pleading may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).
However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in
making its decision. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien &
Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). Finally, in the Third Circuit, a court must grant leave to
amend before dismissing a complaint that is merely deficient.
See, e.g., Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 428 (3d Cir.
2001); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000).
"Dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on the
grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility."
Alston v. Parker, 336 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff proposes four additions to his Complaint.*fn1
First, Plaintiff asserts breach of contract claims against all
Defendants. Second, Plaintiff adds the PSP as a defendant. Third,
Plaintiff adds Barbara Christie, counsel to the PSP, as a
defendant. Fourth, Plaintiff adds Jeffrey Miller, Commissioner of
the PSP, as a defendant. The court will discuss each of the
proposed amendments in turn.
A. Breach of Contract Claims
In Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to
assert breach of contract claims against the PSP and all
individual defendants. Plaintiff contends that because Plaintiff
was admitted to the Academy even though Defendants knew of
Plaintiff's prior sexual encounter with the minor, Defendants
breached their contract with Plaintiff when they removed him from
the Academy weeks later. No employment contract existed between the PSP and Plaintiff.
Plaintiff was a probationary employee, and as such was not
covered by the PSP Member Collective Bargaining
Agreement.*fn2 The probationary nature of Plaintiff's
position negates the expectation Plaintiff might have had in
continued employment. See Blanding v. Pennsylvania State
Police, 12 F.3d 1303, 1307 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, absent
a showing that state law has created a legitimate expectation of
continued employment, a public employee is presumed to be an
at-will employee. Id.; Cooley v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance
Agency, 830 F.2d 469, 471 (3d ...