United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
November 18, 2005.
DAYVED WOODARD, Plaintiff,
PHB DIE CASTING, Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: SEAN McLAUGHLIN, District Judge
Presently pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by the Defendant, PHB Die Casting.
Plaintiff, Dayved Woodard ("Woodard" or "Plaintiff"), started
working at PHB Die Casting ("PHB" or "Defendant"), on February 9,
1998. Plaintiff, an African-American male, worked primarily as a
Die Cast Punch Operator at PHB's Fairview location. (Complaint ¶
5). Plaintiff remained at PHB through October 17, 2003.
Plaintiff contends that, throughout his four years working at
PHB, he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment.
Plaintiff recounts the following comments and incidents which
purportedly took place during his tenure at PHB in support of his
allegation of a racially hostile environment.
Woodard cites two incidents where a co-worker reported to him
that another co-worker had used the racially offensive term
"nigger." (Complaint ¶¶ 19, 21; Woodard Depo., Dkt. #21, Ex. 3,
pp. 33-40). Neither of these comments were made in the presence
of Woodard or any other minority employee. (Woodard Depo., pp.
33-34). Woodard further testified that he had never actually
overheard that word while working at PHB. (Id. at 39-40).
Woodard also describes an incident that occurred in 2000 where
he and another African-American employee, Jamal Shields, were
horsing around and laughing because Shields had hit Woodard with
a rubber band. After observing their horseplay, Jay Lewis, a PHB
employee, purportedly queried another employee, Al Cropeck, as to "who let
the monkeys out?" (Woodard Depo., pp. 42-44). Again, Woodard did
not actually hear the comment firsthand, but had it relayed to
him by Cropeck. (Id.)
Woodard testified that a fellow employee, Nick Hazenback, had
twice used the phrase, "you people," in Woodard's presence.
Sometime in 2000, Hazenback approached Woodard and asked him how
many children he had. When Woodard told Hazenback that he had two
daughters, Hazenback commented, "I thought you people had a lot
of kids." (Complaint ¶ 30; Woodard Depo., pp. 47-48). Although
Hazenback told Woodard that he "didn't mean anything by it,"
Hasenback apparently made the same "joke" about a year later
after having forgotten the prior exchange. (Woodard Depo., p.
48). Hazenback also made a comment in 2001 to the effect that
Woodard's stocking cap made him look like he was headed out to do
a "drive-by shooting." (Id. at 81).
Another PHB employee, Gordon Phillips, used the phrase "you
people" in a conversation with Plaintiff on Martin Luther King
Day in 2000. According to Woodard, Phillips expressed surprise
that Woodard had shown up for work that day, remarking that "I
thought it was a holiday for you people." (Id. at 49-50).
Later in 2000, Woodard asked a co-employee, Dave Turner, for a
bathroom break. Turner responded, "what do you need to do, go
handle one of your drug deals?" (Complaint ¶ 32; Woodard Depo., p
Woodard also recounts three incidents that took place between
himself and a PHB electrician, Bill Diehl. Woodard testified that
Diehl approached him in 1999 and asked, "what are you?" When
Woodard asked what he meant, Diehl rejoined, "well, you're too
light to be black, too dark to be white, what are you?" (Woodard
Depo., pp. 55-56). Later on, in 2001, Diehl encountered Woodard
while looking for an African-American female co-worker, Darlene
Jones, and said, "I'm looking for someone. You're the right
color, but the wrong sex." (Id. at 57). Finally, in early 2003,
Woodard was approached again by Diehl, who queried whether
Woodard knew where chitlins came from. When Woodard indicated no,
Diehl informed him that chitlins were "what the slaves were
allowed to have after the master made them slaughter the pigs."
(Id. at 54-55).
In addition to the aforementioned comments, Woodard testified
to once seeing a small graffiti of a "cross with a KKK" in one of
the bathrooms at PHB. (Complaint ¶ 27; Woodard Depo., p. 69). The image appeared to be drawn by means of a black ballpoint pen
and was approximately 2 inches by 3 inches high. (Id.) Woodard
testified that PHB removed the graffiti after Woodard complained
about it, but that it took several months for them to do so.
(Id. at 70-71).
In addition to his allegations of a hostile work environment,
Woodard asserts that, throughout his employment at PHB, he was
routinely assigned to "harder" jobs than white employees in his
position. Without citing specifics, Woodard contends that he
suffered disparate treatment in his job assignments, primarily by
being assigned to "the worst jobs within the workplace" and
"routine assignment to the most difficult machines." (Complaint ¶
9). Woodard further contends that, while he was assigned to the
"worst and most difficult jobs," Caucasian employees routinely
were assigned to "easier" jobs. (Complaint ¶ 11).
Woodard filed the underlying complaint on May 26, 2004. PHB
filed a motion for summary judgment on May 23, 2005, and Woodard
responded on June 26, 2005. PHB filed a reply on August 22, 2005,
and oral argument on the summary judgment motion was held on
September 12, 2005. This matter is ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In order to
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
[each] element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In evaluating whether the
non-moving party has established each necessary element, the
Court must grant all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
the non-moving party. Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410,
n. 4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). "Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a reasonable trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for
trial.'" Id. (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587).
III. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT Under Title VII and the PHRA it is unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any individual with respect to this
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. See Weston v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Dept. of Corrections, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3rd Cir. 2001),
citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).*fn1 To establish a claim
under Title VII based on an intimidating or offensive work
environment, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that he or she suffered
intentional discrimination because of race; (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination
would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same race
in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior
liability." See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp.,
85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3rd Cir. 1996). In employing this analysis a
court must evaluate the frequency of the conduct, its severity,
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Title VII is not violated by "[m]ere utterance of an . . .
epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" or by
mere "discourtesy or rudeness," unless so severe or pervasive as
to constitute an objective change in the conditions of
employment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
787 (1998) (citations omitted). Thus, "`simple teasing,' offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)" are
not actionable under Title VII. Id. at 788.
Because we find that Woodard has failed to present a triable
issue of fact with respect to elements two and four of the prima
facie case for a hostile environment claim, we shall confine our
A. Whether the discrimination was pervasive, regular and
We note at the outset that Title VII is not meant to be a
"general civility code for the workplace." Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). To be
actionable under Title VII, the harassment must be "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive work environment." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has made clear,
conduct "must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and
conditions of employment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
Harassment is pervasive and regular when "incidents of harassment
occur either in concert or with regularity." Andrews,
895 F.2d at 1484. Despite this high standard, however, the Third Circuit
has acknowledged that "the advent of more sophisticated and
subtle forms of discrimination requires that [courts] analyze the
aggregate effect of all evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom, including those concerning incidents of facially
neutral mistreatment, in evaluating a hostile work environment
claim." Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2001).
In Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2001), the
defendants subjected a Mexican-American plaintiff to ethnic
slurs, including referring to him as "the boy from the barrio"
and "mojado" (the Spanish word for "wetback"), dealt with
disagreements by asking if the plaintiff intended to pull out a
switchblade, wrote derogatory messages on the marker board in
plaintiff's cubicle, rounded the numbers on all other employee
evaluations upward while rounding the plaintiff's numbers
downward, disproportionally assigned other minorities and
trainees to the plaintiff's unit, gave him knowingly
contradictory instructions and impossible-to-perform tasks, and
referred to him as "an affirmative-action hire." Cardinas,
269 F.3d 259. The Third Circuit found those activities to be
sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile work
environment. Id. at 263. Similarly, in Aman v. Cort Furniture
Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074 (3rd Cir. 1996), the Court found
a hostile work environment where African-American employees were
referred to as "one of them" or "another one," told not to touch
or steal anything, made to do menial jobs, screamed at,
threatened with termination, had their time cards stolen, were
falsely accused of wrongdoing, had information necessary to their
jobs withheld, and were given conflicting orders. Additionally,
the employer's general manager had stated at a district meeting
that "the blacks were against the whites" and that if they did
not like it they could leave. Aman, 85 F.3d at 1082-84.
When judged against the above, the conduct here is patently
insufficient to satisfy the severity requirement of a hostile
environment claim. While the comments and conduct at issue here
were unprofessional and insensitive, courts have consistently required
a stronger showing of egregious conduct than that described by
Woodard. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Philadelphia Gas Works,
57 Fed. Appx. 68, 75-77 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding that alleged
incidents, including managers making comments that "the way [two
African-American employees] were eating at their desks, it must
be their culture," and that if such clerks did not do their work,
"I'm going to sit at their desks with a whip," were not
sufficiently severe and pervasive, even considering the comments
in conjunction with other facially neutral alleged mistreatment
of the employee); Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp.,
382 F.3d 869, 870 (8th Cir. 2004) (denying summary judgment where
plaintiff was subjected to six racially derogatory comments,
including use of the word "nigger" in his presence, and
particularly because plaintiff witnessed a physically threatening
graffiti depicting his name in conjunction with a burning cross
and a KKK sign, but noting that the decision to deny summary
judgment "is not altogether free from doubt," and that the facts
straddled the "cusp of submissibility."); Woodland v. Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding that "racist graffiti drawings of `KKK,' a swastika,
and a hooded figure" on the walls of the plant bathroom, a
racially derogatory "poem" strewn about the plant, and three
racially derogatory comments made about plaintiff (but out of his
presence) were "neither severe nor pervasive . . ."); Peters v.
Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535 (7th Cir.
2002) (finding that six incidents, including a reference to black
music as "wicka wicka woo music" by a supervisor, a bartender's
request to investigate an African-American guest who was
allegedly stealing coins from a fountain, other African-American
guests being denied additional ice and cups for a party, and one
use of the word "nigger" in plaintiffs presence, were not severe
or pervasive); Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th
Cir. 1994) (holding that two overtly racial remarks directed at
plaintiff, including use of the terms "nigger" and "KKK,"
distribution of an arguably racial cartoon, and general ridicule
and harassment were not severe or pervasive).
Unlike in the cases discussed above, Woodard's counsel admitted
that very few racially tinged comments were actually directed
towards Plaintiff in his presence. Woodard testified that he
never overheard a single use of the more offensive terms alleged,
"nigger" and "monkey":
Q: Just to make sure I understand then, the use of
the word nigger at PHB was not something concerning
which you had personal knowledge, but rather A: I never heard it.
Q: What you've told me is information provided by
(Woodard Depo., pp. 39-40). Counsel reiterated this point at oral
The Court: He also testified that he himself never
heard directly any racial slurs, is that correct?
Mr. Johnson: He never directly heard the word nigger.
He did he did hear different comments or phrases
that he took as racial or slurred.
The Court: So he never heard that term directed to
Mr. Johnson: That's correct.
(Hearing Transcript, 9/12/05, p. 14).
Indeed, the only comments Woodard directly overheard were the
comment about the drug deal, the comment about the drive-by
shooting, the comment about chitlins, and the two references to
"you people." Each of these remarks are tinged with racial
overtones and stereotypes and are undoubtedly offensive, but none
are egregiously severe. Woodard was not physically threatened or
humiliated. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (noting that
circumstances to consider "may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance."). Rather, the comments he endured were precisely
the type of "isolated incidents of racial enmity" that are not
actionable under Title VII. See Snell v. Suffolk County,
782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2nd Cir. 1986). Even coupled with the single
instance of racist graffiti observed by Woodard, they do not rise
to the level of severity displayed in Cardenas and Aman.
In addition to being qualitatively deficient, many of Woodard's
claims, including those that are the most egregious, consist of
hearsay statements that are unsupported by first-hand evidence.
Although incidents occurring outside of a plaintiff's presence
and not directed at him are relevant to a hostile environment
claim under the requisite totality of the circumstances analysis,
see Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 108-09 (2nd
Cir. 1997) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23), the Third Circuit
has held that "comments referring to other individuals that [are]
merely overheard by [plaintiff] are the sorts of `offhanded
comments and isolated incidents' that the Supreme Court . . . cautioned should not be considered severe or pervasive enough to
constitute a hostile work environment." Caver v. City of
Trenton, 2005 WL 2045715 (3rd Cir. 2005) (quoting
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788).
In sum, we conclude that Woodard has failed to come forward
with sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to
whether his "workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that [was] sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and
create an abusive working environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate on this basis.
B. Whether the discrimination would have detrimentally
affected a reasonable person of the same race in that position
We also find that Woodard has failed to raise a triable issue
of fact with respect to the fourth prong set forth in Aman,
namely, that the discrimination would have detrimentally affected
a reasonable person of the same race in his position. Aman,
85 F.3d at 1081. In considering whether the objective test is met,
we are directed to consider "all the circumstances," including
"the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see
also Abramson v. William Patterson College of New Jersey,
260 F.3d 265, 280 (3rd Cir. 2001).
As discussed above, the conduct at issue here was neither
frequent nor severe. The incidents described by Woodard, even
assuming that they were indeed racially motivated, are
insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the work
environment here would have been hostile from the "standpoint of
a reasonable person." Consequently, summary judgment is
appropriate on this alternative ground.
IV. DISPARATE TREATMENT
Assertions of disparate treatment are governed by the
burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Thus, Woodard bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506
(1993). To establish his prima facie case, Woodard must
demonstrate that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was
qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse
employment action despite being qualified; and (4) the
circumstances of the adverse employment action create an inference of discrimination. See
Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797
(3rd Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802).
When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employer's
allegedly adverse action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff then must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's
proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination, and
not the real motivation for the unfavorable job action. Id. at
Woodard, an African-American, is a member of a protected class.
Moreover, it is not disputed that Woodard was qualified for his
position as a DCPO at PHB. Woodard's claim fails, however,
because he had not raised a triable issue of fact as to whether
he was subjected to an adverse employment action creating an
inference of discrimination.
The Supreme Court has defined an adverse employment action as:
A tangible employment action consists of a
significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits . . .
A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts
direct economic harm.
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62
(1998). Such an action must be "serious and tangible enough to
alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment." Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
390 F.3d 760, 764 (3rd Cir. 2004) (quoting Cardenas,
269 F.3d at 263).
Loss of money or benefits is not required in order for a change
in an employee's working conditions to constitute an adverse
action; rather, an adverse employment action might consist of
changes in location, duties, perks, or other basic aspects of the
job. Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 787
(3rd Cir. 1998) (citing Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692,
703 (7th Cir. 1987)). Thus, courts have consistently held
that "discriminatory assignments, undermining of work conditions
and harassment are exactly the kind of actions that Title VII was
designed to prevent." See Ferrell v. Harvard Industries,
Inc., 2001 WL 1301461, *20 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Mondzelewski,
162 F.3d at 787 (meat factory worker's reassignment to a shift
leaving him less free time and requiring him to work Saturday
evenings was sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the terms, conditions and privileges of his job were altered in
retaliation for discrimination complaint); Hampton v. Borough of
Tinton Falls Police Dep't, 98 F.3d 107, 116 (3rd Cir. 1996)
(under Title VII, appointment to undesirable police assignment
sufficient to withstand summary judgment on retaliation claim);
Collins, 830 F.2d at 703 (under Title VII, "adverse action"
does not require loss of money or benefits but rather may consist
of changes in location, duties, perks, or other basic aspects of
Here, Woodard asserts that he "has consistently been subjected
to disparate treatment based upon his race in the form of
assignment to the worst jobs within the workplace and . . .
routine assignment to the most difficult machines . . .".
(Complaint ¶ 9). Woodard further alleges that Caucasian employees
were assigned to much easier jobs. (Complaint ¶ 11). In the
abstract, this allegation of racial bias in the assignment of
workplace tasks sufficiently implicates the "terms, conditions
and privileges of his job" so as to be cognizable under Title
VII. See, e.g., Mondzelewski, 162 F.3d at 787. Nonetheless,
Woodard's claim fails because he has not produced sufficient
evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he was
assigned to "more difficult" jobs than white employees at
In response to Woodard's allegations, PHB has presented a
spreadsheet report identifying each job and machine operated by
Woodard throughout his employment at PHB. PHB's report also
identifies, by name and race, the other employees who ran the
same job and machine during shifts before and after Woodard.
(Affidavit of Catherine Bernard, Dkt. #25, Ex 2, Woodard Job
Activity Report). The results of the report demonstrate that
white employees at PHB were assigned to the same jobs and
machines as Woodard during shifts preceding and following
Woodard's shift. (Bernard Affidavit, ¶¶ 2-9). Moreover, PHB has
provided affidavits asserting that job assignments at PHB were
made on a random basis without regard to race, and that most
incidents where an employee worked the same machine more
frequently than other employees resulted from temporary
production needs, customer priorities, or an employee's expertise
and training on an individual machine. (Phillips Affidavit ¶¶
16-17; Sayers Affidavit ¶¶ 13-18). Woodard argues that PHB's spreadsheet fails to account for
several factors that impact on the difficulty of a job assignment
beyond simply the machine that is used. These include the size of
the parts being placed in the machine, the composition of those
parts, and the cycle time of the machine. (Woodard Depo. I, pp.
69-71). Be that as it may, Woodard offers no evidence that white
employees who worked on the same machines had the luxury of
machining parts that were lighter and less cumbersome over a
longer period of time.
Moreover, even if Woodard could demonstrate that he was
routinely assigned to more difficult jobs than his co-workers,
his testimony indicates that any such disparity resulted from an
incident between Woodard and his supervisor, rather than because
of his race. Woodard testified that his assignment to more
difficult jobs "started after an incident with Ron Sayers."
(Woodard Depo., p. 82). According to Woodard, Rex Ryan, a PHB
supervisor, had asked Woodard to come in for a Saturday shift.
Due to an apparent mis-communication between Ryan and Sayers,
Sayers, who was not expecting Woodard to come in that Saturday,
ordered him to go home. (Id.) Although Woodard complied with
Sayers' order to go home, PHB later investigated the incident and
paid him for the time he spent at work that Saturday. (Id.)
Woodard testified that this incident provoked Sayers to assign
him to difficult jobs:
[F]rom there on, you know, I just felt like, you
know, Ron had it out for me. I'm not sure if he got
in trouble for sending me home or what. But from
there on I felt like he had it out for me. And he was
putting me on, you know, the worst jobs he could here
(Woodard Depo., pp. 82-83).
Moreover, Woodard testified that Sayers would "take care of"
Jamal Shields, an African-American, by giving him easier jobs and
assignments. (Woodard Depo., p. 97). Sayers allegedly urged
Woodard to be more like Shields. (Id.) While this supports the
inference that Sayers may indeed have "had it out for" Woodard,
it does nothing to ascribe any racial animus to the
In sum, Woodard has not raised a triable issue of fact as to
whether he was assigned to difficult jobs more frequently than
his white employees. As such, he cannot make out a prima facie
case of disparate treatment and summary judgment is appropriate.
VI. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
To sustain a constructive discharge claim, a Plaintiff must
prove that his employer knowingly engaged in conduct which foreseeably resulted in working
conditions so intolerable or unpleasant that a reasonable person
in the employee's position would resign. See Durham Life Ins.
Co. v. Evans, 165 F.3d 139, 155 (3rd Cir. 1999); Aman,
85 F.3d at 1085. Summary judgment is appropriate if a trier of fact
could not reasonably conclude that a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Hopson v.
Dollar Bank, 994 F.Supp. 332, 340 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
As noted above, Woodard's allegations fall short of
demonstrating that a hostile working environment existed at PHB.
Thus, Plaintiff cannot establsih the necessary factual predicate
for a constructive discharge claim. See Konstantopoulos v.
Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 718-719 (3rd Cir. 1997) ("In
light of our conclusion that no hostile work environment existed
. . ., [plaintiff] cannot show the necessary predicate to
maintain a constructive discharge claim, specifically, that there
were `conditions of discrimination' so intolerable that a
reasonable person would have resigned."); Greb v. Potter, 2005
WL 1387649, *10 (D.N.J. 2005) ("[T]he Third Circuit [has]
intimated that if a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a hostile work
environment claim, the plaintiff will likewise fail to establish
the necessary predicate for a constructive discharge claim.").
VI. PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT
Claims of race discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act, 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 951 et seq., are analyzed under
the same framework as a Title VII claim, "as Pennsylvania courts
have construed the protection of the two acts interchangeably."
Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 n. 3 (3rd Cir.
2001); see also Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc.,
228 F.3d 313, 317 (3rd Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII and
PHRA discrimination analyses are identical). Accordingly, for the
reasons discussed supra, summary judgment is also granted as to
Woodard's PHRA claim.
For the foregoing reasons, PHB's motion for summary judgment is
granted. An appropriate Order follows.
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