United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
November 10, 2005.
HOWARD G. CLAIR, RALPH S. WEAVER, and CAROL S. PINTEK, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
ANTHONY J. DeLUCA, HARRY J. SOOSE, FRANCIS J. HARVEY, JAMES C. McGILL, RICHARD W. POGUE, DANIEL A. D'ANIELLO, PHILIP B. DOLAN, E. MARTIN GIBSON, ROBERT F. PUGLIESE, JAMES DAVID WATKINS, and THE CARLYLE GROUP, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAM STANDISH, Senior District Judge
Pending before the Court is a Motion by Albert and Barbara
Glover ("the Glover Plaintiffs" or "the Glovers"), seeking to
become the lead plaintiff in this securities class action.
(Docket No. 25.) For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is
denied without prejudice.
A. Factual History
The facts of this case are largely irrelevant to the decision
herein and will not be reiterated in detail. Briefly stated,
Howard G. Clair, Ralph S. Weaver, and Carol S. Pintek ("Plaintiffs") filed an action on behalf of themselves and other
investors similarly situated against the "Individual
Defendants"*fn2 and The Carlyle Group*fn3
(collectively, "Defendants"), claiming that Defendants' actions
on behalf of IT Group, Inc., violated federal securities law. IT
Group, Inc. ("IT" or "the Company"), was an environmental waste
remediation firm based in Monroeville, Pennsylvania. The Carlyle
Group acquired control of IT in November 1996 and, at
approximately the same time, the Company expanded rapidly by
acquiring other firms who performed similar services. Plaintiffs
claim that by the end of 2001, Defendants had made a number of
poor financial and management decisions which, inter alia,
resulted in liquidity problems and violation of the company's
highly lucrative government contracts. IT declared bankruptcy on
January 15, 2002.
During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, Plaintiffs
learned that Defendants had consistently misrepresented IT's
financial condition and results in annual and quarter filings
made with the Securities and Exchange Commission, press releases,
and other statements disseminated to the investing public. As a
result, Plaintiffs and other investors were damaged when they purchased IT common stock at artificially inflated prices during
the Class Period.*fn4 Plaintiffs did not learn of
Defendants' fraudulent activities until March and April 2002 when
the relevant documents were published in the bankruptcy
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed suit on February 27, 2003, alleging (1) that
Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to investors by making
false and misleading statements; (2) that by preparing and
issuing public statements containing misrepresentations and
omissions which induced Plaintiffs and members of the class to
purchase IT common stock at artificially inflated prices, the
Individual Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("the Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and
78(n) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, promulgated
thereunder; and (3) that Defendants caused the Company to engage
in the illegal conduct and practices described above inasmuch as
they were "controlling persons" of IT Group as that term is
defined in Section 20(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
On May 18, 2003, Plaintiffs published a notice of the pending
private securities class action pursuant to Section 21D(a)(3)(B)
of the Act as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "Reform Act.")*fn5 (See
Docket No. 17, Exhibit A.) On July 7, 2003, Albert and Barbara
Glover moved for approval as lead plaintiff, approval of Glancy
Binkow & Goldberg, LLP, and Miller Shea, PC, as Co-Lead Counsel,
and approval of Chimicles & Tikellis, LLP, as Liaison Counsel for
the Class. (Docket No. 15.) Defendants opposed this motion,
claiming that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Reform Act
requirement that the early notice be published not more than 20
days after the complaint was filed and that any motion seeking
appointment as lead plaintiff be filed within 60 days thereafter.
(Docket No. 19.) Plaintiffs responded that such notice was not
required in light of the relationship between this case and
Payne v. DeLuca, CA 02-1927,*fn6 and their reasonable
assumption that this case would be consolidated with Payne. (Docket No. 21.) When
Defendants refused to consolidate the cases "for tactical
reasons," Plaintiffs provided the additional notice "out of an
abundance of caution," albeit beyond the 20 day publication
period. (Id. at 1.)
In considering the motion by the Glover Plaintiffs, the Court
found that although no additional notice was required, given the
timely notice provided in the Payne action and the fact that
the allegations in the two cases were substantially the
same,*fn7 Plaintiffs herein could not rely on the Payne
notice because a motion to dismiss had been granted in that case.
(Memorandum and Order of December 16, 2004, Docket No. 24,
"December 16 Order," at 4-5.) Moreover, we agreed with Defendants
that the notice filed in this action failed to conform with the
requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3). Plaintiffs were directed
to re-publish notice and renew their motion for appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel.
On March 18, 2005, the Glover Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion
for appointment to act as lead plaintiff and for the same firms
to serve as co-lead counsel and liaison counsel. ("Motion,"
Docket No. 25.) They*fn8 indicated that on January 20, 2005,
they published a revised notice of this action on "Primezone," a
"widely circulated national business-oriented wire service."
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of the
Glover Plaintiffs for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and for
Approval of Lead Plaintiff's Selection of Co-Lead Counsel, Docket
No. 26, "Plfs.' Memo," at 5.) No other members of the putative
class responded to the republished notice by seeking to be
appointed lead plaintiff, and no class member has opposed the
Glover Plaintiffs' Motion.
Defendants oppose the Motion, however, arguing that once again,
Plaintiffs failed to publish notice of the class action within
the 20 days mandated by the Reform Act and that the Glover
Plaintiffs failed to file the motion for lead plaintiff status
within 80 days of the December 16 Order permitting them to do so. (Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Glover Plaintiffs' Motion
for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and Approval of Lead
Plaintiff's Selection of Co-Lead Counsel, Docket No. 30, "Defs.'
Opp.," at 5-6.) Defendants further argue that the Glover
Plaintiffs do not satisfy the requirements for acting as lead
plaintiffs that are set out in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii).
(Id. at 7-9.) We address each of these objections in turn.
A. Timeliness of the Notice and the Glover Plaintiffs' Motion
The timeliness of the Glover Plaintiffs' Motion is easily and
quickly addressed. The Motion was filed on March 18, 2005, that
is, 57 days after publication of the second notice on January 20,
2005, and 92 days after the December 16 Order. A plain reading of
the notice provision ties the date for filing a motion for lead
plaintiff status only to the publication of the notice. According
to § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(II), a motion to serve as lead plaintiff must
be filed "not later than 60 days after the date on which the
notice is published." Assuming for the sake of argument that
Defendants are correct in their position that the December 16
Order was the triggering event for publication of the notice,
that date is irrelevant to the calculation of the date on which
the Motion had to be filed. For example, had the notice been
published on December 19, 2004, the motion would have been timely
if it were filed on or before February 17, 2005 (60 days after
the notice), but not if it were filed on February 19, 2005, even though the latter date is only 62 days after the triggering
In response to Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs failed to
publish the notice itself within the time prescribed, the Glover
Plaintiffs contend that the December 16 Order did not set a
specific deadline for publication and that they therefore were
"expected to act reasonably," which they did. (Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion of the Glover Plaintiffs for
Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and for Approval of Their Selection
of Co-Lead Counsel, Docket No. 33, "Plfs.' Reply," at 2; 4.)
Relying on a reference in the December 16 Order to In re Lucent
Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 2000),*fn9
and the fact that the court therein ordered a revised notice to
be published within 37 days of its decision that the first notice
was inadequate, they contend the 20-day period need not be
strictly enforced when a plaintiff is required to re-publish the
notice. Therefore, they assert that they complied with the intent
of the December 16 Order even though the notice was not filed
until 35 days thereafter. (Plfs.' Reply at 4.)
In the December 16 Order, the Court determined that the initial
notice did not provide the detail necessary to comply with the
requirements of 15 U.S.C. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3). This was also the finding of the court in Lucent. However, unlike
the court in that case, we did not require Plaintiffs to submit a
proposed draft of the notice for review before re-publication. In
an order dated April 26, 2000, the Lucent court required
plaintiffs' counsel to submit a revised notice to the court and
the defendants for comment by May 12, 2000. Counsel for the
defendants were then given ten days to comment on the proposed
draft and the plaintiffs were directed to publish the second
notice not later than June 2, 2000. Lucent, 194 F.R.D. at 148.
The thirty-seven day period granted by the Lucent court thus
anticipated an interim step which the December 16 Order did not
the time necessary for comment and correction. We find the Glover
Plaintiffs' reliance on our single reference to Lucent and the
assumption that a 35-day period in which to republish their
notice was therefore "reasonable" to be somewhat overreaching in
light of the clear distinction between the two cases.
We simply directed Plaintiffs to publish a revised notice "in
accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)." (December 16 Order at
5.) The parties have identified and cited numerous cases which
address a potential lead plaintiff's failure to comply with the
second clause of 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) requiring that
motions to serve as lead plaintiff be filed "not later than 60 days after the date on which the notice is published."*fn10
However, there appears to be a dearth of published opinions
dealing with the failure of plaintiffs to comply with the
introductory clause of the statute, i.e., that "not later than 20
days after the date on which the complaint is filed, the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall cause to be published . . . a
notice advising members of the purported plaintiff class (I) of
the pendency of the action, the claims asserted therein, and the
purported class period." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i).
With little guidance from the parties, the Court has
independently researched the case law on the 20-day notice period
and discovered only one relevant case. In Century Community
Church of God v. Ent & Imler CPA Group, the plaintiff, CCC, did
not publish the required notice twenty days or less after filing
the amended complaint in which CCC joined the case as a
plaintiff, but rather within 20 days after the court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss that amended complaint almost a
year later. The first notice provided an erroneous case number
and CCC was compelled to publish a corrected notice nine days
later. "CCC v. E&I," CA No. 03-0678, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8679, *7-*8 (S.D. Ind., May 9, 2005). As here, the defendant
argued that CCC's motion to be appointed lead plaintiff should be
denied because the notice was filed out of time, even though
there were no other candidates for lead plaintiff.
The court concluded that E&I had not shown "substantial
prejudice to potential class members" as a result of the late
notice and pointed out that "[t]his is not a case where other
investors and attorneys are lining up to carry the burden and to
seek the potential rewards of class representation." Id. at *9. Moreover, while refusing to permit CCC to represent the potential
class "would stymie the class action entirely" and thereby serve
E&I's interests, such a drastic measure was not required by
statute and would "run directly contrary to the purpose of the
notice and lead plaintiff provisions of the [Reform Act]" that
is, "to protect the interests of a plaintiff class of investors
by inviting competition to ensure that the best available class
representative takes the lead." Id. at *9-*10. The court found
CCC adequate to serve as lead plaintiff and concluded that in the
absence of "other applicants for the lead plaintiff role, and in
the absence of a showing of substantial harm to other investors'
interests, CCC's late publication of the notice [did] not
disqualify it from serving as lead plaintiff." Id. at *10.
Both parties agree that barring special circumstances
identified by the court, failure to file a motion to serve as
lead plaintiff within the mandatory 60-day period is fatal to
such a claim. See, e.g., cases cited in footnote 10. Although
by referring to the section of the Reform Act which establishes
the time frame for publication and filing we expected Plaintiffs
to republish notice within 20 days of the December 16 Order,
because we were less than explicit about that expectation, we
will not hold them strictly to the statutory requirement. Thus,
we conclude that lateness of the notice alone does not preclude
consideration of the Glovers' motion for lead plaintiff status. B. Suitability of Albert and Barbara Glover to Act as Lead
In passing the Reform Act, Congress intended "to ensure more
effective representation of investors in securities fraud class
actions by transferring control of the litigation from attorneys
to investors," in part to alleviate the perception that such
actions had become largely attorney-driven. Lucent,
194 F.R.D. at 144, citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 730-734. Therefore, the Reform Act
provides that upon motion of a member of the purported class in
response to the notice of a pending securities fraud class
action,*fn11 the court is to "appoint as lead plaintiff the
member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court
determines to be most capable of adequately representing the
interests of class members," a role referred to as "the most
adequate plaintiff." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
Because one of the goals of the Reform Act was to encourage shareholders with significant holdings rather than professional
plaintiffs to exercise control over the selection and actions of
counsel (Lucent, id.), the statute establishes a rebuttable
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff (1) "either filed
the complaint or made a motion in response to a notice;" (2) has
"the largest financial interest" in the relief sought by the
class as determined by the court; and (3) satisfies the
requirements set forth in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). "A district court
must exercise exceptional care to insure [sic] that in applying
the lead plaintiff provisions of the statute, the concerns that
motivated Congress are carefully heeded, as the determination of
lead plaintiff by the district court is, with probably little
exception, not immediately subject to review." Burke v.
Ruttenberg, 102 F. Supp.2d 1280, 1309 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
As one court has pointed out, multiple class members may
satisfy the first and third requirements of
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii). "The second factor, however, is exclusive;
there may be only one person with the largest financial stake in
the litigation." In re Microstrategy Sec. Litig.,
110 F. Supp.2d 427, 433 n. 11 (E.D. Va. 2000). There is no question that
the Glover Plaintiffs satisfy the first criterion; they filed a motion*fn12 for lead plaintiff status in response to the
first untimely, inadequate notice and again in response to the
In determining if a proposed lead plaintiff satisfies the third
criterion, the court need not conduct a full investigation and
analysis of the four prongs of Rule 23, generally referred to as
numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy. In evaluating
the suitability of a proposed lead plaintiff, "the court's
initial inquiry should be confined to determining whether [the]
movants have stated a prima facie case of typicality and
adequacy," as required by Rule 23. In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,
264 F.3d 201, 264 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Mark
v. Cal. Pub. Emple. Ret. Sys., 535 U.S. 929 (2002).
According to the certifications provided with the Motion,
Albert and Barbara Glover, like other members of the putative
class, purchased shares of IT stock during the Class Period. (Declaration of Lionel Z. Glancy in Support of Motion, Docket No.
27, "Glancy Decl.," Exh. B.) The Complaint asserts that class
members were damaged because the price of the stock was inflated
as a result of Defendants' false and misleading representations.
(Complaint, ¶¶ 284-287.) The Glovers' claims thus appear to be
typical in that they "arise from the same course of events," and
there is no reason to believe their legal arguments will not be
the same as those of other class members in establishing
Defendants' liability. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3); see also
Lucent, 194 F.R.D. at 149-51. Because there is nothing to show
that the Glovers' "factual or legal stance is not characteristic
of that of other class members" (Lucent, id. at 150, internal
quotation omitted), they appear, at this point, to satisfy the
prima facie requirements of the typicality prong of Rule 23.
A putative lead plaintiff satisfies the adequacy requirement
prong if he or she "will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). For purposes
of the lead plaintiff determination, adequacy "is contingent upon
both the existence of common interests among the proposed lead
plaintiff and the class, and a willingness on the part of the
proposed lead plaintiff to vigorously prosecute the action."
Lucent, 194 F.R.D. at 151. Unlike the typicality analysis which
may be based on a mere comparison of the would-be lead
plaintiff's claims vis-a-vis the allegations in the complaint, the adequacy analysis "presents an inquiry that
reaches beyond the factual allegations and legal theories of a
complaint." Lucent, id.
The problem here is that the Glover Plaintiffs have provided
absolutely no information about themselves beyond the
certifications which are required by law. See
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(i)-(vi). In those certifications, they assert that
they are willing to testify at deposition and trial if necessary,
have not served as a class representative in a securities
litigation action during the preceding three years, and will not
accept supplemental payment except as approved by the court for
reasonable costs and expenses directly related to lead plaintiff
status. (Glancy Decl., Exh. B, ¶¶ 3, 5, and 6.) They further
assert that they have "demonstrated their adequacy" by "evincing
a strong desire to prosecute these actions on behalf of the Class
and have shown that they are willing and able to take an active
role in and control the litigation and to protect the interests
of absentees." (Plfs.' Memo at 9.)
In enacting the lead plaintiff provisions of the Reform Act,
Congress intended that courts would appoint "the most
sophisticated investor available and willing to serve in a
putative securities class action," that is, "an investor capable
of understanding and controlling the litigation." Berger v.
Compaq Computer Corp., 279 F.3d 313, 313 (5th Cir. 2002). The consequence of this expectation is that the lead plaintiff in a
large private securities class action case is generally, but not
necessarily, a large institutional investor rather than an
individual. "The two principal responsibilities assumed by a lead
plaintiff are: (1) monitor the conduct of class counsel, and (2)
decide whether and when the case should be settled or taken to
trial." In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 481 (N.D.
Cal. 2001). A lead plaintiff also has a fiduciary duty to
identify and retain competent counsel and to negotiate a
reasonable attorney's fee for the class. Id. at 482.
We recognize that at this point in the litigation it would be
inappropriate to conduct an in-depth analysis of the Glovers'
adequacy; rather, such an inquiry properly takes place at the
point of class certification. Lucent, 194 F.R.D. at 149.
However, without disparaging the Glovers personally, there is no
evidence that they are the type of sophisticated investor who can
control a multi-million dollar class action. Compare, for
instance, In re Baan Co. Secs., CA 98-2465, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27875, *13-*14 (D.D.C. July 19, 2002), where the court,
while recognizing "the inherent difficulties in having
non-institutional investors as lead plaintiffs," nevertheless
appointed three individuals based on their personal declarations
that they understood they "must act as final decision-makers in
the litigation," had been in regular communication with counsel, and were prepared to do whatever was necessary to recover their
sizeable loss; Microstrategy, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 438, n. 28, in
which an individual investor seeking lead plaintiff status
submitted an affidavit providing information that supported both
his desire and his ability to undertake that task, i.e., he was
responsible for managing his family's savings, followed his
investments on a daily basis, contacted counsel on his own, and
was pursuing lead plaintiff status to protect his investment and
recover as much as he could for himself and other investors; or
Tanne v. Autobytel, Inc., 226 F.R.D. 659, 668 (C.D. Cal. 2005),
in which a lead plaintiff candidate filed a declaration stating
that he would accept the responsibilities of serving as a
representative party on behalf of the class, was comfortable
overseeing large projects and meeting deadlines by virtue of his
education and experience, communicated with his attorneys via
telephone or e-mail on an almost-weekly basis, and was prepared
to attend out-of-town court proceedings when necessary.
Here, the Court is presented only with a representation in the
Glover Plaintiffs' memorandum that they are "extremely motivated"
to pursue this action. This motivation stems from (1) the fact
that they made the Motion, and (2) their alleged "significant
losses" from their investment. (Plfs.' Memo at 9.) While we do
not dispute that their alleged loss was a significant percentage
of their investment, that point is more pertinent to determination of their status as having the greatest financial
interest. Simply making a motion for lead plaintiff status, taken
alone, establishes nothing about the movant's adequacy to take on
this burdensome task.
Since there is no declaration to support this alleged "strong
desire" and no evidence of their ability to "take an active role"
and "control the litigation," we view these assertions somewhat
skeptically. We know nothing about the Glover Plaintiffs'
understanding of their role and responsibilities as lead
plaintiff, their commitment to pursue vigorously litigation that
is liable to extend for years, or their experience directing
counsel. In sum, we cannot, on the record as it now stands,
determine if the Glovers satisfy the adequacy prong of Rule
Moving to the third criterion, we view with even more
skepticism the Glovers' assertion that they are the "person or
group of persons that . . . [have] the largest financial interest
in the relief sought by the class."
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii). Nothing in the Reform Act explains how a
court is to determine if a candidate for lead plaintiff status
meets the financial interest criterion. Courts have typically
made this determination in one of three ways: "(1) the number of
shares that the movant purchased during the putative class
period; (2) the total net funds expended by the plaintiffs during the class period; and (3) the approximate losses suffered by the
plaintiffs." Cedent, 264 F.3d at 262, adopting a test
established in Lax v. First Merch. Acceptance Corp., CA No.
97-C-2715, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866, *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11,
Jointly, the Glovers own 8,500 shares of IT Group common stock
purchased in September and October 1999.*fn13 Their total
investment was $81,199.69. They did not sell any shares, but
claim to have suffered a loss of $23,866.34, "based on the
average close price of IT Group common stock during the 90-day
period beginning February 23, 2000, and ending May 23, 2000."
(Glancy Decl., Exh. C.) No explanation is provided as to why the
loss is calculated as of this period, which is almost two years
before the Company declared bankruptcy.
According to the Complaint, on November 1, 2001, there were
21,971,829 shares of IT Group outstanding and actively traded on
the New York Stock Exchange. (Complaint, ¶ 51.) At that point,
the Glovers owned less than one-half of one percent of the
shares, i.e., 00.0387%. The Company's market capitalization at
that time was $368 million. (Id., ¶ 56.c.) The Glover
investment represented just over two-tenths of one percent of
that amount. There is no question they suffered a significant loss, i.e., 29.4% of their investment. Although they state in
their memorandum that to the best of their knowledge, they
"believe that they have the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the Class in this case" (Plfs.' Memo at 7),
there is no sworn affidavit to support this statement nor do they
provide any basis for this speculation. Again, based on the
record as it now stands, the Court cannot determine if the
Glovers have the largest financial interest of all the purported
thousands of class members.
A court is under no obligation to accept a proposed lead
plaintiff merely because his or her appointment is unopposed by
other members of the putative class. Lucent, 194 F.R.D. at 152.
Moreover, "a district court would be well within its discretion
in . . . seeking further information if it deems the original
submissions to be an inadequate basis for an informed decision."
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 262. We wish to be entirely clear that we
are not rejecting the Glover Plaintiffs as lead plaintiff in this
matter, only that we do not believe they have made an adequate
showing at this point that they are the most adequate plaintiff.
This case provides what appears to be a unique situation. If we
reject outright the Glovers' motion to be named lead plaintiff,
the putative class members are left without any viable plaintiff.
Although we have not directly addressed this issue on motion by
Defendants, it is obvious from the face of the Complaint and the certifications filed therewith that the
original Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the typicality requirement of
class representatives because none of them purchased his or her
stock in IT during the Class Period.*fn14 According to
Defendants, those three have "disappeared." (Defs.' Opp. at 3, n.
3.) Therefore, to maintain this litigation it appears that either
(1) the Glover Plaintiffs must cure the defects outlined herein,
or (2) an alternative lead plaintiff must be identified.
We are disinclined to require a third notice publication in the
hope of drawing out another lead plaintiff candidate. Although it
may seem unfair to Defendants to allow Plaintiffs yet one more
bite at the apple, the Court has an obligation to protect the
interests of the putative class members and therefore will
reconsider a final attempt by the Glover Plaintiffs (or other as
yet unidentified alternatives) to establish their credentials to
serve as lead plaintiff. In the interim, the Court will reserve
its consideration of the suitability of the Glover Plaintiffs' proposed co-lead and class liaison counsel. An
appropriate Order follows.
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