United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
November 3, 2005.
CARI GOODWINE, Plaintiff,
PHB DIE CASTING, Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: SEAN McLAUGHLIN, District Judge
Presently pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by the Defendant, PHB Die Casting.
Plaintiff, Cari Goodwine ("Goodwine" or "Plaintiff"), started
working at PHB Die Casting ("PHB" or "Defendant"), on March 6,
2000. (Complaint ¶ 5). Plaintiff, an African-American male,
worked primarily as a Die Cast Punch Operator at PHB's Fairview
location. (Complaint ¶ 6). Plaintiff remained at PHB through
In or around February 2003, Plaintiff's supervisor, Gary
Gebhart, directed Plaintiff to undertake a workplace task that
Plaintiff was not qualified to perform. Plaintiff objected and
summoned another supervisor, Ron Sayers, who informed Gebhart
that Plaintiff lacked the requisite training to accomplish the
task. According to a white PHB employee, Rob Tolhurst, Gebhart
then made the comment, "We have to make them work harder." This
comment was not made in Goodwine's presence, but was relayed to
him by Tolhurst. (Goodwine Depo. I (1/29/05), Dkt. #27, Exhibit
1, p. 54). Goodwine attributes racial connotations to the remark,
interpreting it to mean that Gebhart felt that the white
employees ("we") had to make the black employees ("them") work
harder. (Goodwine Depo. I, pp. 56-59, 60-62; Complaint ¶ 14).
Goodwine reported the comment to Sayers who advised Goodwine that
he would look into it. Sayers returned in less than an hour and
advised Goodwine that he had arranged a meeting between Goodwine,
Gebhardt, Tollhurst, Sayers and a union steward. (Goodwine Depo.
I, pp. 56-57). At the meeting, Gebhardt stated that he did not recall making
the comment, but that, whatever he said, he did not intend it to
be racial in nature. Gebhardt attempted to apologize to Goodwine
and offered his hand, but Goodwine refused to shake his hand and
rejected the apology. (Goodwine Depo. I, pp. 57-58). Goodwine
indicated that he did not feel the apology was sincere. (Id.)
After the meeting, Ben Hancock, PHB's Manager of Human Resources,
met with Gebhardt and advised him to be more considerate in his
comments and sensitive to how others might perceive them. Hancock
also ordered Gebhardt to attend a diversity training class at
Edinboro University. (Hancock Affidavit, ¶¶ 12-14). Gebhardt
enrolled in the course, but Edinboro University later cancelled
it due to insufficient enrollment. (Id.)
After Goodwine complained about Gebhardt, another incident
occurred involving Goodwine. Goodwine's machine had
malfunctioned, so Goodwine and Ron Sharp, a process control
technician, worked on the valves in an attempt to repair it. At
some point, while Goodwine was away getting a drink of water, a
joke was shared between Supervisor Gordon Phillips and another
employee, Jay Lewis, to the effect that they should open the
valve and spray Goodwine with water to see how fast he could run.
(Goodwine Depo. I, pp. 76-78). Sharp informed Goodwine of
Phillips' comment when Goodwine returned from the water fountain
and inquired as to why everyone was laughing. (Id.) It is
undisputed that no one actually opened the valve or sprayed water
on Goodwine, and there is nothing in the record indicating that
Phillips' comment had anything to do with Goodwine's race.
Sometime in late 2003 or early 2004, while Goodwine was on
leave, a large hole was being excavated on the premises of PHB.
Maintenance Supervisor Bill Donnell, when asked as to the purpose
of the hole, allegedly responded with words to the effect that
"he would like to put Cari Goodwine in it." (Goodwine Depo. I.,
pp. 122-23; Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition, Dkt. #35, Ex. 2,
Henry Aff.). Goodwine was not present when the comment was made,
but it was relayed to him by another employee, James Henry.
(Id.) Goodwine testified that he did not feel the comment was
racially motivated; instead he attributed it to Phillips' anger
over Goodwine having asserted what Phillips believed to be a
frivolous EEOC claim against PHB. (Goodwine Depo. I, pp 123-24).
In addition to the aforementioned comments, Goodwine asserts
that he was constantly subjected to racial slurs from
co-employees and supervisors and to racist graffiti in the
workplace. Goodwine also suggests that he was subjected to a
hostile work environment because he was once made to "degrease shot monitors," a job that was apparently
distasteful to PHB employees. (Complaint, ¶ 39). Although
Goodwine alleges in his complaint that this job assignment
constitutes evidence of a racially hostile work environment, he
later admitted at deposition that the job assignment had nothing
to do with his race. (Goodwine Depo. I, pp. 133-135). Rather,
Goodwine asserts that Hancock required him to degrease the
monitors because he held a grudge against Goodwine for prevailing
in an unemployment compensation proceeding. (Goodwine Depo. II
(2/12/05), Dkt. #27, Exhibit 2, p. 34-35).
Finally, Goodwine also asserts that, throughout his employment
at PHB, he was routinely assigned to "harder" jobs than white
employees in his position. Without citing specifics, Goodwine
contends that he suffered disparate treatment in his job
assignments, primarily by being assigned to "the worst jobs
within the workplace" and "routine assignment to the most
difficult machines." (Complaint, ¶¶ 9-10). Goodwine contends that
assignment to the "difficult" machines occurred "three or four
times more often" than his white co-workers. (Id.)
Goodwine filed the underlying complaint on May 26, 2004. PHB
filed a motion for summary judgment on May 23, 2005, and Goodwine
responded on July 25, 2005. PHB filed a reply on August 11, 2005,
and oral argument on the summary judgment motion was held on
August 25, 2005. This matter is ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In order to
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
[each] element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In evaluating whether the
non-moving party has established each necessary element, the
Court must grant all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
the non-moving party. Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410,
n. 4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). "Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no
`genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting Matsushita,
475 U.S. at 587).
III. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
Under Title VII and the PHRA it is unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any individual with respect to this
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. See Weston v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Dept. of Corrections, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3rd Cir. 2001),
citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).*fn1 To establish a claim
under Title VII based on an intimidating or offensive work
environment, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that he or she suffered
intentional discrimination because of race; (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination
would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same race
in that position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior
liability." See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp.,
85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3rd Cir. 1996). In employing this analysis a
court must evaluate the frequency of the conduct, its severity,
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Title VII is not violated by "[m]ere utterance of an . . .
epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" or by
mere "discourtesy or rudeness," unless so severe or pervasive as
to constitute an objective change in the conditions of
employment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
787 (1998) (citations omitted). Thus, "`simple teasing,' offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)" are
not actionable under Title VII. Id. at 788.
Because we find that Goodwine has failed to present a triable
issue of fact with respect to elements two and four of the prima
facie case for a hostile environment claim, we shall confine our
analysis accordingly. A. Whether the discrimination was pervasive, regular and
We note at the outset that Title VII is not meant to be a
"general civility code for the workplace." Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). To be
actionable under Title VII, the harassment must be "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment and create an abusive work environment." Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has made
clear, conduct "must be extreme to amount to a change in the
terms and conditions of employment." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
Harassment is pervasive and regular when "incidents of harassment
occur either in concert or with regularity." Andrews,
895 F.2d at 1484. Despite this high standard, however, the Third Circuit
has acknowledged that "the advent of more sophisticated and
subtle forms of discrimination requires that [courts] analyze the
aggregate effect of all evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom, including those concerning incidents of facially
neutral mistreatment, in evaluating a hostile work environment
claim." Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2001).
In Cardenas, the defendants subjected a Mexican-American
plaintiff to ethnic slurs, including referring to him as "the boy
from the barrio" and "mojado" (the Spanish word for "wetback"),
dealt with disagreements by asking if the plaintiff intended to
pull out a switchblade, wrote derogatory messages on the marker
board in plaintiff's cubicle, rounded the numbers on all other
employee evaluations upward while rounding the plaintiff's
numbers downward, disproportionally assigned other minorities and
trainees to the plaintiff's unit, gave him knowingly
contradictory instructions and impossible-to-perform tasks, and
referred to him as "an affirmative-action hire." Cardinas,
269 F.3d 259. The Third Circuit found those activities to be
sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute a hostile work
environment. Id. at 263. Similarly, in Aman v. Cort Furniture
Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074 (3rd Cir. 1996), the Court found
a hostile work environment where African-American employees were
referred to as "one of them" or "another one," told not to touch
or steal anything, made to do menial jobs, screamed at,
threatened with termination, had their time cards stolen, were
falsely accused of wrongdoing, had information necessary to their
jobs withheld, and were given conflicting orders. Additionally,
the employer's general manager had stated at a district meeting
that "the blacks were against the whites" and that if they did
not like it they could leave. Aman, 85 F.3d at 1082-84.
We begin our analysis by noting that none of the three comments
nor the assignment to degrease monitors raise an inference of
racial animus on their face. Indeed, Goodwine himself
acknowledged that the comment by Donnell about putting Goodwine
"in the hole" and the assignment to degrease shot
monitors*fn2 had nothing to do with his race. See Goodwine
Depo. I, pp 123-24; Goodwine Depo. II, pp. 34-35.
Despite the ambiguity as to the remaining comments, we
recognize that "the advent of more sophisticated and subtle forms
of discrimination require that we analyze the aggregate effect
of all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, including
those concerning incidents of facially neutral mistreatment, in
evaluating a hostile environment claim." Cardenas,
269 F.3d 262. Thus, although we are hard pressed to divine a racial intent
behind Phillips' comment about opening the water valve on
Goodwine, we must view that incident, as well as the "we/them"
comment, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Even so,
Goodwine's showing here still falls appreciably short of the
severe and pervasive conduct described in Cardenas and Aman.
While the comments and conduct at issue here were unprofessional
and insensitive, courts have consistently required a stronger showing of egregious conduct than that described by
Goodwine. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Philadelphia Gas Works,
57 Fed. Appx. 68, 75-77 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding that alleged
incidents, including managers making comments that "the way[two
African-American employees] were eating at their desks, it must
be their culture," and that if such clerks did not do their work,
"I'm going to sit at their desks with a whip," were not
sufficiently severe and pervasive, even considering the comments
in conjunction with other facially neutral alleged mistreatment
of the employee); Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp.,
382 F.3d 869, 870 (8th Cir. 2004) (denying summary judgment where
plaintiff was subjected to six racially derogatory comments,
including use of the word "nigger" in his presence, and
particularly because plaintiff witnessed a physically threatening
graffiti depicting his name in conjunction with a burning cross
and a KKK sign, but noting that the decision to deny summary
judgment "is not altogether free from doubt," and that the facts
straddled the "cusp of submissibility."); Woodland v. Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding that "racist graffiti drawings of `KKK,' a swastika,
and a hooded figure" on the walls of the plant bathroom, a
racially derogatory "poem" strewn about the plant, and three
racially derogatory comments made about plaintiff (but out of his
presence) were "neither severe nor pervasive . . ."); Peters v.
Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535 (7th Cir.
2002) (finding that six incidents, including a reference to black
music as "wicka wicka woo music" by a supervisor, a bartender's
request to investigate an African-American guest who was
allegedly stealing coins from a fountain, other African-American
guests being denied additional ice and cups for a party, and one
use of the word "nigger" in plaintiffs presence, were not severe
or pervasive); Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th
Cir. 1994) (holding that two overtly racial remarks directed at
plaintiff, including use of the terms "nigger" and "KKK,"
distribution of an arguably racial cartoon, and general ridicule
and harassment were not severe or pervasive).
Unlike in the cases discussed above, the record here reflects
that Goodwine himself never heard any racial slurs in the
Q. Mr. Goodwine, am I correct that no one in your
presence during the course of your employment at PHB
ever used a racial slur?
A. In my presence?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. Meaning me hearing it directly? Q. Yes, sir.
(Goodwine Depo. I, p. 83). This point was reiterated by
Goodwine's counsel at oral argument:
The Court: Did your client testify or is my
recollection correct that your client testified that
he never observed any racist graffiti, he never heard
any racial slurs directed at him, nor did he ever
hear any racial slurs directed at any other person,
is that accurate?
Mr. Connelly: I believe that's accurate in terms of
direct contact, yes.
(Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 8/25/05, p.
Similarly, he acknowledged that he had never seen any racist
graffiti in the workplace:
Q. Am I also correct that during the course of your
employment you never observed any graffiti that you
perceived to be racist?
A. That's correct.
(Id. at 83-84).
To the extent that Plaintiff relies on general allegations of
racial slurs and graffiti occurring at PHB outside of his
presence, these allegations contribute little to his claim. In
addition to being contrary to his own testimony, those
allegations do not legally support his hostile environment claim.
(Complaint ¶ 7). We note, for example, that the affidavits upon
which Goodwine primarily relies are conclusory in nature and, in
the case of James Henry's affidavit, are inconsistent with the
affiant's own deposition testimony.*fn3 Indeed, the
affidavits primarily recount events that purportedly took place outside of Goodwine's presence. Although incidents
occurring outside of a plaintiff's presence are relevant to a
hostile environment claim under the requisite totality of the
circumstances analysis, see Schwapp v. Town of Avon,
118 F.3d 106, 108-09 (2nd Cir. 1997) (citing Harris,
510 U.S. at 23), the Third Circuit has held that a plaintiff must, at the
least, point to evidence that some of the incidents occurred in
We note first that no racist comment, written or
spoken, was ever directed at [plaintiff] himself. In
addition, [plaintiff] does not dispute that he never
personally saw any racist graffiti or flyers in the
Department; he heard about the graffiti and flyers
second-hand. As a threshold matter, [plaintiff]
cannot meet the first element of the hostile work
environment claim . . . solely by pointing to
comments that were directed at other individuals.
Caver v. City of Trenton, 2005 WL 2045715 (3rd Cir. 2005).
Finally, we find that two incidents over a four year and four
month period are not sufficiently pervasive to support a hostile environment claim under Title VII.
See, e.g., Peters, 307 F.3d at 551-52 (six incidents in a
one and a half year period not pervasive); Gharzouzi v.
Northwestern Human Services of Pennsylvania,
225 F. Supp. 2d 514, 536 (M.D.Pa. 2002) (six incidents in a three month period
not sufficiently pervasive); Keown v. Richford Holdings, 2002
WL 1340311 at *4-5 (E.D.Pa. 2002) (eight or nine sexually
explicit pamphlets sent to plaintiff over a four month period not
sufficiently pervasive and regular to constitute harassment);
Bauder, 2000 WL 340191 at *4 (four incidents over a two month
period not pervasive). Rather, the four separate incidents
described by Goodwine describe precisely the type of "isolated
incidents of racial enmity" that are not actionable under Title
VII. See Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103
(2nd Cir. 1986).
In sum, we conclude that Goodwine has failed to come forward
with sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to
whether his "workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that [was] sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and
create an abusive working environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate on this basis.
B. Whether the discrimination would have detrimentally
affected a reasonable person of the same race in that position
We also find that Goodwine has failed to raise a triable issue
of fact with respect to the fourth prong set forth in Aman,
namely, that the discrimination would have detrimentally affected
a reasonable person of the same race in his position. Aman,
85 F.3d at 1081. In considering whether the objective test is met,
we are directed to consider "all the circumstances," including
"the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see
also Abramson v. William Patterson College of New Jersey,
260 F.3d 265, 280 (3rd Cir. 2001).
As discussed above, the conduct at issue here was neither
frequent nor severe. The incidents described by Goodwine, even
assuming that they were indeed racially motivated, are
insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the work
environment here would have been hostile from the "standpoint of
a reasonable person." Consequently, summary judgment is
appropriate on this alternative ground.
IV. DISPARATE TREATMENT Assertions of disparate treatment are governed by the
burden-shifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Thus, Goodwine bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506
(1993). To establish his prima facie case, Goodwine must
demonstrate that: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was
qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse
employment action despite being qualified; and (4) the
circumstances of the adverse employment action create an
inference of discrimination. See Sarullo v. United States
Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3rd Cir. 2003) (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
When a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employer's
allegedly adverse action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff then must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's
proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination, and
not the real motivation for the unfavorable job action. Id. at
Goodwine, an African-American, is a member of a protected
class. Moreover, it is not disputed that Goodwine was qualified
for his position as a DCPO at PHB. Goodwine's claim fails,
however, because he had not raised a triable issue of fact as to
whether he was subjected to an adverse employment action creating
an inference of discrimination.
The Supreme Court has defined an adverse employment action as:
A tangible employment action consists of a
significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits . . .
A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts
direct economic harm.
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-62
(1998). Such an action must be "serious and tangible enough to
alter an employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment." Storey v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
390 F.3d 760, 764 (3rd Cir. 2004) (quoting Cardenas,
269 F.3d at 263).
Loss of money or benefits is not required in order for a change
in an employee's working conditions to constitute an adverse
action; rather, an adverse employment action might consist of
changes in location, duties, perks, or other basic aspects of the
job. Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 787 (3rd Cir. 1998) (citing
Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)).
Thus, courts have consistently held that "discriminatory
assignments, undermining of work conditions and harassment are
exactly the kind of actions that Title VII was designed to
prevent." See Ferrell v. Harvard Industries, Inc., 2001 WL
1301461, *20 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Mondzelewski, 162 F.3d at 787
(meat factory worker's reassignment to a shift leaving him less
free time and requiring him to work Saturday evenings was
sufficient to raise a triable issue as to whether the terms,
conditions and privileges of his job were altered in retaliation
for discrimination complaint); Hampton v. Borough of Tinton
Falls Police Dep't, 98 F.3d 107, 116 (3rd Cir. 1996) (under
Title VII, appointment to undesirable police assignment
sufficient to withstand summary judgment on retaliation claim);
Collins, 830 F.2d at 703 (under Title VII, "adverse action"
does not require loss of money or benefits but rather may consist
of changes in location, duties, perks, or other basic aspects of
Here, Goodwine asserts that he "has consistently been subjected
to disparate treatment based upon his race in the form of
assignment to the worst jobs within the workplace and . . .
routine assignment to the most difficult machines . . .".
(Complaint ¶ 9).*fn4 Goodwine contends that he "has
routinely been assigned to the more difficult machines three or
four times more often than his white co-workers contrary to the
rotation policy that is supposed to be followed." (Complaint ¶
10). In the abstract, this allegation of racial bias in the
assignment of workplace tasks sufficiently implicates the "terms,
conditions and privileges of his job" so as to be cognizable
under Title VII. See, e.g., Mondzelewski, 162 F.3d at 787.
Nonetheless, Goodwine's claim fails because he has not produced
sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to
whether he was assigned to "more difficult" jobs than white employees at PHB.*fn5
In response to Goodwine's allegations, PHB has presented a
spreadsheet report identifying each job and machine operated by
Goodwine throughout his employment at PHB. PHB's report also
identifies, by name and race, the other employees who ran the
same job and machine during shifts before and after Goodwine.
(Affidavit of Catherine Bernard, Dkt. #22, Ex 1, Goodwine Job
Activity Report). The results of the report demonstrate that
white employees at PHB were assigned to the same jobs and
machines as Goodwine during shifts preceding and following
Goodwine's shift. Moreover, PHB has provided affidavits asserting
that job assignments at PHB were made on a random basis without
regard to race, and that most incidents where an employee worked
the same machine more frequently than other employees resulted
from temporary production needs, customer priorities, or an
employee's expertise and training on an individual machine.
(Phillips Affidavit ¶¶ 15-20; Sayers Affidavit ¶ 12-18).
Goodwine argues that PHB's spreadsheet fails to account for
several factors that impact on the difficulty of a job assignment
beyond simply the machine that is used. These include the size of
the parts being placed in the machine, the composition of those
parts, and the cycle time of the machine. (Goodwine Depo. I, pp.
69-71). Be that as it may, Goodwine offers no evidence that white
employees who worked on the same machines had the luxury of
machining parts that were lighter and less cumbersome over a
longer period of time.
In sum, Goodwine has not raised a triable issue of fact as to
whether he was assigned to difficult jobs more frequently than
his white employees. As such, he cannot make out a prima facie
case of disparate treatment and summary judgment is appropriate.
VI. PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT
Claims of race discrimination under the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act, 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 951 et seq., are analyzed under
the same framework as a Title VII claim, "as Pennsylvania courts
have construed the protection of the two acts interchangeably."
Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 n. 3 (3rd Cir.
2001); see also Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc.,
228 F.3d 313, 317 (3rd Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII and PHRA
discrimination analyses are identical). Accordingly, for the
reasons discussed supra, summary judgment is also granted as to
Goodwine's PHRA claim.
For the foregoing reasons, PHB's motion for summary judgment is
granted. An appropriate Order follows. ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of November, 2005, and for the
reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by Defendant, PHB Die Casting, [Doc. No. 19] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Judgment is hereby entered in favor
of Defendant, PHB Die Casting, and against Plaintiff, Cari
The clerk is hereby directed to mark the case closed.
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