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October 12, 2005.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: JAMES McCLURE JR., Senior District Judge



On December 22, 2004, plaintiff, Rodney Alan Wilson, filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., ("Title VII") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 955 et seq., ("PHRA"), against his employer, Primus Technologies Inc. Wilson alleged that he was discriminated against and harassed on a daily basis at work. Plaintiff's complaint asserts that his supervisors racially harassed him, and that the harassment culminated in his demotion.*fn1

  On July 15, 2005, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a brief in support of its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff then failed to file a brief in opposition by the scheduled deadline. We then ordered plaintiff to file an opposing brief by September 2, 2005, or have his complaint subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a court order. On September 2, 2005, plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 13),*fn2 which the court will construe as a brief in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant did not file a brief in reply, and the matter is now ripe for our decision. For the following reasons we will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment, enter judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, and direct the Clerk to close the case file.


  It is appropriate for a court to grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

  "If the nonmoving party has the burden of persuasion at trial, `the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the nonmovant's burden of proof at trial.'" Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Chippolini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d. Cir. 1987)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

  In evaluating a motion for summary judgment the court will draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Am. Flint Glass Workers Union v. Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, (3d Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party, however, cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by merely offering general denials, vague allegations, or conclusory statements; rather the party must point to specific evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 32; Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999).


  First, we note that defendant complied with Local Rule 56.1 and filed a separate and concise statement of uncontested material facts. (Rec. Doc. No. 10.)

  Plaintiff, meanwhile, has not introduced any evidence into the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact. Instead, plaintiff, who is pro se, made only additional allegations when he wrote responses adjacent to various paragraphs in defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Rec. Doc. No. 13.) In order for plaintiff to create a genuine issue of material fact he needed to make citations to evidence in the record; otherwise, under Local Rule 56.1 the material facts set forth by the moving party are deemed to be admitted.

  Although plaintiff says that he told defendant's counsel everything that was done to him, the court notes that we only have before us those portions of plaintiff's deposition that defendant has provided us. Therefore, what follows is largely taken from the defendant's statement of material facts.

  On or about October 11, 1999, plaintiff began his employment with the defendant. Plaintiff was initially employed in defendant's stockroom. Plaintiff had problems with his work performance in the stockroom. On May 5, 2003, Wilson was transferred from the stockroom to defendant's soldering department allegedly because of his performance at work. When he was transferred, plaintiff's terms and conditions remained the same; including his rate of pay, benefits, and hours of work.

  After plaintiff was transferred to the soldering department he filed a Workers' Compensation claim. While waiting for a determination on his Workers' Compensation claim, Wilson filed for disability benefits. Plaintiff was approved for and received disability benefits for more than a year. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was removed from ...

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