The opinion of the court was delivered by: JAMES McCLURE JR., Senior District Judge
On December 22, 2004, plaintiff, Rodney Alan Wilson, filed a
pro se complaint alleging violations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, et seq., as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., ("Title VII") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act, 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 955 et seq., ("PHRA"), against his employer,
Primus Technologies Inc. Wilson alleged that he was
discriminated against and harassed on a daily basis at work.
Plaintiff's complaint asserts that his supervisors racially
harassed him, and that the harassment culminated in his demotion.*fn1
On July 15, 2005, defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment. Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a brief in support
of its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff then failed to file
a brief in opposition by the scheduled deadline. We then ordered
plaintiff to file an opposing brief by September 2, 2005, or have
his complaint subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute and
failure to comply with a court order. On September 2, 2005,
plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 13),*fn2 which the court will
construe as a brief in opposition to defendant's motion for
summary judgment. Defendant did not file a brief in reply, and
the matter is now ripe for our decision. For the following
reasons we will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment,
enter judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, and
direct the Clerk to close the case file.
DISCUSSION: I. LEGAL STANDARD
It is appropriate for a court to grant a motion for summary
judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled a judgment as
a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
"If the nonmoving party has the burden of persuasion at trial,
`the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by
showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to
admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the
nonmovant's burden of proof at trial.'" Jalil v. Avdel Corp.,
873 F.2d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Chippolini v. Spencer
Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 896 (3d. Cir. 1987)); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment the court will draw
all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record in
favor of the nonmoving party. Am. Flint Glass Workers Union v.
Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, (3d Cir. 1995). The nonmoving
party, however, cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment by
merely offering general denials, vague allegations, or conclusory
statements; rather the party must point to specific evidence in
the record that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 32; Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252
(3d Cir. 1999).
First, we note that defendant complied with Local Rule 56.1 and
filed a separate and concise statement of uncontested material
facts. (Rec. Doc. No. 10.)
Plaintiff, meanwhile, has not introduced any evidence into the
record that creates a genuine issue of material fact. Instead,
plaintiff, who is pro se, made only additional allegations
when he wrote responses adjacent to various paragraphs in
defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Rec. Doc. No. 13.) In
order for plaintiff to create a genuine issue of material fact he
needed to make citations to evidence in the record; otherwise,
under Local Rule 56.1 the material facts set forth by the moving
party are deemed to be admitted.
Although plaintiff says that he told defendant's counsel
everything that was done to him, the court notes that we only
have before us those portions of plaintiff's deposition that
defendant has provided us. Therefore, what follows is largely
taken from the defendant's statement of material facts.
On or about October 11, 1999, plaintiff began his employment
with the defendant. Plaintiff was initially employed in
defendant's stockroom. Plaintiff had problems with his work
performance in the stockroom. On May 5, 2003, Wilson was transferred from the stockroom to defendant's soldering
department allegedly because of his performance at work. When he
was transferred, plaintiff's terms and conditions remained the
same; including his rate of pay, benefits, and hours of work.
After plaintiff was transferred to the soldering department he
filed a Workers' Compensation claim. While waiting for a
determination on his Workers' Compensation claim, Wilson filed
for disability benefits. Plaintiff was approved for and received
disability benefits for more than a year. Plaintiff testified at
his deposition that he was removed from ...