United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
September 29, 2005.
CHARLES A. SINGLETON, Plaintiff,
MELLON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania Corporation; MELLON BANK, N.A., A National Association Held by MELLON FINANCIAL CORPORATION; MARTIN G. McGUINN, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: TERRENCE McVERRY, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently before the Court for review and disposition are the
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, with brief in support filed by
Defendants Mellon Financial Corporation, Mellon Bank, N.A., and
Martin G. McGuinn (Document Nos. 84 and 85, respectively);
Brief and Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff (Document Nos. 89 and 90);
Reply Brief in Further Support of Their Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Defendants (Document No. 95);
Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff (Document No. 100); and
Reply to Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
(Document No. 103). After careful consideration of Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the filings in support and opposition thereto, the
briefs of the parties, the relevant case law, and the record as a
whole, the Court finds that there is not sufficient record
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
Plaintiff, Charles A. Singleton, on his federal and state claims
of disability and race discrimination. Therefore, the Court will
grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all federal
and state claims which allege discrimination and dismiss without
prejudice the Counterclaims alleged by Defendants Mellon
Financial Corporation and Mellon Bank, N.A.
Construed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the
record facts are as follows:
On January 4, 1999, Defendant Martin G. McGuinn, the Chief
Executive Officer of Mellon Financial Corporation and Mellon
Bank, N.A., contacted Thomas Flannery of the search firm,
Resources for Management, Inc. ("RFM") to search for a new
Executive Vice President of Human Resources for Mellon Bank, N.A.
Defendant McGuinn explicitly requested that Mr. Flannery make a
special effort to locate qualified female and minority
candidates. Mr. Flannery contacted Plaintiff, Charles A.
Singleton, who expressed interest in the Mellon opening and faxed
his resume to Mr. Flannery's office. In his resume, Plaintiff
represented that he was employed at the time by the Eastman Kodak
Company ("Kodak") as the Vice President of Corporate Human
Resources, Director of Worldwide Compensation & Benefits.
Plaintiff also represented in his cover letter to Mr. Flannery
that he was then a current Kodak employee. On February 27, 1999, Plaintiff had his initial interview with
Mr. Flannery, at which time he presented Mr. Flannery with a
second resume. Although this resume was formatted differently,
Plaintiff continued to represent himself as a "then current"
employee of Kodak.
Mr. Flannery presented a number of candidates to Mellon, but
two emerged as "the strongest of the bunch" Plaintiff and James
Defendant McGuinn interviewed Plaintiff on March 15, 1999.
After interviewing both Plaintiff and James Alef, Defendant
McGuinn determined to offer Plaintiff the position of Executive
Vice President of Human Resources for Mellon. Defendant McGuinn
then called Plaintiff to outline an offer of employment and asked
Mr. Flannery to convey the details of the offer to Plaintiff.
As instructed, Mr. Flannery conveyed the offer to Plaintiff,
who "came back and said he wanted more and different things . . .
both in terms of money and replacing certain things he had at
Kodak. . . ." Defs' Stmt of Material Undisputed Facts, at ¶ 23.
In particular, Plaintiff represented to Mr. Flannery, inter alia,
that (i) he was at that time earning $175,000 at Kodak and that
was to increase to $200,000 in June 1999; (ii) he would be
receiving an $80,000 bonus from Kodak that he would have to
forfeit if he left Kodak; (iii) he had a $700/month car allowance
from Kodak that reimbursed him for his car lease payments; (iv)
he had Kodak stock options in the amount of $165,000 that he
would lose if he departed Kodak; and (v) he had an interest-free
loan from Kodak in the amount of $125,000 that he would have to
repay upon his departure from Kodak.
In response, on April 20, 1999, Defendant McGuinn revised his
offer to Plaintiff to include reimbursement for the following
losses Plaintiff alleged he would incur: (i) $165,000 to
replace Plaintiff's alleged lost gains on Kodak stock options; (ii)
$125,000 to enable Plaintiff to repay his loan from Kodak; and
(iii) $80,000 to replace Plaintiff's alleged loss of a 1998
On April 25, 1999, Plaintiff accepted Mellon's revised offer of
employment. On June 14, 1999, Plaintiff commenced his employment
with Mellon Bank, N.A. as Executive Vice President of Human
Resources and at all times was an at-will employee. In this
position, Plaintiff reported directly to Defendant McGuinn and
was a member of Mellon's Senior Management Committee. Plaintiff
was responsible for all aspects of Mellon's human resources
policies, procedures and initiatives and had numerous direct
reports of his own. Defendant McGuinn testified that he hired
Plaintiff specifically "to undertake leadership of major changes
to human resources capabilities and delivery." Defs' Stmt of
Material Undisputed Facts, at ¶ 30.
Defendant McGuinn testified that as of the fall of 1999, he was
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the lack of progress that
Plaintiff was making in the Human Resources department and
"ask[ed] [Plaintiff] about his review of the people and the
department and what his plans were. And he had not yet really
developed those plans. I asked about his progress on various
initiatives, trying to impress on him the urgency that was
needed." McGuinn Depo. at 13-14. Defendant McGuinn also testified
that he noted that Plaintiff tended to schedule his personal
appointments in the middle of the day and "he wouldn't come in
beforehand or he couldn't come back to the office after it."
Id. at 15.
Mr. Flannery testified that Defendant McGuinn voiced his
dissatisfaction with Plaintiff's performance to him "almost from
the outset [and] certainly within three to six months of his
employment because [Plaintiff] was not performing to Mr.
McGuinn's standards." Flanery Depo. at 91. In December of 1999, Defendant McGuinn gave Plaintiff a
favorable rating, based upon his six months performance, but
noted Plaintiff "should build [a] greater sense of urgency in
people working for him." Singleton Depo. Exh. 31.
In March of 2000, Plaintiff had back surgery and took a leave
of absence to recuperate from his surgery. Plaintiff contends
that during his recuperation, he had a fax machine installed at
his home dedicated to Mellon, as well as a lap top computer
dedicated to the Mellon Local Access Network, which enabled him
to work from home every day during his leave of absence.
Plaintiff returned to work on July 17, 2000, without
restrictions that would have prevented him from performing his
job. On the day of his return, Plaintiff met with Defendant
McGuinn, who informed Plaintiff that he needed to be more visible
in the human resources department, particularly in Pittsburgh,
and that it was taking "too long" for him to make the necessary
changes within the human resources department. In response,
Plaintiff acknowledged that implementing changes in the human
resources department was taking "longer than [he or Defendant
McGuinn] . . . would like" and Plaintiff also acknowledged that
his alleged difficulties in scheduling meetings due to
conflicting work schedules were, as Defendant McGuinn suggested,
"no excuse." Singleton Depo. Exh. 32.
Defendant McGuinn met with Plaintiff again in August of 2000.
At that meeting, Defendant McGuinn discussed an interim
performance appraisal he had prepared for Plaintiff in which he
rated Plaintiff a "marginal" performer. Plaintiff contends that
Defendant McGuinn did not discuss specifics with him during this
meeting, but rather "alleged simply that everything Plaintiff was
doing was going wrong. . . ." Pl's Stmt of Material Undisputed
Facts, at ¶ 68. On January 30, 2001, Defendant McGuinn met with Plaintiff for
his first full-year performance evaluation at which time
Defendant McGuinn noted that Plaintiff had made some improvements
since his discussions with him in the summer of 2000. However,
notwithstanding these improvements, Defendant McGuinn noted that
with respect to two of Plaintiff's four specific department
priorities establishing a methodology to track turnover and
recruiting and reengineering the human resources process
Plaintiff had made little progress over the span of his year
In August of 2001, Defendant McGuinn again met with Plaintiff
for a mid-year review. During this meeting, Defendant McGuinn
explained that "[he] was getting more disappointed by
[Plaintiff's] sub-par performance and told him that, at best, he
was a `meets target,' which is [Mellon's] third rating, so he was
actually declining from where he was." McGuinn Depo. at 137-138.
Defendant McGuinn testified that it became more and more apparent
to him that Plaintiff "just wasn't getting all of the things done
that he was supposed to be getting done in a timely manner" and
that "he was not providing sufficient leadership in the HR
Department." Id. at 139.
In September of 2001, Defendant McGuinn made the decision to
terminate Plaintiff's employment and did so.
On July 26, 2002, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a
Complaint in which he contends that Defendants unlawfully
terminated his employment because he was disabled under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and/or because of his
In June of 2003, Mellon received correspondence from the
custodian of records of Kodak, in response to a subpoena for
documents, which indicated that Plaintiff had worked for Kodak only until November 30, 1997, contrary to Plaintiff's
representations that he was employed by Kodak in April 1999.
Thereafter, on May 12, 2004, Defendants Mellon Financial
Corporation and Mellon Bank, N.A., filed counterclaims for "fraud
and conversion against Plaintiff based upon alleged various
fraudulent misrepresentations he made to Mellon in 1999 and based
upon which he was not only given a job but was also given large
sums of money." Defs' Br. at 2.
Defendants have filed the instant motion for summary judgment,
in which they contend that Plaintiff is unable to establish a
prima facie case on either his ADA and/or Title VII claim.
Further, Defendants seek summary judgment on their counterclaims
for fraud and conversion. Not surprisingly, Plaintiff vigorously
opposes the motion for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may grant summary judgment only when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c). A fact is "material" only if its existence or
non-existence would affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986). An issue of fact is "genuine" only when there is
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in
favor of the non-moving party regarding the existence of that
fact. Id. In determining whether there exist genuine issues of
material fact, all inferences must be drawn, and all doubts must
be resolved, in favor of the non-moving party. Coregis Ins. Co.
v. Baratta & Fenerty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 302, 305-06 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Although the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, in a case such as
this, where the non-moving party is the plaintiff and, therefore,
bears the burden of proof at trial, that party must present
affirmative evidence sufficient to establish the existence of
each element of his case. Id. at 306 (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Accordingly, a plaintiff
cannot rely on unsupported assertions, speculation, or conclusory
allegations to avoid the entry of summary judgment, see
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, but rather, the plaintiff "must go
beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that
there exists a genuine issue for trial," Jones v. United Parcel
Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000).
I. Disability Discrimination Claims*fn1
Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiff does not suffer
from a "disability" as that term is defined in the ADA and/or the
PHRA and, thus, his disability claims necessarily must
fail.*fn2 For Plaintiff to prevail on his discrimination claims, he must
demonstrate that: (1) he is a disabled person within the meaning
of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodations by the employer; and (3) he had suffered an
otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of
discrimination. See Gaul v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 576,
580 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831
(3d Cir. 1996)).
The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002). Under the ADA, a
(A) a physical*fn3 or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 193. As neither
the allegations nor arguments of Plaintiff address the second or
third prongs of the ADA definition of disability, the disposition
of the present motion depends upon whether Plaintiff has
established sufficient evidence for any reasonable jury to
conclude that he suffers from a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. Toyota Motor,
534 U.S. at 195 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
The ADA does not specifically define "major life activities."
However, the EEOC regulations define the term as those activities
that are of "central importance to most people's daily lives."
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii); Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 197. This
means "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning
and working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii). The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has "held only extremely limiting
disabilities in either short or long-term to qualify for
protected status under the ADA." Marinelli v. City of Erie,
Pennsyvlania, 216 F.3d 354, 362 (3d Cir. 2000).
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the
United States Supreme Court stated that under the ADA:
A "disability" exists only where an impairment
"substantially limits" a major life activity, not
where it "might," "could," or "would" be
substantially limiting if mitigating measures were
not taken. A person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by medication or other
measures does not have an impairment that presently
"substantially limits" a major life activity. To be
sure, a person whose physical or mental impairment is
corrected by mitigating measures, still has an
impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it
does not "substantially limi[t]" a major life
Id. at 482-83 (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also given
direction on whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major
life activity: "[An] impairment must not only affect the way in
which the plaintiff engaged in [a major life activity]. . . . To
the contrary, a plaintiff must establish that the impairment
substantially limits the ability to engage in the activity."
Marinelli, 216 F.3d at 361 (emphasis in original). For example,
in Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 186-87 (3d
Cir. 1999), our appellate court found that a plaintiff who could
stand or walk for only fifty minutes at a time was not disabled under the ADA.
Similarly, in Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 108 (3d
Cir. 1996), the court of appeals found that a plaintiff who had a
hip fracture and noticeable limp, and could not walk more than a
mile without stopping, had a "comparatively moderate restriction
? on the ability to walk" and, therefore, had no disability.
Plaintiff contends that his back condition is a "significant
disability that substantially limits his ability to perform the
major life activity of walking." P's Br. at 3. Plaintiff
testified that he has persistent pain and leg weakness. It is not
disputed that Plaintiff continues to have "problems with walking,
"his gait is "not normal," and he experiences persistent pain.
However, it is also not disputed that following his surgery,
Plaintiff was able to do the following activities:
care for himself, including dressing and showering;
See Depo. of Carol Singleton at 18;
drive an automobile without accommodations,
although he does utilize a disabled parking sticker
for his vehicle; Id.; see also Depo. of Charles
Singleton at 154;
exercise on a treadmill and recumbent bike for
nearly an hour, three days a week and is encouraged
by his physician to exercise as much as he can; see
Carol Singleton depo. at 16, 20;*fn4
attend the movies and his son's extracurricular
events; see Depo. of Charles Singleton at 164; and
return to work on July 17, 2000, with the only
restrictions being that he was unable to lift over
ten pounds and that he could not engage in prolonged
The Court finds and rules that although Plaintiff's impairment
certainly "affects" his ability to walk, the impairment does not
"substantially limit" his ability to engage in this activity.
Plaintiff's inability to engage in prolonged walking is even less
restrictive than those which the appellate courts of the Third
Circuit already found did not substantially limit a major life
activity in Taylor and Kelly. Because Plaintiff's impairment
does not substantially limit his ability to engage in a major
life activity, the Court finds and rules that Plaintiff has not
met the first element of his prima facie case and, therefore,
is not disabled under the ADA and/or the PHRA.
II. Race Discrimination Claims*fn6
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Thus, a court's ultimate
task in a race discrimination case is to determine whether the
plaintiff has carried his burden of showing, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the employer intentionally discriminated
against him. Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632,
637 (3d Cir. 1993); see Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[A] plaintiff must show that his
status as a minority class was the but for reason for the
treatment accorded."), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986). In a Title VII lawsuit, the familiar McDonnell Douglas
formulation*fn7 regarding the appropriate burdens of proof
and allocation of production of evidence govern and guide the
analysis of the evidence presented on a motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
presenting a prima facie case by demonstrating that (1) he is a
member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the job;
(3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) others
not in the protected class were treated more favorably. Fuentes
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Should the plaintiff make this
showing, a presumption of discrimination is created and the
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Fuentes,
32 F.3d at 763; Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir. 1990).
The employer need only produce sufficient evidence to enable a
factfinder to conclude that the action taken was motivated by a
nondiscriminatory purpose. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. If the
defendant is able to clear this relatively low hurdle, the
presumption evaporates and the onus is again on the plaintiff,
who bears the ultimate burden of showing that a discriminatory
purpose was a determinative factor in the decision. Id. at 764;
Bellissimo, 764 F.2d at 179-80. The plaintiff can either prove
this directly, by showing that discriminatory considerations
motivated the defendant's actions, or indirectly, by showing that
the rationale provided by the defendant is unworthy of credence.
Josey, 996 F.2d at 638; Weldon, 896 F.2d at 797.
At trial, a Title VII plaintiff must prove both that the
employer's reason was false and that discrimination was the real
reason for the discharge. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. However, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the
plaintiff's burden is not as onerous when attempting to survive a summary judgment motion. In such
situations, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that there are
disputed factual issues concerning either (1) whether the
proffered reason for the discharge is false, or (2) whether an
invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause for the discharge. Torre v.
Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994); Fuentes,
32 F.3d at 764.
For purposes of this decision, the Court will presume that
Plaintiff has met his prima facie case. Therefore, the burden
shifts to Defendants to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Defendants argue that
legitimate reasons exist for its decision to terminate
Plaintiff's employment. For example, Defendants contend that
Plaintiff was having difficulty meeting Defendant McGuinn's
expectations for the position of Executive Vice President of
Human Resources. By Plaintiff's own admission, Plaintiff's
progress with the Employer of Choice initiative was slow and he
too was disappointed with his own slow progress.
By the time of Plaintiff's mid-year review in August of 2001,
Defendant McGuinn explained that "[he] was getting more
disappointed by [Plaintiff's] sub-par performance and told him
that, at best, he was a `meets target,' which is [Mellon's] third
rating, so he was actually declining from where he was. And . . .
[they] talked about a lot of issues around that." Defs' Stmt of
Mat. Undisputed Facts, at ¶ 89.
Further, Defendant McGuinn testified that Plaintiff had failed
to motivate his subordinates in the Human Resources Department.
Because Defendants have articulated a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for their decision to terminate
Plaintiff's employment, the onus shifts back to Plaintiff to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendants' stated
explanation is pretextual. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763.
Plaintiff responds that "[t]here are significant contradictions
or discrepancies in the evidence presented by Defendants
witnesses with regard to why Mr. Singleton was fired, that cast
doubt upon the Defendants' proffered reason for terminating
Plaintiff." Pl's Br. at 17. For example, Plaintiff argues that
Defendant McGuinn "could not identify a single time frame for any
of the objectives that he felt Singleton was not meeting quickly
enough." Id. at 18. Further, although Plaintiff concedes that
upon his return from medical leave Defendant McGuinn met with him
and expressed his "displeas[ure] with his performance," Plaintiff
contends that Defendant McGuinn "gave no specifics about his
displeasure." Id. at 19.
The Court, however, finds and rules that the record upon which
summary judgment is to be determined is utterly devoid of any
evidence which demonstrates that Plaintiff's race was a factor in
Defendants' decision to terminate his employment. Plaintiff
relies upon his own "unsupported assertions, conclusory
allegations, or mere suspicions." For example, when Plaintiff was
asked during his deposition why he thought he was terminated
because of his race, he replied:
[T]here were at least at least six, seven members
of the senior management committee who was retained
and/or promoted with the same or lesser performance
ratings in the same two-year period as I had. . . .
That's a very strong statement, I think, and the
150-year history of Mellon never having anybody on
the senior management committee previously I think
was another one. And I also say to you that just
because Mr. McGuinn decided to have one for some
limited period of time, being a person of color on
the senior management committee, doesn't mean that
his intentions were pure in that regard at all. I
think there has been many, you know, instances in
corporate America where that could be proven as
such. . . . It's called tokenism.
That he, as CEO, would, as I think I just said, for
some period of time have a person of color at the
senior management committee level, utilize that to
make himself perhaps look somewhat enlightened, and for whatever
reasons, then have that situation that scenario
terminated and be able to say, well, at least I
Pl's Depo. at 196.
The Court finds and rules that Plaintiff has simply failed to
present any evidence to establish that race was a factor in
Defendants' decision to terminate him. Plaintiff's disagreement
with Defendants' employment decision is insufficient to survive
summary judgment. See Fuentes v. Perski, 32 F.3d 759, 765-66
(3d Cir. 1994) ("plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's
decision was wrong or mistaken"; "These criticisms amount to
little more than the schoolyard retort, `Not so,' an approach
which . . . does not create a material issue of fact.").
Therefore, the Court will grant the summary judgment motion
filed by Defendants on Plaintiff's Title VII claim of race
III. Counterclaims for Fraudulent Misrepresentation and
Defendants Mellon Financial Corporation and Mellon Bank, N.A.
have filed a Counterclaim against Plaintiff for fraudulent
misrepresentation and conversion based upon alleged
"misrepresentations" Plaintiff made to Mellon in his resume and
in subsequent communications. This Court has supplemental
jurisdiction over this Counterclaim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Supplemental jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of
plaintiff's right. Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster,
45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995). If the claims over which a district
court has original jurisdiction are dismissed, the district court
has the option of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In determining whether to dismiss the state law claims, the district
court should consider whether state law claims involve issues of
federal policy and whether either party will be prejudiced by the
dismissal of the state law claims. Growth Horizons, Inc. v.
Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993).
Defendants' state law claims for fraudulent misrepresentation
and conversion do not involve issues of federal policy. Further,
Pennsylvania law provides that matters dismissed by a federal
court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be refiled in
the appropriate state court without regard to the limitations
period. 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 51.03(b); Fulkerson v. City
of Lancaster, 801 F. Supp. 1476, 1486 n. 3 (E.D. Pa. 1992),
aff'd, 993 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1993). Therefore, Defendants will
not be prejudiced with respect to the applicable limitations
period if they choose to refile their lawsuit in state court.
Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion and dismiss
without prejudice the Counterclaim of the Defendants.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff,
the Court finds that there is not sufficient record evidence upon
which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff on
his federal and state claims of disability and race
discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted on
Plaintiff's claims of disability and race discrimination.
Defendants' counterclaims under Pennsylvania state law for
fraudulent misrepresentation and conversion will be dismissed
without prejudice. ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 29th day of September, 2005, in accordance with
the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED as follows:
1. The Motion For Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Mellon
Financial Corporation; Mellon Bank, N.A., and Martin G. McGuinn
is GRANTED as to all claims of alleged disability
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act;
2. The Motion For Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Mellon
Financial Corporation; Mellon Bank, N.A., and Martin G. McGuinn
is GRANTED as to all claims of alleged race discrimination in
violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act;
and 3. The Pennsylvania state law claims of Defendants Mellon
Financial Corporation and Mellon Bank, N.A., for fraudulent
misrepresentation and conversion are dismissed without prejudice
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