United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
September 15, 2005.
UMAR BETHEA, a minor child, by and through his mother, KIMBERLY M. DAVIS, and KIMBERLY M. DAVIS, Plaintiffs
CENTRAL DAUPHIN SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: YVETTE KANE, District Judge
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
THE BACKGROUND TO THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
On May 24, 2004, Kimberly Davis, represented by counsel, filed
a complaint on behalf of herself and her son, Umar Bethea,
alleging that Central Dauphin School District and a number the
District's Board members and employees violated the Plaintiffs'
civil rights. (Doc. No. 1.) Generally, Plaintiff Davis alleged
that her son had been subjected to racial slurs and disparate
treatment on the basis of his race from kindergarten until his
eventual expulsion from Dauphin County Technical School in 2004.
Plaintiffs also claim that their procedural and substantive due
process rights were violated in connection with the District's
decision to suspend Mr. Bethea for drug use and assault of
another student while on a school bus. Ms. Davis also generally
alleged that Defendants have discriminated against her on the
basis of her race and religion, and have violated her First
Amendment rights by "barring her from school property" and
subjecting Mr. Bethea to "retaliatory disciplinary actions, and
harassment" after she protested what she believed to be
Defendants' "discriminatory and otherwise unlawful treatment." (Compl. ¶ 96.) Plaintiff Davis also alleged
that Defendants violated her "substantive due process parental
right to a full and equal public education for her son in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." (Id. ¶ 100.) Plaintiff Davis
generally averred that her substantive and procedural due process
rights were violated, and that Defendants's actions were
"undertaken pursuant to an illicit plan and agreement between and
among them" thereby violating 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and
Defendants subsequently filed a joint motion to dismiss the
complaint in its entirety, as well as a motion to strike and a
motion for a more definite statement. (Doc. Nos. 5, 6, and 7.)
The motions were fully briefed, and the Court scheduled oral
argument on the motion to dismiss for January 28, 2005.
On November 30, 2004, Plaintiffs submitted an amended
complaint, which contained factual allegations substantially
similar to those set forth in the original complaint. (Doc. No.
32.) Defendants again moved jointly to dismiss the amended
complaint, and alternatively moved to strike or requested a more
definite statement. (Doc. Nos. 35, 36, and 37.) Pursuant to
Defendants' request, the previously scheduled oral argument on
the pending motions was continued until February 15, 2005.
Subsequent to oral argument, the Court became aware the
Plaintiffs' original counsel, Andrew Ostrowski, had unexpectedly
been forced to discontinue his legal practice due to the onset of
a medical emergency. On June 8, 2005, attorney Sherri Coover, an
attorney with Bailey & Ostrowski, entered an appearance on behalf
of Plaintiffs. (Doc. No. 51.) Through Attorney Coover, Plaintiffs
moved to extend the June 8, 2005 discovery cutoff. (Doc. No. 52.)
Defendants opposed extending discovery, and on June 29, 2005, the
Court convened a telephone conference to discuss the status of
the litigation and Plaintiffs' request to extend discovery
deadlines. During the June 29 telephone conference, Attorney Don Bailey of
Bailey & Ostrowski advised the Court that Plaintiff Davis had
been seeking replacement counsel since April 2005, and she did
not wish for the Bailey & Ostrowski firm to continue representing
her and her son in this action. Attorneys Bailey and Coover had
sought to hold discovery open in order to protect Plaintiffs'
interests while she engaged replacement counsel. The Court agreed
to suspend the action for a period of 30 days while Plaintiff
Davis found new representation. On July 8, 2005, the Court
entered an Order scheduling a telephone conference for August 4,
2005, and directed Plaintiff Davis to participate in the
conference call either through replacement counsel or, if counsel
had not been obtained, on a pro se basis.
As of August 4, 2005, Plaintiff Davis had been unable to find a
lawyer willing to undertake representation of her and Mr. Bethea
in this action. Plaintiff Davis participated in the telephone
conference and indicated that she continued to seek new counsel
and wished to engage in settlement discussions with Defendants.
Defendants suggested that such settlement talks would be better
facilitated if Plaintiffs were represented. On August 5, 2005,
the Court entered an Order allowing Bailey & Ostrowski to
withdraw and granted Plaintiff Davis an additional ten days in
which to engage replacement counsel. (Doc. No. 64.) In the event
Plaintiffs were able to secure new representation, the Court
would hold the action open for 30 days to allow the parties to
engage in settlement negotiations. However, the Court advised
Plaintiff Davis that if she had not found new counsel, the Court
would proceed to consider the pending motions to dismiss the
amended complaint. (Id.)
By letter dated August 17, 2005, Plaintiff Davis advised the
Court that she had been unable to find a new lawyer to represent
her and Mr. Bethea in the litigation. (Doc. No. 66.) Ms. Davis
requested that the Court hold the case in abeyance "for an
extended period of time" to allow her to continue her search for a new lawyer. (Id.) Alternatively, Ms.
Davis asked that if the Court were constrained to rule upon the
pending motions to dismiss, that it do so without prejudice in
order that she might refile the complaint at such time as she
secured new counsel. (Id.)
The Court is sensitive to Plaintiff Davis's current status as
an uncounseled litigant in this action. However, that sensitivity
must be balanced against the legitimate interests of, and expense
incurred by, the many Defendants to an action that has now been
pending for more than 15 months with little progress.*fn1
The Court finds that Plaintiff Davis has been afforded an
adequate opportunity to find suitable replacement counsel and, to
date, has been unable to find a lawyer willing to take this case.
Accordingly, the Court is now constrained to consider the merits
of the pending and fully briefed motions to dismiss with respect
to Ms. Davis's claims. However, for the reasons discussed below,
the Court will dismiss Plaintiff Bethea's claims without
II. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).
When considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true
all factual allegations contained in the complaint and views them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines
Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The plaintiff
is required to "set forth sufficient information to outline the
elements of his claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that
those elements exist." Kost, 1 F.3d at 183 (citations omitted).
A court should grant a motion to dismiss only if it appears the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir.
1985) (citations omitted).
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) is properly granted when, taking all factual allegations
and inferences as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co.,
906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to
show that no claim has been stated. Johnsrud v. Carter,
620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir. 1980). "A court may dismiss a complaint only
if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of
facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations."
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). However, "a
court need not credit a complaint's `bald assertions' or `legal
conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906, 908 (3d Cir. 1997). "The
issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims." Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 688 (3d Cir. 1997)
(citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled
on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
II. Plaintiff Bethea's Claims
Plaintiff Davis, a pro se litigant, is not entitled to
represent her son in place of an attorney in federal litigation.
See Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83
(3d Cir. 1991). In a recent unpublished decision, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated a district
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of a school
district where plaintiff-mother improperly represented herself
and her minor son in the litigation after their attorney
withdrew. Harris-Thomas v. Christina Sch. Dist., No. 04-1184,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14152 (3d Cir. July 12, 2005). The Third
Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment against the minor
plaintiff and suggested, inter alia, that the district court on remand may wish to dismiss the minor
plaintiff's claims without prejudice. Id. at * 3.
Given the tortured procedural history of this action, the fact
that Plaintiff Bethea became uncounseled due to his attorney's
unexpected illness, and has at no time appeared before or advised
the Court of his wishes with respect to this litigation, the
Court finds that it would be unfair to enter judgment on
Plaintiff's claims in this case. Accordingly, the Court will
enter an order dismissing Plaintiff's claims without prejudice.
III. Plaintiff Davis's Claims
Plaintiff Davis is permitted to represent her own interests in
federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2005). See also
Osei-Afriyie, 937 F.2d at 882 (citation omitted). After her
attorney withdrew, and after he had filed briefs in opposition to
the pending motion to dismiss, Plaintiff Davis was afforded a
considerable amount of time to retain new counsel to assist her
in this action. As noted, she has been unable to find another
lawyer willing to take her case, and has not sought the
Defendants' concurrence to have this action dismissed without
prejudice. In the absence of such concurrence, the Court finds it
must now consider the merits of the pending motion with respect
to Plaintiff Davis's claims.
A. Counts X-XIII
Courts have found that parents do not have a cognizable
constitutional interest in their children's education. See
Brian A. v. Stroudsberg Area Sch. Dist., 141 F. Supp. 2d 502,
507 (M.D. Pa. 2001); Collins v. Chichester Area Sch. Dist.,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9651, at *19 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("The right to
a free public education is a right which belongs to the student
and not their parents"). See also Jarmon v. Batory, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8902, *15-16 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 1994) ("When a
student is suspended or expelled, it is the student who is entitled to
due process, because it is the student not [her] parents who
has a right to a free public education") (internal quotation and
citation omitted). A fair reading of the complaint, taken in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff Davis, establishes that nearly
all of her claims are integrally related to, and predicated upon,
Plaintiff Bethea's underlying claims that Defendants violated his
civil and due process rights with respect to a free public
For example, in Count X of the amended complaint, Plaintiff
Davis asserts that "the conduct of Defendants, as alleged herein,
was arbitrary, capricious, reckless, and/or outrageous, and
served no legitimate purpose, and has deprived Plaintiff of her
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process parental right to a
full and equal public education for her son. . . ." (Doc. No. 32,
Am. Compl. ¶ 115.) As such, Plaintiff Davis is attempting to
assert that her own constitutional rights were violated through
Defendants' alleged infringement of her son's right to a free
public education. As such, the Court finds the claims in Count X
are not cognizable and must be dismissed.
In Count XI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "deprived
Plaintiff of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments" as a result of what she describes as "malicious
prosecution and abuse of process." (Id. ¶ 119.) The only
arguable claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process
that Plaintiffs articulate are those relating to Mr. Bethea's
numerous suspensions, and his eventual expulsion. Plaintiff Davis
simply cannot make out a cognizable Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment violation of her own rights relating to the
disciplinary action taken against Mr. Bethea relating exclusively
to his right to a public education, nor the process afforded him
in connection with his suspension hearings.
In Count XII, Plaintiff alleges generally that "Defendants[']
actions and conduct . . . deprived Plaintiff of her procedural
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and has
persisted to such a degree so as to constitute a substantive due process
deprivation as well." (Id. ¶ 123.) The Court has difficulty
comprehending exactly what "actions and conduct" of Defendants
Plaintiff is alleging violated her own procedural due process
rights, but it is clear from the amended complaint that the only
process complained of in the amended complaint is the process
surrounding Mr. Bethea's suspension and disciplinary hearings. As
such, the procedural due process rights at issue are those of Mr.
Bethea, not his mother. Accordingly, Count XII must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.
In Count XIII, Plaintiff alleges, with no specificity, that
"some or all" of the Defendants were engaged in a conspiracy,
which directly and proximately had the effect of "the loss of
education and educational opportunities for [Plaintiff Bethea]"
causing Plaintiff Davis to suffer humiliation and embarrassment.
(Id. ¶¶ 127-128.) Although the allegation is especially vague,
it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that an "illicit plan and
agreement" among "some or all" of the Defendants compromised her
son's right to a free public education. (Id. ¶ 127) Like the
counts discussed above, Count XIII must be dismissed because
Plaintiff Davis does not have a cause of action for a conspiracy
that was allegedly designed to, or had the effect of, impairing
her son's education rights. Setting aside that the amended
complaint is lacking in specific allegations of conspiracy, the
fact remains that the right to challenge such a conspiracy is Mr.
Bethea's, not his mother's. Accordingly, Count XIII must also be
B. Count VIII
In Count VIII of the amended complaint, Plaintiff Davis alleges
that "Defendants intentionally discriminated against and
knowingly subjected Plaintiff . . . based upon her race and
religious affiliation, and have abridged her rights to the equal
privileges and benefits of the laws, all in violation of
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 2000d, et seq." (Id. ¶ 107.) Like
many of the other counts, the allegations contained in Count VIII lack detail. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the principal injury Ms. Davis claims as the result of this
alleged intentional discrimination is again "the loss of
education and educational opportunities for [Plaintiff Davis's]
son." (Id. ¶ 108.) Additionally, Ms. Davis alleges humiliation
and emotional upset as a result of the claimed racial
discrimination. (Id. ¶ 108.)
Examining only those allegations of conduct directed
specifically at her, Plaintiff Davis claims that in October 2004,
Central Dauphin High School Principal Richard Mazzatesta had the
Lower Paxton Township police remove Ms. Davis from school
premises after she refused the school's request that she schedule
an appointment if she desired to visit the school buildings or
her son's classes. (Id. ¶¶ 37-39.) Plaintiff Davis also alleges
that Principal Mazzatesta "imposed a ban" on her and advised Ms.
Davis that "he would protect his staff and property by `any means
necessary'." (Id. ¶ 40.) At some unspecified point, Ms. Davis
claims Mr. Mazzatesta referred to her as "the Rosa Parks of the
Central Dauphin School District." (Id. ¶ 41.) Additionally, Ms.
Davis alleges that on May 9, 2003, she received a notice that she
was in violation of the compulsory school law, and that the
affiant of the complaint was the Central Dauphin School District.
(Id. ¶ 55.)
Upon careful review of the amended complaint, it is clear to
the Court that all of Ms. Davis's remaining factual allegations
relate to what she believes was a racially hostile environment
that was permitted to exist within the school district, or
complaints about the process that the school district afforded to
her son following his apparently frequent disciplinary incidents.
Although the Court appreciates Ms. Davis's genuine concern
regarding what she perceived as a racially insensitive school
district, and with what she considered to be disregard of her
manifest interest in her son's education and development, the
Court cannot find that Plaintiff Davis has stated a cognizable
claim that her own civil rights were violated. Assuming as true that one of the Defendants
compared her to a known civil rights figure, or used
disrespectful or vulgar language in dealing with Ms. Davis, or
served her with notice that she was in violation of the
compulsory school law, these allegations simply do not amount to
a cognizable civil rights violation because none of Plaintiff
Davis's own civil rights were compromised or infringed in any
way. At most, Ms. Davis has alleged racial insensitivity or
incivility on the part of certain Defendants, but has not
articulated how her own civil rights under the law were violated.
Furthermore, as discussed above, Ms. Davis cannot predicate her
own civil rights claims on allegations that her son's educational
rights were abridged or otherwise impaired. Because she has
failed to set forth sufficient allegations regarding her own
civil rights claims, Count VIII of the amended complaint must be
C. Count IX
In Count IX, Plaintiff Davis alleges that "Defendants
intentionally discriminated against and knowingly violated
Plaintiff Davis' rights under the First Amendment by barring her
from school property and subjecting her son to retaliatory
disciplinary actions, and harassment, after she protested their
discriminatory and otherwise unlawful treatment." (Id. ¶ 111.)
Read liberally, it appears Ms. Davis is arguing that her action
of filing two claims with the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission caused Defendants to retaliate against her son with
disciplinary action. Additionally, Ms. Davis claims that the
Principal Mazzatesta's alleged order barring her from school
property constitutes retaliation for her speech activity. Upon
considering the allegations set forth in the amended complaint,
the Court finds that Plaintiff Davis has failed to plead a First
Amendment retaliation claim.
As an initial matter, the Court questions whether Plaintiff can
articulate a cognizable claim for First Amendment retaliation where the alleged retaliation is
discipline imposed upon her son. The Court acknowledges that in
certain limited contexts, courts have found that a family member
had a First Amendment claim for "intimate association" where a
husband was subjected to an adverse employment action in
retaliation for speech conduct on the part of his wife. See
Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1999). Whatever may be
the contours of this limited right and theory of liability under
the First Amendment, and whether it may in certain contexts
extend to a parental-child relationship, the amended complaint
does not even allege that such a right was violated. Moreover,
with respect to the disciplinary action taken against her son,
the Court notes that neither Plaintiff Davis nor Plaintiff Bethea
has denied the conduct that ultimately formed the basis for his
suspension: namely, consuming hallucinogenic drugs and pouring
his own urine over another student while riding on a school bus.
The Court finds that Plaintiff Davis has failed to plead a valid
cause of action that her own First Amendment rights were violated
on the basis that her son was subjected to retaliation for her
own First Amendment activity.
The Court finds equally unavailing Plaintiff's claim that being
barred from school property constitutes retaliation for engaging
in protected speech activity. It is obvious from the allegations
in the amended complaint that Plaintiff Davis is not claiming
that her speech activity of filing complaints with the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission gave rise to the
allegedly retaliatory decision to bar her from school property.
This is so because Plaintiff Davis claims that she filed
complaints with the PHRC after her alleged confrontation with
Principal Mazzatesta and other school officials that led to her
being removed from school premises. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 57.) Thus, it
is not altogether clear what protest regarding Defendants'
"discriminatory and otherwise unlawful treatment" Plaintiff Davis
is claiming forms the basis for her retaliation claim. Reading the amended complaint
liberally, the Court can only conclude that Ms. Davis is
contending that her confrontation with school officials on
October 28, 2002 qualified as protected speech activity, and that
the resultant decision to bar her from school premises
constituted retaliation. The Court finds that none of the
allegations surrounding this incident could conceivably be
considered protected speech activity. Plaintiff Davis alleged
only that she requested a meeting with a building administrator,
which was denied because no administrators were available.
Plaintiff Davis then stated that she wanted to visit the school
building and her son's classes, and was advised that she needed
an appointment prior to such a visit. Plaintiff was asked to
leave the school premises, and when she refused, she was escorted
off the premises by Lower Paxton Township police officers.
Nothing in these allegations remotely suggests that Plaintiff
Davis was engaged in protected speech activity in connection with
this incident, nor that the decision to bar her from school
property could be reasonably interpreted as retaliation for
speaking out on an issue of public concern. For all of these
reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim of
First Amendment retaliation and Count IX must be dismissed.
D. Count XIV
Finally, in Count XIV, Plaintiff Davis alleges that the
"actions and conduct of the Defendants . . . also constitute
abuse of process/wrongful use of proceedings and the intentional
infliction of emotional violations [sic] in violation of
Plaintiff's rights under Pennsylvania state law." (Id. ¶ 131.)
There are no specific allegations as to what "actions and
conduct" are said to constitute "abuse of process/wrongful use of
proceedings," nor does Plaintiff explain what "Pennsylvania state
law" has allegedly been violated. Even reading the allegation
liberally within the context of the amended complaint, the Court finds it is so vague that it fails to satisfy the pleading
requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In order to state a claim for abuse of process under
Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must establish: (1) an abuse or
perversion of process already initiated; (2) with some unlawful
or ulterior purpose; and (3) harm to the plaintiff as a result.
See Kedra v. Nazareth Hosp., 868 F. Supp. 737, 738 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (citing Shaffer v. Stewart, 473 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa.
Super. 1984)). This requires that the plaintiff offer some proof
of a "definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or
aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process."
William v. Fender, 69 F. Supp. 2d 649, 673 (M.D. Pa. 1999);
see also Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1219 (3d Cir.
The only process Defendants arguably initiated against
Plaintiff Davis was issuing a notice to appear for violation of
Pennsylvania's compulsory school law. The amended complaint does
not allege that there was an unlawful or ulterior purpose in the
issuance of the notice, nor that Plaintiff Davis suffered any
particular harm as the result of being served with the notice.
Thus, the allegations relating to this legal process do not
support a claim for abuse of process.
To the extent that this claim relates to the process
surrounding Mr. Bethea's suspension hearings and related
disciplinary proceedings, the Court finds that any injury
relating to such process rests with Mr. Bethea; the Court cannot
find that Plaintiff Davis has standing to assert this claim
because any alleged injury emanating from the suspension and due
process hearings was incurred by Mr. Bethea, who was the focus of
the disciplinary proceedings.
Plaintiff Davis's claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress also must be dismissed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, has
explained the showing necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress as follows:
The gravamen of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is that the conduct complained of
must be of an "extreme and outrageous type." As a
preliminary matter, it is for the court to determine
if the defendant's conduct is so extreme as to permit
recovery. Pennsylvania courts have been chary to
declare conduct "outrageous" so as to permit recovery
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
have allowed recovery "only in limited circumstances
where the conduct has been clearly outrageous." It
has been said that "the conduct must be so outrageous
in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390
, 395 (3d Cir. 1988)
(internal citations and footnotes omitted). The complaint's
allegations of conduct directed at Plaintiff Davis are especially
limited and frequently vague. Without minimizing Plaintiff
Davis's feelings regarding her son's alleged experiences
throughout his young life within the Central Dauphin School
District, the Court is unable to find that the allegations give
rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
on the part of Ms. Davis. Aside from allegations of limited and
infrequent offensive conduct on the part of some Defendants
directed specifically at Ms. Davis, the entire amended complaint
concerns allegations of conduct taken towards Mr. Bethea, not his
mother. A cognizable tort claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is quite rare, and must be predicated upon
outrageous conduct that is extreme in degree. The amended complaint is simply lacking in allegations of
sufficiently outrageous and extreme conduct on the part of
Defendants necessary to support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, this claim must
also be dismissed. An appropriate order follows. IV. Order
And now, this 15th day of September 2005, for the reasons
set forth in the within memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 35) is GRANTED as
1. Plaintiff Umar Bethea's claims contained in Counts
I VII are DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. Plaintiff Kimberly Davis's claims contained in
Counts VIII XIV are DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the following pending motions are
DENIED as moot:
1. Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 36);
2. Defendants' Joint Motion for a More Definite
Statement (Doc. No. 37);
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Complete Discovery (Doc. No.
4. Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 54); and
5. Defendants' Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time
(Doc. No. 57). The Clerk of Court is directed to
close the file.
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