United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
September 13, 2005.
JOHN D. LIGHT, Plaintiff
CHARLES B. HAWS, et al., Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHRISTOPHER CONNER, District Judge
Presently before the court is defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the claims of plaintiff John D. Light ("Light"),
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages to
compensate for allegedly unlawful searches and retaliatory
conduct by officials of the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP"), and for a declaration that
several provisions of Pennsylvania's Solid Waste Management Act,
35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6018.101-.1003 ("SWMA"), are
unconstitutionally vague. For the reasons that follow, the motion
will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Statement of Facts*fn1
A former dairy farmer, Light now owns and operates almost 200
apartment units scattered throughout south-central Pennsylvania.
(Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 1; Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 7, 10-11). He resides on a farm in Lebanon County,
upon which is situated a garage, a barn, several trailers and
mobile homes, various pieces of heavy equipment, and a chicken
coop. (Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 1, 2; Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 201). Within the
garage and barn Light stores auto parts, tools, building
materials, appliances, and furnishings for his apartments. (Doc.
64, Ex. 4 at 201-04; Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 1). The trailers contain
various items abandoned by former tenants, as well as old tires
to be reused or sold to consignment shops. (Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 2;
Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 125, 191, 193). The heavy equipment stored on
Light's property includes trucks, tractors, log skidders, and
farming equipment. (Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 2). Outside, Light stores
sheet metal, lumber, pipe, window frames, and firewood, as well
as metal drums which he either resells or uses to store gasoline,
oil, and antifreeze for his equipment. (Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 1-4).
Most of Light's possessions were purchased from consignment sales
or removed from his rental properties, and are intended for
refurbishment and reuse, if possible, in his apartment units.
(Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 9-10, 201-02; Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 1-2).
Light's property has garnered the attention of local and state
authorities in recent years. In January 1998, officials from DEP
visited Light's farm in response to a citizen complaint, and
requested access to the property for an inspection. (Doc. 64, Ex.
2 at 6-8, 18; Doc. 44, Attach. 2 ¶ 3). Light initially refused,
but acquiesced to the search when the officials said that, if he
persisted, they would obtain a search warrant and then fine Light
for obstructing their investigation. (Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 8, 13-18; Doc. 44, Attach. 2 ¶ 4). Light was subsequently cited for
unlawfully possessing and storing "waste" on his property. (Doc.
64, Ex. 2 at 8, 20).
Two years later, DEP investigator Robert Belfanti ("Belfanti")
visited Light's farm and informed him that he was in violation of
various regulations. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 44-45; Doc. 64, Ex. 3 at
15; Doc. 64, Ex. 9 at 18). Light subsequently received a citation
related to those violations, and was fined $1,000. (Doc. 64, Ex.
4 at 42, 484-9). He appealed the fine to a state court and
succeeded in having it reduced to $300. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at
50-51). Belfanti and another DEP official, Anthony Rathfon
("Rathfon"), were present during the state-court proceeding and,
according to Light, were extremely upset at the reduction. (Doc.
64, Ex. 4 at 52-53, 59-60). They purportedly followed Light from
the courthouse back to his farm, entered Light's barn without
permission, and declared the majority of the barn's content
waste, demanding that it be removed. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 54-55,
In November 2001 Light's garage caught fire. DEP was contacted
when firefighters at the scene observed metal drums near the
flames. (Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 45-; Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 40-42, 60; Doc.
64, Ex. 4 at 74-75). A DEP official arrived at the fire and was
able to confirm that the drums did not pose an immediate risk to
the environment. (Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 27, 43). However, when
interviewed by a local television news crew, the official
purportedly stated that he had observed violations while on the
property, and that Light was a "packrat" with whom DEP was having
problems. (Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 23; Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 83). Although
Light declined to provide an interview on camera, he relayed to a
reporter that he was working with DEP and that everything was "okay." (Doc. 64, Ex. 4
at 77-78). The story was later broadcast and, although Light
could be seen speaking with others, the conversation itself could
not be heard. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 76-77).
While at the fire, the DEP official was told by an unknown
individual that Light was storing tires and other objects on the
southern parcel of the farm, across the street from Light's
garage. (Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 32-33, 37-38; Doc. 44, Attach. 2 ¶ 8).
This information was subsequently relayed to Belfanti and
Rathfon. (Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 27, 43; Doc. 44, Attach. 2 ¶ 9). The
following morning, Light observed Belfanti and another DEP
official on the farm assessing the fire damage. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4
at 85, 212; Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 37-39; Doc. 44, Attach. 2 ¶ 9).
After looking at the fire-damaged garage, the officials advised
Light that they had received a complaint of tires being stored
across the street, and requested entry onto that part of the
property. (Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 37-39; Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 91-92,
209-210). Light refused, and pointed to the "no trespassing"
signs posted on his land. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 919-2, 107; Doc. 44,
Attach. 5 ¶ 4,7; Doc. 44, Attach. 2 ¶ 10; Doc. 44, Attach. 3 ¶
11). Belfanti purportedly responded by warning Light that, if
they were forced to obtain a search warrant, Light would be fined
$2,000. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 96, 105). Light again refused, and the
officials left. (Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 34). The DEP officials returned several hours later with a search
warrant.*fn2 (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 108, 115-16). Construction
waste, farming supplies, several thousand stacked tires, and
piles of scrap metal overgrown with brush were found on the
property. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 124-128; Doc. 64, Ex. 2 at 46-47).
In a subsequent meeting with Belfanti, Rathfon, and DEP
investigator Stephen Bartos ("Bartos"), Light was allegedly
advised that he would be fined $2,000 under the SWMA for making
them obtain a search warrant and that DEP was going to "get him."
(Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 124-28, 134, 136-37; Doc. 64, Ex. 9 at 18).
Light received a DEP compliance order, purportedly dated two
months prior to his receipt, demanding that he clean up the farm
within ninety days. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 136-38, 153). According to
Light, he attempted to negotiate the fine, but was told that
there would be no negotiating, that penalties were going to
increase from that point forward, and that fines could be levied
at $25,000 per day if he did not comply. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at
139-40). Defendants aver that they offered to limit the penalty
to $2,000 if Light would sign a consent assessment form. (Doc.
44, Attach. 4 ¶¶ 6-7). However, Light refused to sign the
agreement, and on February 22, 2002, Bartos assessed a penalty of $6,000 upon Light for refusing DEP
officials access to his farm without a warrant. (Doc. 64, Ex. 4
at 163-68; Doc. 44, Attach. 4 ¶ 3, 10).
Light also received a DEP compliance order to clean up the
items that were found on his property. He filed an appeal from
this order with the Environmental Hearing Board ("EHB"). (Doc.
64, Ex. 4 at 118-20, 122; Doc. 44, Attach. 6 ¶ 3). Attorney
Charles B. Haws ("Haws") represented DEP during these enforcement
proceedings. (Doc. 44, Attach. 6 ¶¶ 4, 7-8). Following one
judicial proceeding, Light's counsel purportedly provided Haws
with a draft of the complaint which he intended to file in this
case. After reviewing the draft complaint, Haws allegedly became
very agitated and threatened Light and his counsel with further
"harassment," purportedly telling Light to "just wait and
see."*fn3 (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 51-55; Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 8; Doc. 64,
Ex. 9 at 189-90). Light alleges that DEP has since renewed its
effort to harass and intimidate him, and that he complies with
DEP directives only to have officials revisit his farm and issue
new directives. (Doc. 64, Ex. 1 at 9; Doc. 64, Ex. 4 at 98-99,
The instant action was commenced in April 2003, and an amended
complaint was filed eight months later, naming as defendants
Belfanti, Rathfon, Bartos, Haws, the Secretary of the Department
of Environmental Protection, and the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (See Docs. 1,
21). The amended complaint alleges violations of the state
constitution and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution, and seeks monetary damages and a
declaration that provisions of the Solid Waste Management Act are
II. Standard of Review
"Summary judgment serves as a minimal but important hurdle for
litigants to overcome before presenting a claim to a jury."
Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (M.D. Pa.
2004). Faced with such a motion, the adverse party must produce
affirmative evidence, beyond the disputed allegations of the
pleadings, in support of the claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Corneal
v. Jackson Township, 313 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464 (M.D. Pa. 2003),
aff'd, 94 Fed. Appx. 76 (3d Cir. 2004). "Such affirmative
evidence regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial
must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in
the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance." Saldana v.
Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d
Cir. 1989)). Only if this burden is met can the cause of action
proceed. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c), (e). III. Discussion
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers
private citizens a means to redress violations of federal law by
state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. . . .
Id. Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but
merely a method to vindicate violations of federal law committed
by state actors. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199
, 1204 (3d Cir.
1996). To establish a claim under this section, the plaintiff
must show a deprivation of a "right secured by the Constitution
and the laws of the United States . . . by a person acting under
color of state law." Id. (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro,
51 F.3d 1137
, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Satisfaction of these elements, however, does not guarantee
recovery. Certain officials, including police officers and other
state actors who perform "discretionary functions," are shielded
from suit if their conduct did not violate a "clearly established
statutory or constitutional right? of which a reasonable person
would have known." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01
(2001); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). This
doctrine, known as "qualified immunity," provides not only a
defense to liability, but "immunity from suit." Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). To gain the protection of the doctrine, the defendant must show either
(1) that the plaintiff has not demonstrated "a deprivation of an
actual constitutional right" or (2) that the right at issue was
not "clearly established at the time of the alleged violation."
Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999); see Kopec v.
Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775-76 (3d Cir. 2004).
When immunity is raised at the summary judgment stage, the
court's analysis of the merits of the claims for purposes of
summary judgment essentially merges with its analysis of the
existence of a deprivation of federal rights for purposes of
immunity. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir.
2000); Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599-600
(3d Cir. 2005); Russoli v. Salisbury Township,
126 F. Supp. 2d 821, 838-41 (E.D. Pa. 2000); see also Grant v. City of
Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[C]rucial to the
resolution of [the] assertion of qualified immunity is a careful
examination of the record . . . to establish . . . a detailed
factual description of the actions of each individual defendant
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff."). Proceeding
under this framework, the court will examine each claim to
determine, first, whether plaintiff has offered sufficient
evidence of a deprivation of a constitutional right and, second,
whether the right at issue was clearly established.
A. Unlawful Search and Seizure
Issuance of a warrant is normally a constitutional prerequisite
to a valid search or seizure of private property. New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699-704 (1987); see also Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) ("It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is `per se
unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."). The warrant requirement is relaxed
when officials act to enforce regulatory provisions designed to
protect the public at large, rather than to advance a criminal
prosecution. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-41
(1967); see also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,
321 (1978) ("The reasonableness of a warrantless search . . .
will depend upon . . . specific enforcement needs. . . .").
Hence, an exception to the warrant requirement exists for
searches of closely regulated industries when conducted pursuant
to an administrative inspection scheme. Shoemaker v. Handel,
795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir. 1986); Showers v. Spangler,
182 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 1999). This exception is based upon the
premise that heavily regulated businesses have "a long tradition
of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses
to enter such a business must already be aware." Marshall,
436 U.S. at 313; see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973) ("The businessman in a regulated industry in
effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.").
In the case sub judice, defendants' warrantless inspections
were conducted pursuant to the Solid Waste Management Act, 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 6018.101-.1003. This regulatory scheme was
enacted to, in part, "protect the public health, safety and
welfare from the short and long term dangers of transportation,
processing, treatment, storage, and disposal of all wastes."
Id. § 6018.102. Those charged with enforcement of the statute are empowered to "[e]nter any
building, property, premises or place where solid waste is
generated, stored, processed, treated, beneficially used or
disposed. . . ." Id. § 6018.608; 25 PA. CODE § 271.421(a)(3).
The Act expressly authorizes warrantless searches and makes it
unlawful to "refuse, hinder, obstruct, delay, or threaten" an
official's "entry and inspection under any circumstances." 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 6018.608-.610.
While warrantless searches under the SWMA are constitutional
when applied to a commercial entity operating in a heavily
regulated industry, see Commonwealth Dep't of Envtl. Res. v.
Blosenski Disposal Serv., 566 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1989), a reasonable
jury could find that he was not involved in such an enterprise.
Presently, there is no record evidence that Light's property was
licensed for any commercial or industrial activity; rather, it
was a private farm. There is circumstantial but disputed evidence
that Light may have operated a business on his farm and it is
certainly possible that his farm operations were ancillary to his
management of rental properties. In addition, there is no clear
evidence that Light held his farm open to the public; rather, it
appears that he posted "no trespassing" signs to keep the public
at bay. Nor is there undisputed evidence that the buildings on
Light's farm were used in a manner consistent with a heavily
regulated industry; rather, they were used to store an eclectic
mix of materials, appliances and furnishing for use in Light's
Because there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that
Light was acting as a businessman in a heavily regulated
industry, a reasonable jury could find that Light's property was not subject to the administrative search
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.*fn4
Moreover, the law barring random and extensive searches of such
private property was clearly established prior to the events at
issue. Therefore, qualified immunity will not shield defendants
from these claims.*fn5 See Showers v. Spangler,
182 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202
("The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a
right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
he confronted."). B. Retaliation
Claims for retaliation require proof that the defendant's
actions impacted an interest guaranteed by the First Amendment,
and that impairment of that interest was a "substantial or
motivating factor" in the defendant's conduct. Feldman v. Phila.
Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 829 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Estate
of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 2003). Temporal
proximity of the alleged interference to the exercise of the
First Amendment interest is probative of the causation element of
a retaliation claim. Marasco, 318 F.3d at 512. However, unless
the "timing of the alleged retaliatory action [is] `unusually
suggestive' of retaliatory motive," additional evidence of
causation is required to satisfy this element. Id. (quoting
Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir.
In the matter sub judice, Light alleges that defendants
retaliated against him for conversing with the media, appealing
the compliance order, and filing the instant lawsuit. While the
record is devoid of evidence of retaliation for speaking with
reporters, a reasonable jury could find the timing of the search
of Light's barn by Belfanti and Rathfon occurring immediately
following the state-court proceeding and of the alleged threat
by Haws made immediately upon being informed of the instant
lawsuit is unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive. See
Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311-12; California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); Brown v.
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1990); see also
Bristow v. Clevenger, 29 Fed. Appx. 813, 815 (3d Cir. 2002). As
the right to be free from such retaliatory conduct was clearly
established at the time of the events at issue, qualified immunity will not shield defendants
from this claim. See Millhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371,
373-74 (1981); Anderson v. Davilla, 125 F.3d 148, 161-63 (3d
C. Prosecutorial Immunity
When "functioning as integral parts of the judicial process,"
certain officials are immune from § 1983 suits. McArdle v.
Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992). Judges,
prosecutors, and witnesses are entitled to immunity when they
perform judicial or quasi-judicial acts that are "intimately
associated with the judicial phase" of a proceeding. Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991); Ernst v. Child & Youth Serv.,
108 F.3d 486, 494, 496 (3d Cir. 1997).
In the present case, Belfanti and Bartos insist that they are
entitled to prosecutorial immunity for their roles in preparing
compliance orders and fines. Similarly, Haws contends that he is
entitled to immunity because he acted only in the capacity of
counsel for DEP. In the context of the instant motion, the court
finds that defendants' actions did not take place during "an
integral part of the judicial process." Indeed, Belfanti and
Bartos were DEP investigators conducting an administrative
investigation. See Miller v. City of Philadelphia,
174 F.3d 368, 376 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[A]bsolute immunity does not
extend to investigative or administrative acts."); Ernst,
108 F.3d at 497 n. 7 ([W]e would be unwilling to accord absolute
immunity to investigative or administrative actions taken by . . .
[administrative agency employees] outside the context of a
judicial proceeding."). Haws's alleged threats were made during a
private conversation with Light and his counsel. Id. at 495 (stating that prosecuting attorney not
entitled to immunity where actions taken were outside of the
judicial process). As such, defendants are not entitled to
D. Void For Vagueness
An enactment violates due process if its prohibitions are
"vague or not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). For a statute to pass a vagueness
challenge it must (1) provide to a person of "ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited," and (2) provide explicit standards such that the law
will not be arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforced. Id.;
Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127,
134-35 (3d Cir. 2000); see also City of Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) ("It is established that a law fails to
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague
and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the
conduct it prohibits."). In the instant matter, Light alleges that the term "waste," as
used in the SWMA, is unconstitutionally vague.*fn6 (See
Doc. 63 at 6). The court disagrees. The statute specifically
delineates unlawful conduct involving six defined categories of
waste.*fn7 See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6018.103, 6018.610.
The regulations implementing the SWMA define and proscribe
conduct involving an additional sixteen categories of waste.
See 25 PA. CODE § 271.1; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 616 n. 14 (1973) (stating that administrative
regulations may tailor overbroad statute into constitutional
confines). Under these circumstances a person of ordinary
intelligence is provided fair notice of the definition of the
term "waste" as well as unlawful acts pertaining thereto.*fn8
See Commonwealth v. Packer, 798 A.2d 192, 200 (Pa. 2002)
("The SWMA contains standards definite enough to inform a person
of what he or she can and cannot do."); Baumgardner Oil Co. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 606 A.2d 617, 623 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1992) ("The SWMA need not specifically list every conceivable
type of garbage, refuse, or discarded material in order to inform
fully a person that he or she is subject to the SWMA."); see
also San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1136 (3d Cir.
1992) ("Simply because a criminal statute could have been written
more precisely does not mean the statute as written is
unconstitutionally vague.") (citing United States v. Powell,
423 U.S. 87, 94 (1975)).
E. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is generally immune from
suit brought by a private party in federal court. See A.W. v.
Jersey City Pub. Sch., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). The
goal of this "sovereign immunity defense" is to prevent the entry
of judgments in federal court that must be paid from the coffers of a state treasury. Callahan v. City of Philadelphia,
207 F.3d 668, 670-71 (3d Cir. 2000). In essence, it prohibits federal
courts from considering claims that state officials have violated
state laws in carrying out their official duties. See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106
(1984); Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v. Hess,
297 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2002).
In the instant matter, Light seeks a determination that conduct
of the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Secretary of the DEP
violate state constitutional provisions. (See Doc. 21 ¶¶ 6,
20). This court does not have jurisdiction to hear these claims.
See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106; Hess, 297 F.3d at 325.
However, the claims against these defendants for injunctive and
declaratory relief to end the alleged violations of federal law
may go forward. See Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323; M.A. ex rel.
E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of City of Newark,
344 F.3d 335, 344-45 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Melo v. Hafer,
912 F.2d 628, 635 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1990) ("In suits for injunctive or
declaratory relief . . . the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an
action in which a state official is the named party.").
As the terms of the Solid Waste Management Act are not
unconstitutionally vague, and because the court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over alleged state constitution violations by state
officials, defendants' motion for summary judgment on these
claims will be granted. The motion will otherwise be denied. An appropriate order will issue. ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of September, 2005, upon consideration
of defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37), and for the
reasons set forth in the accompanying memoranda, it is hereby
1. The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37) is
GRANTED in favor of defendants and against plaintiff
on the claims that the Solid Waste Management Act is
unconstitutionally vague and that the actions of the
Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the
Secretary of the Department of Environmental
Protection violate the state constitution. See
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984); Pennsylvania Federation of
Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 325
(3d Cir. 2002).
2. The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37) is
3. The pretrial and trial schedule in the
above-captioned action is revised as follows:
a. Jury selection shall commence at 9:30 a.m. on
November 7, 2005, in Courtroom No. 2, Ninth Floor,
228 Walnut Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
b. Motions in limine and supporting briefs shall be
filed on or before October 3, 2005. c. Pretrial memoranda shall be filed on or before
12:00 p.m. on October 12, 2005.
d. A pretrial conference shall be held at 11:00 a.m.
on Wednesday, October 19, 2005, in Courtroom No. 2,
Ninth Floor, 228 Walnut Street, Harrisburg,
e. Proposed voir dire questions shall be filed on or
before October 19, 2005.
f. Proposed jury instructions shall be filed on or
before October 19, 2005.
4. All other pretrial instructions set forth in prior
case management orders shall remain in effect.
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