United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
May 25, 2004.
CANDACE RAY Plaintiff,
ABINGTON TOWNSHIP, CHIEF OF POLICE WIEEIAM KELLY, POLICE OFFICER NISBET, POEICE OFFICER J. KING, POLICE OFFICER BRUCE HASLAM, OFFICER MATZ, OFFICER RAWTZ, OFFICER SCHOLL, OFFICER MANN AND ABINGTON MEMORIAE HOSPITAE AND MARK SCHNEE Defendants
The opinion of the court was delivered by: RONALD BUCKWALTER, District Judge
Presently before the Court are Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment, and Plaintiff's responses thereto. For the reasons set forth
below, Defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part.
According to the Plaintiff, the following events led to Plaintiff's
present complaint. In July 2000, Plaintiff Candace Ray called the police
to her house to intervene in a domestic dispute. As a result of this
call, the Abington police arrested Jon Grob, Plaintiff's fiance. Shortly
thereafter, Plaintiff went to Mr. Grob's arraignment hearing and
attempted to stop the hearing by explaining that she was responsible for the
alleged altercation, not Mr. Grob. The magistrate ordered Plaintiff to
leave the courtroom, and Defendant Officer Nisbet of the Abington Police
department escorted her out of the building, eventually convincing her to
leave the premises in her car. Within a few minutes, Plaintiff returned,
parking outside the courtroom window. Defendant Officer Nisbet went out
to speak with Plaintiff and to place her under arrest. While speaking
with Plaintiff, Defendant Officer Nisbet leaned his head and arms inside
the passenger's side window of Plaintiff's car. When Plaintiff learned
she was to be arrested, her car rolled forward, hitting Defendant Officer
Nisbet. Defendant Officer Nisbet then dove inside the car, and attempted
to stop Plaintiff from fleeing. Defendant Officer King soon joined
Defendant Officer Nisbet in subduing Plaintiff. During the course of the
struggle, Defendant Officer King sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray.
Defendant Officer Bruce Haslam allegedly instructed other officers
responding to the scene via police radio. Throughout the time that the
Defendant Police Officers were subduing her, Plaintiff was screaming and
crying. This event caused Plaintiff to suffer a bipolar episode.
Defendant Officer King and other officers placed Plaintiff under arrest
and transported her in a police car to the Abington Police Station.
Plaintiff requested she be taken to the hospital for treatment for the
pepper spray still burning her skin. Instead, Plaintiff was placed in an
open area, forced to strip in front of several male officers and various
prisoners in nearby cells, and sprayed with a hose. During this time,
Plaintiff cried and screamed, while the unidentified officers jeered and
taunted her.*fn1 Afterward, Plaintiff was given a paper dress, and put in a cell. Six hours later, Plaintiff was taken to Abington
According to hospital records, while at Abington Hospital, Plaintiff
became violent and was placed in four point restraints. She was then
given 10 mg of intramuscular Haldol to bring her out of her bipolar
episode. When she came out of this episode, Plaintiff saw Defendant Mark
Schnee talking to police officers at the nurses' station. She heard him
tell the police officers to "lock her [Plaintiff] up and throw away the
key." She also observed Defendant Mark Schnee revealing Plaintiff's
medical history to the police officers, by reviewing her medical records
on the computer at the nurses' station and she heard Defendant Mark
Schnee tell the police officers that Plaintiff was not currently taking
her medication and refused to take her medication. Soon after Plaintiff
observed this exchange, she was involuntarily committed to the Montgomery
County Emergency Services Building 50.
II. Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where all of the evidence
demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Since a grant of summary judgment will deny a
party its chance in court, all inferences must be drawn in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The ultimate question in determining whether a
motion for summary judgment should be granted is "whether reasonable
minds may differ as to the verdict." Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 143 F.3d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1998).
"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
a. Count I Civil Rights Violations
Plaintiff brought suit against the following Defendants: Chief of
Police William Kelly, Police Officer S. Nisbet, Police Officer J. King,
Police Officer B. Haslam, Police Officer Matz, Police Officer Rawtz,
Police Officer Scholl, and Police Officer Mann (collectively referred to
as "Defendant Police Officers"). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Police Officers intentionally used excessive force and failed
to provide Plaintiff with medical care for her serious medical condition,
thereby violating her Constitutional rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Despite naming all the
Defendant Police Officers in her complaint, the deposition evidence
provided by both parties identifies only Defendant Officers Haslam,
Nisbet and King as participating in any activity that might involve
Defendant Officer Haslam is only implicated as directing, via radio,
the police response involved with Plaintiff's arrest. A police officer
may be held liable for a violation of a Plaintiff's constitutional rights
not only when he or she personally participates in the violation, but
also if he or she "directs others to so violate, or had knowledge of and
acquiesced in his [or her] subordinates' violations." Sharrar v.
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 821 (3d Cir. 1997). However, where the
Plaintiff can not identify the alleged violators or where the Plaintiff
cannot provide any evidence that superior officers knew and acquiesced to
the subordinate officer's actions, those officers cannot be held liable. In this case, although Plaintiff
cannot identify any of the perpetrators, Defendant Nisbet named Defendant
Officers Matz, Scholl and King as well as himself as being in the
cellblock area while Plaintiff was being hosed off.*fn2 Plaintiff has
not provided evidence that any of the other named Defendant Police
Officers participated in, or had knowledge of and acquiesced to the
alleged excessive force incidents or any of the other incidents detailed
in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Therefore as to Defendant Officers Mann
and Rawtz, Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment is granted on Count I.
As to Chief of Police William Kelly, there is no evidence that he
participated in any part of the arrest or detention of Plaintiff nor did
Plaintiff provide any evidence that Defendant Chief of Police Kelly knew
of and acquiesced to the level of force used in connection with her
arrest and detention, therefore as to Chief Kelly, Defendants' Motion on
Count I is granted. As to all other Defendants, Defendants' Motion on
Count I is denied.
b. Count II Civil Rights Violation (Excessive Force)
The second count of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is against the
Township of Abington for civil rights violations for repeatedly and
knowingly failing to enforce the laws of the United States and allowing
instead for Police Officers to employ excessive and illegal force. Under
the United States Supreme Court holding in Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality may be held
responsible for civil rights violations if the Plaintiff can prove that
there was a longstanding custom or policy in place that had taken on the
force of law, and that a municipality employee, acting in accordance with
that policy, violated the civil rights of the Plaintiff.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95. A municipality cannot be held
liable for merely employing persons who commit tortious acts. There must
instead be a causal link between the tortious act and the municipality's
custom or policy. Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 972
(3d Cir. 1996). In this case, there are several practices alleged by the
Plaintiff that if proven to be a custom of established and condoned by
Abington Township, would subject the township to liability. Specifically,
if the Township's policy condoned the excessive use of pepper spray or if
the Township's custom was that prisoners were to be stripped naked and
hosed down in front of members of the opposite sex, then the Township
would be liable to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has provided some
evidence that such a policy exists, in the form of witness testimony
describing the violations.*fn3 Therefore Defendants' motion as to Count
II is denied.
c. Count III Assault and Battery
Plaintiff's third count is against all defendants for assault and
battery. In order to sustain a claim for assault, under Pennsylvania law
Plaintiff must show that "Defendant intentionally caused an imminent
apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily contact in Plaintiff."
Lakits v. York, 258 F. Supp.2d 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
Although Plaintiff brought this assault charge against all Defendants, in
her opposition brief, she only points to one incident, during which she
claims Dr. Schnee told police officers to "lock her up and throw away the
key." Dr. Schnee's words do not threaten imminent bodily harm, but rather
imprisonment. Plaintiff offered no authority that a threat of imprisonment might be
considered an assault, nor could this Court could find any authority
supporting that proposition. Indeed, this Court finds that under no
reasonable interpretation of the term could a threat of imprisonment
cause an imminent apprehension of harmful bodily contact. Even if the
Court were to agree, which it does not, that Plaintiff might come to
bodily harm while imprisoned, there is still no threat of imminent bodily
harm. This threat simply does not qualify as an assault.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that she suffered a battery caused by all
Defendants. In Pennsylvania, to prove a claim of battery one must show
that a "Defendant intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact to
Plaintiff, and that such contact with Plaintiff resulted."
Lakits, 258 F. Supp.2d at 407. In the present case, Plaintiff
alleges that she experienced a bipolar episode that lasted from the time
she was arrested outside the Abington courthouse, until she awoke at
Abington Hospital to discover herself in four point restraints. She has
no recollection of any of the events that transpired during her bipolar
episode. Despite Plaintiffs assertion that she could not have acted
violently during her bipolar episode such that four point restraints were
required because she has never acted violently in a hospital setting, two
witnesses and hospital records state that she struck a nurse and had to
be restrained. (Defs. Abington Hosp. et al's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A at
40, Ex. B at 26, Ex. C at 11). Thus, Defendants have provided evidence
that Plaintiff's violent actions necessitated the restraints, and
Plaintiff provides no evidence except her conjecture that she does not
usually act in a violent manner in a hospital setting. This is not enough
to create a genuine issue of material fact. Under the circumstances
described, it is reasonable for Hospital personnel restrain a violent
patient in order to provide medical care. See. Collins v.
Klotz, No. Civ. A. 92-3772, 1994 WE 371479 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1994)
(holding that the restraint and administration of anti-psychotic medication to a
prisoner in the mental health wing of a prison was reasonably related to
the state's interest in preventing harm to the inmate and others).
Plaintiff also alleges that she was given twice the legal dosage of
intramuscular Haldol during her bipolar episode. Plaintiff did not
provide expert testimony to substantiate this claim, rather she merely
states within her deposition that a friend asked a doctor friend of his
about the dosage of Haldol given to the Plaintiff. The doctor allegedly
stated that given Plaintiff's weight, the lOmg dose given to Plaintiff by
Abington hospital was two and a half times the limit. (Pl.'s Opp. to
Defs. Abington Hospital, et al's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B at 26-27). This
unsubstantiated allegation is not enough to create a genuine issue of
Finally, Plaintiff argues that her signed consent to treatment form was
invalid because she signed it while in the throes of a bipolar episode
and could not truly consent to treatment. Unquestionably, injecting
Plaintiff with intramuscular Haldol without her consent would be a
battery. Karibjanian v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp.,
717 F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (E.D.Pa. 1989). However, Plaintiff's argument fails
here as well because even in the absence of consent, physician may still
treat a patient in an emergency situation without causing a battery.
In Re Fiori, 543 Pa. 592, 601, 673 A.2d 905, 910 (1996) ("The doctrine
of informed consent declares that absent an emergency situation, medical
treatment may not be imposed without the patient's informed consent.").
In the present case, Plaintiff exhibited a pattern of erratic and violent
behavior that eventually led to medical personnel to place her in four
point restraints. Plaintiff's violent behavior, a symptom of her bipolar
episode, needed to be treated for her safety and the safety of others. In
other words, the Plaintiff's condition caused the emergency that led to her treatment with an injection of Haldol. Although, hospital
staff were reasonable in assuming they had obtained Plaintiffs consent to
treatment when she signed the consent form, even if that was invalid,
Plaintiffs actions created an emergency situation wherein she needed to
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
on Plaintiff's Assault and Battery claims are granted.
d. Count IV Violation of Substantive Due Process
Count IV of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Police
Officers and the Township of Abington violated her substantive due
process rights under the 14th Amendment and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To make out a claim for violation of substantive due
process, "the plaintiff must show that the state acted in a manner that
`shocks the conscience.'" Schieber v. City of Philadelphia.
320 F.3d 409, 417 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Sacramento v. Lewis.
523 U.S. 833 (1998)). There are at least some questions of fact regarding
police actions, specifically Plaintiff's allegation of being stripped and
hosed down in view of members of the opposite sex, that when determined
would establish or negate a cause of action in this case. Therefore
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV is denied.
e. Count V Violation of Civil Rights
Defendants did not address this count in their Motion for Summary
Judgment, therefore it stands. f. Count VI Violation of Privacy
In Count VI of her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant
Police Officers and the Township of Abington violated her constitutional
right to privacy under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Plaintiffs claim under the First Amendment right to peaceably
assemble is not a privacy right. The First Amendment right to peaceably
assemble is instead a right to congregate in a public place, so long as
the participating parties do not obstruct the free passage.
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham. 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)
("Our decisions make it clear that the mere refusal to move on after a
police officer's requesting that a person standing or loitering should do
so is not enough to support the offense. . . . [T]here must also be a
showing of the accused's blocking free passage. . . ."). In this case,
however, the Plaintiff was ordered by Defendant Police Officers King and
Nisbet to leave the premises, when she returned she was arrested and
eventually found guilty of misbehavior in office. If Plaintiff wished to
challenge her right to peaceably assemble outside the Abington courtroom
where her fiance was arraigned, she should have done so during her
hearing on the misbehavior in office charge.
Plaintiff also alleges Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment privacy
right by stripping her naked and hosing her down in front of five male
police officers as well as an unknown number of male prisoners. Prisoners
do not have an expectation of privacy in their prison cells.
Warcloud v. Horn, No. Civ. A. 97-3657, 1998 WL 126917 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 17, 1998). Prisoners do not, however, shed all their constitutional
rights at the prison gate and in fact, retain some limited rights to
bodily privacy, so long as they do not interfere with legitimate
penological interests. Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 493
(9th Cir. 1985) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)); Johnson v. Pa. Bureau of
Corrections, 661 F. Supp. 425, 430 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that
prisoners had a constitutional right to privacy not to be viewed by
guards of the opposite sex, although this right is not unlimited.).
Plaintiff argues that the Abington Police Department had a practice of
stripping female prisoners within view of male police officers and male
prisoners. Although Defendants do not concede that this event occurred as
Plaintiff alleges, there is at least a genuine question of fact as to
whether it happened as the Plaintiff described. If it did occur, then it
is hard to imagine how the circumstances described would serve a
legitimate penological interest as alleged by the Defendants. It is true
that there might be exigent circumstances which would require a female
prisoner to be cleaned off under the supervision of one or at most two
male police officers. However, there can be no legitimate reason for the
presence of five police officers during such an event, nor for conducting
it in full view of other prisoners of the opposite sex. Because there is
a genuine question of fact concerning whether Plaintiff's version of
events did in fact occur, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on
Count VI is denied.
g. Count VII Failure to Train
Plaintiff further alleges that her civil rights were violated because
the Abington Chief of Police and the Township of Abington failed to
properly train the Defendant Police Officers to properly deal with
persons afflicted with Plaintiff's condition. In order to prove a failure
to train claim, Plaintiff must show that the failure to train on the part
of Defendants amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom police come into contact. City of Canton. Ohio v.
Harris. 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989). In the present case, Plaintiff has provided enough evidence, that if believed by a jury, may
substantiate her civil rights claim. Plaintiff, her fiance Mr. Grob, and
Defendant Officer Nisbet all agree to some degree on the following facts:
Plaintiffs hysterical crying and screaming began when she was maced
during her arrest and continued throughout the time she was transported
to the police station. (PL's Opp. to Defs. Abington Township, et al's
Mot. For Summ. J. Ex. B at 21-22; Defs. Abington Memorial Hosp., et al's
Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A at 29). After Plaintiff's arrival at the Abington
Police Station, Plaintiff was seen naked from the waist up, screaming and
crying, arms by her side, during the time when Defendant Police Officers
were spraying her with water. (Pl.'s Opp. to Defs. Abington Township, et
al's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B at 24-25). It was not until Plaintiff stood
on the sink in her cell and tied a string around her neck that the
Abington Police Department called for an ambulance to take her to the
hospital. (Defs. Abington Memorial Hosp., et al's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A
at 35). This sort of ongoing hysterical behavior, if proven, should have
alerted someone to Plaintiff's altered mental state and need for medical
assistance. Ignoring such behavior for over three hours until Plaintiff
made a suicidal gesture could be considered "deliberate indifference."
Therefore, Defendants' Motion as to Count VII is denied.
h. Count VIII Negligence
Count VIII of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants
Abington Memorial Hospital and Mark Schnee were negligent because there
were "policies, practices and customs known to place persons with mental
or emotional conditions in involuntary confinement without proper
jurisdiction or legal authority." (Pl. Am. Compl. ¶ 125). In
Pennsylvania, in order to establish a claim for medical malpractice, a Plaintiff
must show through competent medical testimony that:
(a) The defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff;
(b) The defendant breached that duty;
(c) That the breach of the duty was the proximate
cause or substantial factor in causing harm to
the plaintiff; and
(d) the plaintiff suffered damages as a direct
result of the harm.
Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 584 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1990).
Defendants argue that because Plaintiff did not provide any expert
medical testimony to establish all of the above the above, the Defendants
should prevail. Plaintiff, in turn, argues that she is alleging
Defendants were negligent in disclosing her medical records to the
Defendant police officers, thereby violating her privacy. This is a
wholly different argument from what her pleading alleges. Plaintiff has
offered no evidence that there were negligent practices and customs that
caused her to be involuntarily committed, as alleged in her Amended
Complaint. For this reason, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted on Count VIII.
i. Count IX False Imprisonment
Count IX of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that all Defendants
caused her to be falsely imprisoned against her will. Under Pennsylvania
law, in order to make a case for false imprisonment, the Plaintiff must
show that she was detained, and that such detention was unlawful.
Pahle v. Colebrookdale Tp., 227 F. Supp.2d 361, 374 (E.D.
Pa. 2002) (citing Fagan v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation.
299 Pa. 109, 149 A. 159 (1930)). The record indicates the Plaintiff was lawfully arrested and eventually convicted of
misbehavior in office. (Pl.'s Opp. to Defs. Abington Memorial Hospital,
et al's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B at 39). Plaintiff did not mount a legal
challenge to this charge, therefore her arrest during the commission of
the offense was valid. In addition, as previously explained in section
III (c), the is significant credible evidence that Plaintiff struck a
nurse during her examination at Abington Memorial Hospital.
Plaintiff has no memory of the event and provides no counter evidence
to challenge the facts presented by other witnesses, her only argument is
that she has never been violent towards hospital personnel before. There
is no evidence that Plaintiff's subsequent restraint and involuntary
commitment to a mental facility was anything other than a valid
imprisonment under the law. Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Count IX is granted.
j. Count X Violation of Pennsylvania Mental Health
Count X of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that all Defendants
jointly and severally violated the Pennsylvania Mental Heath Procedures
Act and Plaintiff's right to due process under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act,
physicians, hospitals and peace officers are immune from civil liability
for participating in the decision to have a person examined or treated,
except where there is evidence of willful misconduct or gross negligence.
Downey v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 817 A.2d 517, 524
(2003) (citing 50 P.S. § 7114(a)). Plaintiff alleges that the
following actions violated the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act:
Plaintiff was placed in four point restraints, Plaintiff was given two
and a half times the limit of her medication, and finally, that Defendant
Police Officers King and Nisbet looked at her private medical records and
Defendant Schnee disclosed that to the Defendant Police Officers that Plaintiff
refused to take her medications and should be locked up and the key
thrown away. As previously mentioned in this opinion, Plaintiff has
failed to provide any evidence to substantiate either the unlawful
restraint claim or the over-medication claim. As such, the Court finds
that these two claims cannot form the basis for liability under the
Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act. As for the final allegation,
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she saw the Defendant Police
Officers King and Nisbet looking at her medical record on the computer,
and heard Defendant Schnee discussing her medical history, including her
propensity not to take her medication, as well as making the statement
that they should lock her up and throw away the key. Plaintiff's
testimony about her first hand knowledge of these facts at least creates
a genuine question of fact regarding whether these events took place as
Plaintiff perceived them. The next question becomes whether, if all the
facts are as Plaintiff alleges, that conduct rises to the level of gross
negligence or willful misconduct. The Supreme Court in Bloom v.
Dubois Regional Medical Center. 597 A.2d 671 (Pa.Super. 1991), held
"that the legislature intended the term gross negligence to mean a form
of negligence where the facts support substantially more than ordinary
carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference. The behavior of the
defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard
of care." Id. at 679. In Bloom, a husband and wife
sued a psychiatrist and the manager of a psychiatric unit after the
husband had discovered his wife hanging from shoestrings adjacent to her
room in a failed suicide attempt. The couple charged that the
psychiatrist and the manager of the psychiatric unit were both grossly
negligent in failing to prevent her suicide attempt because upon
admission she had expressed a desire to kill herself and sought treatment
to prevent that from occurring. The trial court held that the defendants
were immune from suit under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, but the
Supreme Court reversed and held that under the facts alleged in the
complaint, such facts could be sufficient to give rise to a finding of
gross negligence. In the present case, the facts alleged make a case, if
proven, for invasion of Plaintiff's privacy through disclosure of her
private medical history. In addition, if Plaintiff's version of events is
believed, such disclosure was not inadvertent, but rather intentional and
knowing. Under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act, medical
personnel have a duty not to disclose a patient's medical history to
anyone except medical professionals during the course of treatment, the
county administrator pursuant to particular sections of the act, the
court in connection with legal proceedings authorized by the act and
federal agencies if they are engaged in treating the patient. 50 P.S.
§ 7111 (2003). Defendant Police Officers King and Nisbet do not
qualify under any of the above categories to warrant access to
Plaintiff's medical records. Therefore, an intentional disclosure of
Plaintiff's medical history, if the jury determines that did in fact
occur, could rise to the level of gross negligence or willful misconduct.
For this reason, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count X is
k. Count XI Invasion of Privacy
Plaintiff concedes that Count XI should be dismissed because it was
brought after the statute of limitations expired. Therefore Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count XI is granted.
IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are
granted as to Count I for Defendant Police Officers Mann, and Rawtz, and
Chief of Police Kelly; Count III for all Defendants; Count VIII for all
Defendants, Count IX for all Defendants, and Count XI for all Defendants.
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are denied as to Count I for
Defendant Police Officers Nisbet, King, Haslam, Matz, and Scholl.
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment on Counts II, IV, V, VI, VII,
and X are denied. ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of May, 2004, upon consideration of Defendants
Abington Township et al's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 22),
Defendants Abington Memorial Hospital and Mark Schnee's Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 21) and Plaintiff Candace Ray's Oppositions
thereto (Docket Nos. 24 & 25). Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment are GRANTED as to Count I for Defendant Police
Officers Mann, and Rawtz, and Chief of Police Kelly; and
GRANTED as to all Defendants for Counts III, VIII, IX, and XI.
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED as to Count
I for Defendant Police Officers Nisbet, King, Haslam, Matz, and Scholl
and DENIED as to all Defendants on Counts II, IV, V, VI, VII, and X.