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MONTGOMERY COUNTY v. MICROVOTE CORPORATION

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania


May 13, 2004.

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Plaintiff,
v.
MICROVOTE CORPORATION, CARSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., and WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, CIVIL ACTION

The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT KELLY, Senior District Judge

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court are the Objections to the Clerk's Taxation of Costs filed by Defendant, Westchester Fire Insurance Company ("Westchester"). For the reasons stated below, this Court will affirm in part and reverse in part the Clerk's Taxation of Costs.

I. BACKGROUND

  Plaintiff, Montgomery County ("the County"), brought this diversity action against Defendants, Microvote Corporation ("Microvote"), Carson Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("Carson") and Westchester. The action stems from a written contract entered on May 25, 1994, whereby the County purchased voting machines, hardware, software and support services from Microvote for the price of approximately $3.8 million.*fn1 The voting machines malfunctioned during several primary and general elections which engendered disputes regarding the parties actions and obligations pursuant to the contract. As a result, the County filed a lawsuit contending that both Microvote and Carson were liable for negligence (Count I), breach of warranty (Count II), and fraud (Count IV). In addition, the County asserted that Microvote was solely liable for breach of contract (Count III) and wrongful use of civil proceedings (Count V). The final Count of the Complaint was an action by the County against Westchester under the performance bond (Count VI).

  Following a ten day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the County in the amount of $1,048,500.00.*fn2 Specifically, the County prevailed on its breach of warranty claim against Microvote (Count II) and its breach of the performance bond claim against Westchester (Count VI). On November 3, 2000, a final judgment was entered in favor of the County and against Westchester and Microvote for $1,048,500.00. (See Doc. No. 386). The parties filed post trial motions which were denied by this Court. Westchester and Microvote appealed the denials of their post trial motions and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ("Third Circuit") affirmed the judgments. Westchester paid the principal amount of the judgment, $1,048,500.00, plus post-judgment interest of $182,106.28, for a total payment of $1,230,606.28. The County filed its Bill of Costs on March 6, 2003. Following a telephone conference, the Clerk of Court awarded costs in the amount of $107,780.81 on February 18, 2004.

 II. STANDARD

  The taxation of costs by the Clerk of Court is subject to de novo review. City of Rome, Italy v. Glanton, 184 F.R.D. 547, 548 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citations omitted). In reviewing a bill of costs, the court applies the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)). Rule 54(d) provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]xcept when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. . . ."*fn3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). "By mandating that, subject to court intervention, costs be allowed to a prevailing party as of course, the rule creates the strong presumption that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 462 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Under Rule 54(d), "a prevailing party generally is entitled to an award of costs unless the award would be `inequitable.'" Smith v. SEPTA, 47 F.3d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). In light of the strong presumption towards the awarding of costs, "the losing party bears the burden of making the showing that an award is inequitable under the circumstances." Paoli, 221 F.3d at 462-63 (citation omitted). Regarding the limitations on a district court's discretion to deny costs to a prevailing party, the Third Circuit has held that "the denial of costs to the prevailing party . . . is in the nature of a penalty for some defection on his part in the course of the litigation." Smith, 47 F.3d at 99 (citations omitted).

 III. DISCUSSION

  Westchester objects to the Clerk's Taxation of Costs on several grounds.*fn4 First, Westchester makes a general argument that the awarding of costs to the County is improper because it was not a prevailing party as required by Rule 54.

  Second, Westchester objects to specific items taxed in the Bill of Costs. The County argues that the Clerk's awarding of costs was proper because it was the prevailing party in this case. The County also asserts that the Clerk correctly taxed all of the specific items included in its Bill of Costs. Lastly, in addition to upholding the Clerk's Taxation of Costs, the County seeks post-judgment interest on its costs. Each of the parties' arguments will be addressed seriatim. A. Westchester's General Objection

  1. Prevailing Party Status

  Westchester argues that the County is not a prevailing party because it only had limited success at trial.

  Westchester's argument is premised upon the basis that the County was not successful on all of its claims and that the award of $1,048,500.00 was not the full amount of the original damages demand. "As is apparent from the language of Rule 54(d)(1), `the determination of who qualifies as a prevailing party is central to deciding whether costs are available.'" Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 2001)(quoting Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2667). "Ordinarily, a prevailing party for Rule 54(d) purposes is no different from a prevailing party in other circumstances." City of Rome, 184 F.R.D. at 549 (citation omitted). In the Third Circuit, "the standard used for determining prevailing party status is `whether plaintiff achieved some of the benefit sought by the party bringing the suit.'" Id. (quoting Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 910 (3d Cir. 1985)). According to the Third Circuit, in order "to apply the prevailing party standard, the court must identify the relief plaintiff sought and sometimes the legal theories on which the relief was based." Id. (citing Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 911). The Third Circuit has "clarified this inquiry by indicating that the court should also evaluate whether the litigation had a material effect in bringing about that benefit or change in legal relationships." Id. (citing Metro. Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. Pittsburgh, 964 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1992); N.J. Rooming and Boarding House Owners v. Ashbury Park, 152 F.3d 217, 225 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998)).

  Evaluating whether the litigation had a material effect in bringing about the benefit sought by the County, this Court concludes that the County is a prevailing party. In light of the judgment entered in the County's favor, and the award of $1,048,500.00, the County did receive some of the relief that it sought by bringing its lawsuit.*fn5 The County did not succeed on all of its claims, and did not receive the full amount of the damages it requested; however, total success is not warranted for purposes of prevailing party status under Rule 54(d). See Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 910 (stating that the standard in determining prevailing party status is "whether plaintiff achieved some of the benefit sought by the party bringing suit")(emphasis added); see also Garonzik v. Whitman Diner, 910 F. Supp. 167, 168 (D.N.J. 1995)(declaring that "[a] prevailing party is the one in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of whether the party has recovered its entire claim or a portion thereof"); 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2667 at 212, n. 16 (collecting cases)(stating that "a claimant who has obtained some relief usually will be regarded as the prevailing party even though he has not sustained all of his claims"). Focusing upon the relief actually obtained by the County in the form of a judgment in its favor and an award of $1,048,500.00, the only viable conclusion is that the County is the prevailing party in this litigation. As a result, the County is entitled to costs because it is a prevailing party for purposes of Rule 54(d).

  B. Westchester's Specific Objections

  Westchester makes several objections to certain portions of the costs enumerated by the County and awarded by the Clerk. Specifically, Westchester objects to the awarding of the following costs: (1) fees of the Clerk; (2) fees for service of summons and subpoena; (3) fees of the court reporter for transcripts; (4) fees for witnesses; and (5) fees for exemplification and copies of papers. The Court will address each objection in turn.

  1. Fees of the Clerk

  Section 1920(1) permits the Court to tax as costs the fees of the Clerk. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1). The Clerk granted the County $410.00 in Clerk's fees. Westchester contends that it was erroneously taxed for $155.00 in fees of the Clerk.*fn6 Westchester argues that it was improperly taxed $155.00 in Clerk's fees for the pro hac vice admission of Plaintiff's counsel into the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama and the certification and filing of the judgment against Microvote in the United States Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The County argues that it is entitled to the full amount of its Clerk's fees because all of the fees were incurred in relation to the litigation of the case.

  The Court will not allow the award of $100.00 in costs for pro hac vice fees. "[Pro hac vice] fees are an `expense of counsel for the privilege of practicing law in this Court' and, as such, are `not normally charged to a fee-paying client . . . and are not recoverable' under § 1920." Sheffer v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 290 F. Supp.2d 538, 552 (E.D. Pa. 2003)(quoting Romero v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 585, 594 (E.D. Mo. 1994)). The Court, however, will allow the taxation of the remaining fees for the certification and filing of the judgment against Microvote in the United States Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Thus, regarding the $155.00 in Clerk's fees that are in dispute, the Clerk's taxation of $100.00 is reversed, while the taxation of the remaining amount is affirmed.

  2. Fees for Service of Summons and Subpoena

  Along with the allowance of Clerk's fees, Section 1920(1) also allows for the taxing of subpoena fees.*fn7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1). Westchester alleges that the Clerk erred in awarding the County $1,999.90 in fees for service of summons and subpoena because the County did not request a waiver of service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d). Westchester argues that Section 1920(1) is tempered by the waiver of service provisions of Rule 4(d) and courts have denied the recovery of process server fees in the absence of a request for a waiver of service. Additionally, Westchester contends that the serving of both testimonial and document subpoenas on certain defense witnesses and third-parties who were not deposed or did not testify at trial should not be taxed. The County argues that it is entitled to all of its costs of serving the summonses and the complaint.

  The Court rejects Westchester's argument that the County is not entitled to recover its process server fees because it failed to request a waiver of service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d). Westchester does not cite to a single relevant case in support of its argument and the Court did not find any support.*fn8 It is Westchester's burden to make the showing that an award is inequitable under the circumstances. Without any support for the argument that a request of waiver of service under Rule 4(d) is required in order to recover fees for service and subpoena, the Court denies Westchester's argument that the subpoena and service fees were improperly taxed.

  Likewise the Court disagrees with Westchester's argument that the costs of serving both testimonial and document subpoenas on certain defense witnesses and third-parties who were not deposed or did not testify at trial were improper. "Although the court has discretion in [the area regarding marshal fees for service of subpoenas], the appropriate inquiry is whether the issuance of the subpoena was reasonable and necessary in light of the facts known at the time of service." Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 422, 427 (D. Del. 2001) (citation omitted). In the County's Response to Westchester's Objections to the Clerk's Taxation of Costs, the County explained that it believed that the subpoenaed depositions, testimony and records were necessary in their case-in-chief and critical to defeating the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. The County's Response specifically addressed, as well as countered, each of Westchester's various arguments. In light of the County's Response, it appears that the fees for service of subpoenas were reasonable and necessary in light of the facts known to the County at the time of service. Westchester has not provided any evidence that the County did not reasonably believe that subpoenaed depositions, testimony and records were necessary at the time of service. Thus, Westchester has failed to meet its burden of making the showing that the award of $1,999.90 in fees for service of the summons and subpoenas is inequitable under the circumstances. Paoli, 221 F.3d at 462-63 (citation omitted).

  3. Fees of the Court Reporter for Transcripts

  28 U.S.C § 1920(2) allows for the taxation of "fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). Westchester argues that the Clerk's award of $39,053.03 in court reporter fees was improper. Specifically, Westchester objects to the taxation of costs for four daily copies of the trial transcript, transcripts of pre-trial hearings and the proceedings in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Westchester also objects to the taxation of costs pertaining to certain copies of depositions. The County contends that the Clerk's taxation of fees for the court reporter costs was proper. The County argues that "Westchester's objections contradict the law and facts and therefore fail to overcome its onerous burden to rebut the heavy presumption that [the County] is entitled to an automatic award of the fees of the Court Reporter." (The County's Response to Westchester's Objections to Clerk's Tax. of Costs at 14).

  The taxation of costs for the three daily copies of the trial transcripts for October 18, 2000 (counsel's opening statements), October 30, 2000 (the last day of testimony) and October 31, 2000 (closing arguments, charge of the court, questions from the jury and answers) is appropriate. "It is properly within the discretion of the trial court to tax costs for a daily transcript where the daily copies were `necessarily obtained for use' in the case." Peters v. Del. River Port Auth. of PA and NJ, No. 91-6814, 1995 WL 37614, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1995)(quoting Holmes v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 63, 64 (5th Cir. 1994)). "The costs of expedited transcripts have been taxed in cases involving complex issues or when a trial extends over a long period of time." Farley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 93-6948, 1997 WL 537406, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1997 Aug. 1, 1997) (citation omitted). Westchester states, without any argument, that the daily copies of the transcripts were "not reasonably necessary." (Westchester's Objections to Clerk's Tax. of Costs at 10). Explaining the length and the factual complexity of the trial, the County argues that it is entitled to the costs for the selectively ordered daily copies of the transcripts because they were required to prepare for, as well as conduct, direct and cross-examination during trial and the close of argument to the jury. In light of the County's explanation, and Westchester's failure to offer any showing that the copies of the transcripts were unnecessary, the County has established that the daily copies were necessarily obtained for use in the case. Thus, the expedited copies of the trial transcripts were necessary to the County's case and were not merely ordered as a convenience for counsel. Consequently, the Clerk's taxation of costs for the daily copies of the transcripts was proper.

  Similar to its sole contention that the daily copies of the trial transcripts were not reasonably necessary, Westchester also argues that the transcripts of the pre-trial hearings and the proceedings in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama were not reasonably necessary. Also similar to the aforementioned contention is the fact that Westchester fails to offer any argument or show how the transcripts were not reasonably necessary. This Court has been closely involved with this action since its inception and has followed the case through extensive discovery, pre-trial hearings, trial and post-trial motions. Based upon its knowledge of the case, the Court finds that the transcripts of the pre-trial hearings and the proceedings in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama were necessarily obtained for use in the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2). Since Westchester has not demonstrated how the pre-trial transcription costs were not reasonably necessary, it has failed to meet its burden of proving that the Clerk's taxation of costs for the transcripts of the pre-trial hearings and the proceedings in the Court for the Northern District of Alabama was inequitable under the circumstances.

  Westchester's last argument regarding the taxation of transcription costs pertains to fees awarded to the County for copies of depositions. Westchester argues that the only court reporter fees which are properly taxable are the fees for depositions that were read into the record at trial. Westchester contends that costs should neither be taxed for depositions that were not used at trial nor for the transcripts of the County's own witnesses. In addition, Westchester argues that the County is not entitled to the costs of having the deposition transcripts prepared on an expedited basis, entered on a computer disk or delivered by a private courier on an expedited basis. "A prevailing party may obtain costs for deposition transcripts which are reasonably necessary for the case." Smith v. Crown Equip. Corp., No 97-541, 2000 WL 62314, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2000) (citations omitted). "It is sufficient that the depositions appear reasonably necessary to the parties in light of the particular situation existing at the time they were taken." Id. (citation omitted). "This rule applies even though the deposition taken may not have been used at trial." Id. (citations omitted). However, "[t]he court will not . . . grant costs for deposition transcripts which were obtained for the mere convenience of counsel." Id. (citation omitted). Also, "[a] party may not . . . recover the costs of depositions for investigatory or discovery purposes which are not used or intended for use at trial." Herbst, 2000 WL 1185517, at *1 (citations omitted). The County argues that the transcripts of all of the depositions were necessary for trial based upon the following reasons: some witness resided outside the jurisdiction of the Court and could not be compelled to attend trial; depositions of critical witnesses were necessary to prepare for cross-examination, impeachment and rebuttal; some deposition transcripts were utilized to prepare witnesses for trial; and many of the deposition transcripts were used at other vital stages of the litigation, i.e. defeating Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.*fn9 As it appears that the depositions were necessarily obtained for use at trial, the costs of the deposition transcripts shall be allowed. The depositions appear to have been reasonably necessary to the parties in light of the particular situation existing at the time they were taken. The County included in its Bill of Costs a declaration by one of its attorneys, Timothy T. Myers, Esq., that the costs expended for copies of the deposition transcripts were necessarily obtained for use in this case. (Bill of Costs, p. 8 (Myers Decl., ¶ 33a.)). The declaration goes on to state that "[t]hese depositions were critical to the case and necessary to establish [the County's] claim that Defendants breached their warranties." (Id.). In addition to the declaration, the County's Response also explains how the transcripts were utilized during the case and trial. Being very familiar with the case, and mindful of its protracted litigation, this Court finds that the costs for the deposition transcripts are recoverable because they were reasonably necessary to the case and utilized for preparation and use during the trial. However, $715.30 in deposition transcription fees for expedited preparation and courier delivery or copies contained on computer disks will not be allowed.*fn10 I will disallow the additional fees for expedited preparation, delivery or copies contained on disks because such costs were not "necessarily obtained" for use in preparing for and trying the case. It appears that the additional fees for expedited services and disk copies were solely for the convenience of counsel and, therefore, shall not be taxed against Westchester. See Nugget Distribs. Coop. of Am., Inc. v. Mr. Nugget, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 54, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1992)(denying the cost of obtaining depositions on ASCII disks because the cost is duplicative of the cost of obtaining a regular transcript and is merely for the convenience of counsel); see also In re Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1136, 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1990)(disallowing the additional fee for an expedited copy of deposition testimony because it was not necessarily obtained for use and trying of the case).

  4. Fees for Witnesses

  28 U.S.C § 1920(3) allows for the taxation of "fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses." 28 U.S.C. § 1920(3). Westchester argues that the Clerk's award of $625.00 in fees for the attendance of certain witnesses at depositions was improper because the fees were not necessarily obtained since some of the depositions were never taken or were not used at trial. Witness fees "costs are properly taxed when there is a good faith expectation that witnesses might be called and had to be made available for that eventuality." Greene v. Fraternal Order of Police, 183 F.R.D. 445, 450 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). The County argues that the witness fees taxed by the Clerk all meet the good faith standard. The County states that, due to the magnitude of its claims and the complexity of the matters at issue, the parties were compelled to engage in enormous discovery which required many witnesses to be subpoenaed for trial. Also, the County contends that the only way in which to gather information and prosecute its claims against the Defendants was by subpoenaing the custodians of records as witnesses for trial.

  The County's Response to Westchester's Objections to the Clerk's Taxation of Costs explains its reasoning that the witness fees were proper, as well as its good faith expectations that the witnesses might be called at trial. Given this Court's familiarity with the complexity of this case's litigation, I agree with the County's contention that many witnesses were required to be subpoenaed for trial, which included subpoenaing the custodians of records as witnesses for trial. The Court finds that the County's explanation regarding the taxation of witness fees, as well as its good faith expectations regarding trial preparation, reveal that the County possessed a good faith expectation of calling the witnesses to testify. As a result, the Clerk's taxation of costs for witness fees was properly awarded.

  5. Fees for Exemplification and Copying of Papers

  28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) provides for taxation of "fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Westchester argues that the Clerk's award of $65,686.88 in copying cost fees was improper because the County did not sufficiently itemize its copying costs.*fn11 "Copying expenses are recoverable as taxable costs when they are `necessarily obtained for use in the case,' whether or not offered into evidence at trial." Herbst, 2000 WL 1185517, at *2 (citations omitted). "The party seeking costs for copying, however, must provide evidence of the material copied so that the court can determine whether each copy was in fact necessary." Id. (citation omitted). The County argues that it is entitled to the full amount of its coping costs because they have been sufficiently itemized and there is an affidavit of counsel verifying that the costs sought were actually incurred.*fn12

  The Court agrees with Westchester's assertion that the County did not sufficiently itemize all of its copying costs. As a result of the County's insufficient itemization, the Court is unable to determine which copies were necessarily obtained for use in the case or were produced for the convenience of counsel. "While the prevailing party is not expected to provide a detailed description of every piece of paper copied, it is expected to provide the `best breakdown of the copied material obtainable from its records.'" Ass'n of Minority Contractors & Suppliers, Inc. v. Halliday Props., Inc., No. 97-274, 1999 WL 1551903, at * 4 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1999)(quoting Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v. Proctor & Gamble, Co., 924 F.2d 633, 634 (7th Cir. 1991)). "The partying seeking costs for copying must provide evidence of the material copied so that the court can determine whether those copies were, in fact, necessary." Day v. Mendenhall Inn, Inc., No. 95-830, 1998 WL 599188, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1998) (citation omitted); see also Herbst, 2000 WL 1185517, at *2.

  As evidence of its copying costs, the County attached Billed Disbursement Detail Reports from the Elliot Reihner law firm to its Bill of Costs. (Bill of Costs, Ex. G). The reports show the dates of the copies and the rate that was charged, however, the columns reserved for the description of what documents were copied are blank. Without providing a description of the documents that were copied, the Court is unable to evaluate the necessity of the costs. Thus, the County has not provided a sufficient itemization of its copying costs. As for the affidavit of counsel averring that the costs sought were actually incurred, its conclusory statement that copies were "reasonably necessary throughout the litigation" does not assist the Court in determining the nature, and the necessity, of the documents that were copied.

  (Bill of Costs, p. 8-9 (Myers Decl., ¶ 33d.)); see also Mortenson v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 99-2419, 2000 WL 347766, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2000)(stating that the conclusory statement contained in counsel's affidavit that the copying costs incurred were reasonable and necessary did not aid the court in assessing the propriety of the taxation of the copying costs). Since the County has not provided a sufficient itemization of its copying costs, this Court is unable to evaluate whether the costs were necessarily obtained for use in the case as required under Section 1920(4). In light of the County's failure to provide an adequate breakdown of copying costs, the Court will reduce the copying costs. Halliday, 1999 WL 551903, at *4 (stating that "[t]he court will reduce the copying costs because of Defendants' failure to sufficiently itemize [the copying costs]"); Peters, 1995 WL 37614, at *2 (awarding fees for substantiated copying costs, but denying fees for unsubstantiated copying costs because the "court is unable to determine whether those charges were incurred necessarily for use in the case"); Herbst, 2000 WL 1185517, at *2 (granting fees for copying costs that were sufficiently itemized, but denying fees for copying costs that were not sufficiently itemized). The Court will reduce the County's award of copying costs in the amount of $64,388.48 by fifty percent. See Elliott, Reihner, Siedzikoski, & Egan, P.C. v. Richter, No. 96-3860, 2000 WL 427377, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2000)(reducing the award of copying costs by fifty percent because Plaintiff's itemization of copying costs was insufficient since it only revealed a chart with dates and corresponding amounts with no description of what was copied); see also Nugget, 145 F.R.D. at 57 (reducing taxable fees for copying costs by fifty percent because the costs were clearly excessive). Reducing the Clerk's taxation of exemplification and copying costs by fifty percent, the County is entitled to a taxation of costs for its exemplification and copying costs in the amount of $32,194.24.

  C. The County's Request for Post-Judgment Interest

  The Third Circuit has held that post-judgment interest accrues on costs. Rogal v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., No. 89-5235, 1994 WL 268250, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1994) (citing Devex Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 F.2d 1020, 1026 (3d Cir. 1984)). The County seeks post-judgment interest on its costs from the date that the underlying judgment was entered in its favor, November 3, 2000.*fn13 Westchester argues that if the County is awarded post-judgment interest, such interest should run from the date that this Court taxes costs, not the date that the underlying judgment was entered. Westchester cites to Eaves v. County of Cape May, 239 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2001), for the assertion that post-judgment interest on costs accrues from the date that the Court taxes the costs, not from the date that the underlying judgment was entered. (Westchester's Reply Mem. at 5). Eaves addresses the issue of post-judgment interest on an attorneys' fees award, not an award of costs. Eaves, 239 F.3d at 527. In Eaves, the Third Circuit determined that "post-judgment interest on an attorney's fee award runs from the date that the District Court enters a judgment quantifying the amount of fees owed to the prevailing party rather than the date that the Court finds that the party is entitled to recover fees, if those determinations are made separately." Id. at 542. Regarding the issue of post-judgment interest on costs, the Third Circuit explained that "[w]e need not, and do not, address the open issue of the date from which post-judgment interest would run on costs taxed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920." Id. at 540 n.13.

  Although the Eaves court did not address the issue of the accrual date of post-judgment interest regarding an award of costs, this Court will follow the direction of the Third Circuit in Eaves and find that the post-judgment interest on the County's award of costs commences upon the entry of the money judgment determined by this Court. See Eaves, 239 F.3d at 542; see also Lewis v. Vestil Mfg. Corp., No. 90-6059, 1993 WL 52569, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1993)(stating that "[n]o money judgment has yet been entered on the costs, so no postjudgment interest is due under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 on any costs until a money judgment for costs is entered"). Since this Court is just now entering a money judgment, no post-judgment interest is presently due upon the County's award of costs. However, the County is entitled to post-judgment interest at a rate of 1.55% from the date of this Memorandum Opinion until the time of payment.*fn14

 IV. CONCLUSION

  For all of the above reasons, Westchester's Objections to the Clerk's Taxation of Costs is granted with respect to the aforementioned pro hac vice fees, certain fees related to deposition transcription and a portion of the exemplification and coping costs, and denied in all other respects. Specifically, the Clerk's taxation of $100 in pro hac vice fees, $715.30 in fees for the convenience of counsel regarding deposition transcription and $32,194.24 in exemplification and copying costs is reversed, while all of the other fees taxed by the Clerk are affirmed. As a result, the County's new award of costs totals $73,472.87. In addition to the award of costs totaling $73,472.87, the County is also entitled to post-judgment interest at a rate of 1.55% from the date of this Memorandum Opinion until the time of payment.

  An appropriate Order follows. ORDER

  AND NOW, this 13th day of May, 2004, upon consideration of the Objections to the Clerk's Taxation of Costs filed by Defendant, Westchester Fire Insurance Company (Doc. No 441), and the Response and Reply thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. the Clerk's Taxation of Costs is reversed in part and affirmed in part;
2. the Clerk's taxation of $100 in pro hac vice fees, $715.30 in fees for the convenience of counsel regarding deposition transcription and $32,194.24 in exemplification and copying costs is reversed, while all of the other fees taxed by the Clerk are affirmed;
3. the County's new award of costs totals $73,472.87; and
4. the County is entitled to post-judgment interest at a rate of 1.55% from the date of this Memorandum Opinion until the time of payment.


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