Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

FAIRFAX v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA

April 26, 2004.

WILLIAM L. FAIRFAX
v.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA et al.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: HERBERT HUTTON, District Judge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff William L. Fairfax filed a forty-one page pro se complaint against the School District of Philadelphia; Paul Vallas, the CEO of the School District; Andrew Rosen, Chief Counsel of the School District; Herbert Kaufman, an administrator in charge of professional personnel for the School District; Management & Training Corporation ("MTC") and three of its employees, Alvin Boardly, Mae Stephens, and Kelly Hale.

Presently before the Court are the School District's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted (Docket No. 8) and Plaintiff's response thereto (Docket Nos. 12 & 14).

  I. BACKGROUND*fn1

  Plaintiff is a former teacher with the School District and has also worked in the School District's Homebound Program. On December 1, 1988, Plaintiff was bitten on his lower left leg by a dog while working in the Homebound Program. The next day, Plaintiff submitted a Serious Incident Report to the School District. Plaintiff claimed that the school principal gave him personal illness cards to be completed instead of marking his absence as an employment injury in violation of Workers' Compensation procedures. Plaintiff also claimed that the School District failed to provide "placards" that informed employees to refer to Workers' Compensation procedures for injuries on the job.

  Plaintiff next asserts that he was coerced into returning prematurely to work without medical clearance on February 7, 1989. Plaintiff worked until May 7, 1989 when pain forced him to again leave work. Plaintiff claims that the School District then withheld his pay and that, after a Workers' Compensation hearing, the School District was ordered to reinstate his compensation. See May 30, 1991 Order from Martin Burman, Pl.'s Ex. K. In October 1991, Plaintiff apparently entered into a third party settlement agreement with the School District for the amount of $100,500. As part of the agreement, the School District's net recovery of the Workers' Compensation lien was approximately $27,000. Plaintiff alleges that the lien amount was determined without a hearing.

  Over the next several years, Plaintiff pursued various claims against the School District. In 1992, the Honorable Raymond Broderick dismissed Plaintiff's suit against inter alia the School District and Kaufman, which arose out of Plaintiff's Workers' Compensation claims. See Fairfax v. Pascuzzi, No. 92-1638, 1992 WL 346457 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 1992). Judge Broderick also denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. See Fairfax v. Pascuzzi, No. 92-1638, 1993 WL 228838 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1993). In December 1993, Judge Broderick dismissed Plaintiff's suit against the School District, its Superintendent, and various doctors for violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff had alleged a conspiracy between private parties and the Superintendent of the School District to deprive him of his state Workers' Compensation benefits. See Fairfax v. Magueri, No. 93-4008, 1993 WL 523675 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1993).

  On January 17, 1993, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted the School District's motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff in a suit that alleged discrimination. Three years later, Plaintiff again brought claims against the School District, this time alleging race, gender, and disability discrimination arising from the School District's denial of Plaintiff's request to return to full service from retirement. Plaintiff also alleged that the School District's decision to deny his request was in retaliation for his filing a previous discrimination complaint against the School District. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of the School District as to all of Plaintiff's claims. See Fairfax v. School Dist. of Phila., No. 96-5914, 1997 WL 256974 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1997).

  In the meantime, in December of 1995, Plaintiff found employment with MTC. He was terminated in August of 2000. Plaintiff alleges that the School District conspired to have him removed from his job with MTC in retaliation for his previous litigations with the School District.

  After his termination from MTC, in January 1, 2002, Plaintiff began to work as an investigator of discrimination complaints at the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC"). Plaintiff was terminated on July 1, 2002 for unsatisfactory performance. Plaintiff alleged that his termination was the result of age, race, and gender discrimination. In a hearing held on January 8, 2003, Plaintiff settled the matter with the PHRC.

  On October 16, 2003, Plaintiff initiated the instant lawsuit, alleging various civil rights and due process violations for the Defendant's handling of the 1988 dog bite incident. In an exceedingly sparse brief, the School District now moves to dismiss all the claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

  II. LEGAL STANDARD

  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993). When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989); Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 2001); Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2000). Claims by pro se litigants may be dismissed only "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1996); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Further, pro se litigants must "abide by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and when confronted by motions to dismiss must articulate reasons why the motions should not be granted." Nanya-Nashut ex rel Kevin Hand v. Bank One, National Association Trustee, No. 03-4022, 2003 WL 22120263, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2003) (Kelly, S.J.) (citations omitted).

  ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.