The opinion of the court was delivered by: LEGROME DAVIS, District Judge
By Memorandum and Order dated October 14, 2003 (the "October Order"),
the Court granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint.
Plaintiff now moves for clarification and reconsideration of that
decision or, in the alternative, for leave to amend the Complaint to
replead their substantive due process claim.
Courts should grant motions for reconsideration sparingly, reserving
them for instances where there has been "(1) an intervening change in
controlling law, (2) the emergence of new evidence not previously
available, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent
a manifest injustice." General Instrument Corp. of Delaware, v.
Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg. Inc., 3 F. Supp.2d 602, 606 (E.D.
Pa. 1998), aff'd., 197 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1999): see also Harsco. Corp. V.
Zlotnicki. 779 F.2d 906. 909 (3d Cir. 1985). cert. denied.
476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895 (1986) ("The purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to
present newly discovered evidence."). Mere dissatisfaction with the
court's ruling is not a proper basis for reconsideration. See U.S.
v. Phillips. Nos. Civ. A. 97-6475, 93-CR-513, 2001 WL 527810, at *1
(E.D.Pa. May 17, 2001) (citing Burger King Corp. v. New England Hood
and Duct Cleaning Co., No. 98-3610, 2000 WL 133756, at *2 (E.D.Pa.
Feb. 4, 2000).
Plaintiff's ask the Court to clarify whether it dismissed their takings
claim for lack
of jurisdiction with or without prejudice. Plaintiffs' Memorandum
in Support of Its Motion for Reconsideration ("Pis.' Mem.") 3-4. The
import of such a dismissal is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b): "Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction . . . operates as an adjudication upon the merits."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). (emphasis added). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' takings
claim was dismissed without prejudice.
In addition, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to reconsideration
because the Court failed to draw all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to Plaintiffs when determining that the March Letter
Agreement and paragraph 59 of the Complaint did not amount to a
continuing violation of Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Pls.'
Mem. 4-11. The "inferences" Plaintiffs ask the Court to draw, however,
are wholly unreasonable. The March Letter Agreement cannot "plausibly be
viewed as continuing the unlawful agreements and wrongful actions by the
Redevelopment Authority and Pulver." Id. at 9.*fn1 As the
Court previously concluded, "the language of the Agreement itself belies
Plaintiffs' claim that it confirmed Defendants' obligations under the
unlawful agreements and continued their unlawful
conduct." October Order 15-16.*fn2 Moreover, the March Letter
Agreement contradicts the allegations in paragraph 59 of the
Finally, Plaintiffs request leave to amend the Complaint in order to
base their Section 1983 conspiracy claim on conduct after December 31,
2000. Pls.' Br. 10-11. Plaintiffs, at no time prior to filing the instant
Motion, asserted that their Section 1983 claim, though not styled as
such, was a conspiracy claim. "A motion for reconsideration may not
advance new facts, issues, or arguments not previously presented to the
court." Vaidya v. Xerox Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-547, 1997 WL
732464, at *2 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 1997) (citing Smith v. City of
Chester, 155 F.R.D. 95, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1994)). Plaintiffs failed to
raise this argument in either their Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or their Sur-Rely Memorandum. For this
reason, Plaintiffs' request for leave to amend is denied.*fn4
ACCORDINGLY, this day of February, 2004, upon consideration of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration (Dkt. No. 23), and Defendants'
responses thereto, IT IS ...