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February 5, 2004.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: HERBERT HUTTON, District Judge


Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants' Full and Complete Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production and for Removal of the Confidential Designation on Certain Documents Identified by Defendant as Confidential (Docket No. 15), Defendant Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc. d/b/a Zep Manufacturing, Inc.'s response (Docket No. 19), Plaintiff's reply (Docket No. 20), and Plaintiff's sur-reply thereto (Docket No. 32).


  This is an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seg., alleging gender discrimination and retaliation. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (1) she was wrongfully denied a promotion to District Sales Manager ("DSM") of the mid-Atlantic division in mid-1999; (2) she was demoted from the Page 2 position of Branch Sales Manager ("BSM") to Field Sales Manager ("FSM") in August of 2001 because of her gender; and (3) Defendant retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission by setting unrealistic sales goals, by failing to give her business leads at a comparable rate to what male employees were receiving, and by reducing her compensation. On January 30, 2004, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's failure to promote claim as time-barred under Title VII and the PHRA. The Court also determined that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of an EPA violation under her failure to promote claim. Plaintiff now moves to compel answers to certain interrogatories and document requests.


  "It is well-established that the scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound discretion of the trial court." Marroquin-Manriques v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery of "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Discovery is not limited solely to admissible evidence but encompasses matters which "appear[] reasonably caculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." See id; Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). "Relevance is construed broadly and determined in relation to the facts and circumstances of each case." Hall v. Harlevsville Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 406, 407 Page 3 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Once the party from whom discovery is sought raises an objection, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate the relevancy of the information requested. Vitale v. McAtee, 170 F.R.D. 404, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1997). At that point, the burden shifts back to the objecting party to show why discovery should not be permitted. Id.


  In this motion, Plaintiff seeks information related to the Branch Sales Manager, District Sales Manager, and Regional Sales Manager positions, including personnel files, performance evaluations, salary information, and company-wide sales information broken down by branch. Plaintiff also seeks documents related to her job performance and responsibilities, documents regarding claims or complaints of gender discrimination against Defendant, and information regarding sales representatives and their expected sales goals.

  Defendant objects to many of these requests as overly broad. Defendant has limited the temporal scope of its production to the period from June 1, 1998 to the present. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff is not entitled to nationwide discovery and has limited the geographical scope of its production to the Philadelphia branch and the Washington branch, which are the branches headed by Ethan Powers. Moreover, Defendant objects to the production of all documents related to the Regional Sales Managers and District Sales Managers, arguing that they are Page 4 irrelevant to Plaintiff's claims. In particular, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff's failure to promote claim is time-barred, Plaintiff is not entitled to any information related to the District Sales Manager position.

 A. Scope of Discovery

  Because much of the discovery dispute may be resolved by determining the proper scope of discovery, the Court addresses this issue first.

  1. Temporal Scope

  Defendant has suggested that the temporal scope of discovery should be for the time period from June 1, 1998 to the present and has not produced documents outside of that scope. Plaintiff responds that she has no issue with the time limitation for most of the discovery requests and in fact, most of her requests have been limited to the past five years.

  "It is well established that discovery of conduct predating the liability period of a Title VII lawsuit is relevant and courts have commonly extended the scope of discovery to a reasonable number of years prior to the liability period of a Title VII lawsuit." Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 89 F. Supp.2d 643, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (discovery limited to five years before filing of EEOC charge); Steven v. General Electric Co., No. 1-77-122, 1978 WL 150, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 1978) (noting emergence of a "five year rule"); Milner v. Nat'l Sch. of Health Tech., 73 F.R.D. 628, 632 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (approximately five years before alleged Page 5 violation). In this case, Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge ...

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