humans is one that has an extraordinarily high rate of error").
 86. See also Allison, 184 F.3d at 1313-14 (affirming district court ruling that plaintiffs' expert failed to draw a sufficient connection between animal studies and the disease in issue); Ruffin v. Shaw Indus., 149 F.3d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court's exclusion of causation testimony where animal studies allegedly showed that the product at issue caused adverse effects in mice, but results could not be replicated); Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Where, as here, no epidemiological study has found a statistically-significant link between EtO exposure and human brain cancer; the results of animal studies are inconclusive at best; and there was no evidence of the level of [plaintiffs] exposure to EtO, the expert testimony does not exhibit the level of reliability necessary to comport with the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, . . . Daubert . . . and this court's authorities"); Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1319-20 (rejecting experts' opinions which relied on animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and epidemiological data when experts failed to clearly demonstrate scientific methodology); Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding animal studies inadequate for showing causation of disease in humans with chlordane exposure); Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., Inc., 972 F.2d 304, 307 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The etiological evidence proffered by the plaintiff was not sufficiently reliable, being drawn from tests on non-human subjects without confirmatory epidemiological data."); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830-32 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (animal studies unreliable), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882, 110 S.Ct. 218, 107 L.Ed.2d 171 (1989).
 87. Here, plaintiff's experts' failure to take into account critical differences between animal data and human experience — including but not limited to extrapolations in dosing — renders their methodology scientifically invalid and unreliable. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Home Depot, U.S.A., 936 F. Supp. 900, 906 (M.D.Fla. 1996) ("the question for causation purposes is . . . [a]t what levels of exposure do what kinds of harm occur?"); Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 34546 (S.D.Fla. 1993) (excluding testimony where expert failed to perform comparisons between the dose of the drug relevant to plaintiff and dose used in studies on which he relied).
 88. As in Joiner, evidence from the animal studies relied upon by plaintiff's experts to support their hypothesis is not sufficiently tied to the facts at issue here, i.e., a live human being with an intact nervous system who ingested no more than two 2.5 mg doses of Parlodel ® per day and who had a stroke. Because "[t]he analytical gap between the evidence presented and the inferences to be drawn on the ultimate issue . . . is too wide," this evidence must be excluded as scientifically unreliable. Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1323.
 89. In the present case, plaintiff's experts attempted to base their causation opinions in part on animal studies in which animals that were treated with bromocriptine allegedly had adverse vasoconstrictive effects. The Court concludes that these animal studies do not present a scientifically-reliable basis for the causation opinion of plaintiff's experts because: (a) plaintiff's experts did not attempt to correlate the doses used in such studies to the dose of bromocriptine arising from the use of Parlodel ® for the prevention of lactation; (b) plaintiff's experts did not demonstrate, or attempt to demonstrate, that the dose of a drug is an unimportant factor in the types of reactions that may be caused by that drug; (c) plaintiff's experts in fact conceded that the concept of "dose-response" is a fundamental premise of toxicology; (d) plaintiff's experts did not demonstrate that the dog or the rat, i.e., the species in which these studies were performed, were sufficiently similar to a human being with regard to vasoconstrictive reactions to make reliance on such studies reasonable; and (e) plaintiff's experts did not demonstrate that the observed effects of "tail necrosis" and "ear tip necrosis" were sufficiently similar to the cerebral vasoconstriction that they allege occurred in this case such as to make reliance on such studies reasonable. Additionally, for the above-stated reasons, plaintiff did not demonstrate an adequate "fit" between the testimony of her experts based on such animal studies and the issue to be determined in this case, i.e., whether bromocriptine can cause cerebral vasoconstriction in human beings using Parlodel ® to prevent lactation.
H. Conclusions of Law Regarding Plaintiff's Proposed Use of
Other Ergot Alkaloid Evidence
 90. This Court finds that plaintiff's experts rely upon data on drugs other than bromocriptine to support their hypotheses. Although they concede that bromocriptine is pharmacologically shown to cause vasodilation, see, e.g., Iffy Dep. at 60 (a large body of literature states that Parlodel ® is vasodilatory) (Att.18), they nevertheless argue that — in an otherwise unidentifiable subset of women that happens to include plaintiff — bromocriptine somehow causes the opposite effect, vasoconstriction, because, they claim, it is structurally similar to other ergot-derived drugs, some of which have vasoconstrictive properties. That explanation does not "fit" the facts of this case where bromocriptine, not another drug, is at issue.
 91. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and its district courts have held that evidence concerning the effect of allegedly "similar" chemicals on the body cannot substitute for direct evidence about the drug in question. For example, in DeLuca, the court addressed claims by the plaintiff's expert that Bendectin was chemically similar to antihistamines generally, that antihistamines were associated with birth defects, and that therefore Bendectin caused birth defects. DeLuca, 791 F. Supp. at 1054. Noting that small differences in chemical structure could cause "very different human effects," the court rejected this type of analysis and excluded the testimony under Rule 702. Id.
 92. In Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D.Pa. 1974), a retrial of a product liability action regarding the drug Aralen, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of "chemically related" drugs. After discussing "[t]he dubious value of such evidence," the court followed its prior holding which "denied permission at the first trial to introduce evidence on the known side effects of drugs allegedly chemically related to Aralen." Hoffman, 374 F. Supp. at 862.
 93. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in Kannankeril v. Terminix International, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997), is not contrary to the Court's conclusions here. In Kannankeril, the Court did note that "the toxic effects of organophosphates on humans are well recognized by the scientific community." Id. at 809. However, the proposition that chlorpyrifos — the active ingredient of Dursban at issue in Kannankeril — acts like other organophosphates was apparently not challenged by defendant there. Rather, the issue in Kannankeril appears to have been, not whether general causation could be established, but whether plaintiff in fact was sufficiently exposed to chlorpyrifos. In the instant case, by contrast, NPC does contest general causation and plaintiff's theory that bromocriptine acts like other ergots vis-a-vis causing vasoconstriction at therapeutic doses. Moreover, whereas in Kannankeril the precise mechanism of chlorpyrifos toxicity was well understood (chlorpyrifos "inhibit[s] the normal breakdown of acetylcholine, which functions as a neurotransmitter in . . . human beings," 128 F.3d at 805), in the instant case there is no scientific knowledge whatsoever concerning how bromocriptine allegedly causes vasoconstriction. Accordingly, Kannankeril is not on point.
 94. Particularly because plaintiff's experts admit they do not know the mechanism by which Parlodel ® allegedly causes vasoconstriction, this Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the decision in Brumbaugh which excluded plaintiff's expert's opinion based, among other things, on plaintiff's inability to establish a causal association through evidence of compounds structurally "similar" to bromocriptine:
[Dr. Iffy's] hypothesis is that drugs similar to
Parlodel ® are vasoconstrictors and not vasodilators,
and some women "cannot distinguish" between them. No
study of this lack of discrimination is put forward.
Testimony extending general conclusions about similar
drugs does not meet Daubert's requirement of
reliability. Schudel v. General Electric Co.,
120 F.3d 991, 996-97 (9th Cir. 1997). The Schudel court
recognized that "small differences in molecular
structure often have significant consequences." Id.
 Brumbaugh v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 77 F. Supp.2d at 1157.
 95. Other federal courts facing proffered expert testimony based on the effects of allegedly similar chemicals have reached the same conclusion and rejected such contentions; these courts have found that consideration of the effects of other drugs can only lead away from the truth. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1999) (excluding testimony based on similarities between benzene and defendant's products); Schudel, 120 F.3d at 997 (excluding opinions extrapolating from studies of organic solvents allegedly similar to the chemicals in question); Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 814 n. 36 (5th Cir. 1992) (actual side effects experienced by patients taking Accutane were a "much better indication of the risks associated with Accutane" than side effects of Vitamin A); Chikovsky, 832 F. Supp. at 345-46 (proposed analogy between Accutane and Vitamin A was "wanting"); see also Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 730 (evidence that an antihistamine other than doxylamine succinate had a similar structure and allegedly caused some adverse effect did not support the opinions of plaintiffs' expert and "could not legitimately form the basis for a jury verdict").
 96. This Court's conclusion on this issue is further supported by the other Parlodel ® cases in which courts have uniformly rejected as unreliable plaintiff's experts' attempts to base their opinions on evidence concerning other ergots. See Glastetter, 252 F.3d at 990 (Dr. Kulig's and Dr. Petro's "generic assumption that bromocriptine behaves like other ergot alkaloids carries little scientific value"); Caraker, 172 F. Supp.2d at 1051-52 (rejecting plaintiff's experts' "guilt by association" ergot theory as scientifically unreliable); Siharath, 131 F. Supp.2d at 1363-64 (plaintiff's experts' reliance on general conclusions about family of ergot drugs does not meet Daubert reliability standards); Glastetter, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1034 (rejecting Dr. Kulig's and Dr. Petro's reliance on other ergots evidence); Hollander, 95 F. Supp.2d at 1238 (rejecting Dr. Kulig's reliance on other ergots evidence); Brumbaugh, 77 F. Supp.2d at 1157 ("Testimony extending general conclusions about . . . drugs [similar to bromocriptine] does not meet Daubert's requirement of reliability.") (citing Schudel, 120 F.3d at 996-97).
 97. In the present case, plaintiff is not alleging exposure to any ergot alkaloid other than bromocriptine. In the absence of a particularized showing of how and why this group of compounds must have pharmacologically identical modes of action, evidence regarding other ergot alkaloids is not reliable or relevant and must be excluded, Fed.R.Evid. 401, 402, 403 and 702, nor can plaintiff's expert witnesses properly base their opinions on such evidence.
I. Conclusions of Law Regarding Plaintiff's Proposed Use of
Evidence of Other Injuries and Other Parlodel ® Indications
Not Alleged Or Raised in Plaintiff's Complaint
 98. Proffered evidence must be relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 to be admissible; the evidence must have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 401; see, e.g., Michetti v. Linde Baker Material Handling Corp., 969 F. Supp. 286, 287-88 (E.D.Pa. 1997). Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402.
 99. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has repeatedly held that evidence of other injuries is not admissible unless the circumstances of the other occurrences are "substantially similar" to those in the case at bar. See, e.g., Barker v. Deere and Co., 60 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting "substantially similar" standard is held by all other federal courts of appeal); Wolf v. Procter & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613 (N.J. 1982).
 100. That the evidence of other injuries allegedly involves the same product "is not enough to make the [evidence] admissible even under the liberal standard of admissibility of Fed.R.Evid. 401." Gumbs v. International Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 98 (3d Cir. 1983) (reversing district court's admission of allegedly similar prior accidents involving U-bolts on loadstar trucks).
 101. The Court concludes that evidence of other uses of Parlodel ® must be substantially similar to the circumstances in which plaintiff used Parlodel ®. Unless there is a sufficient connection, the mere fact that the alleged other incidents involve the same product "is not enough to make the [evidence] admissible even under the liberal standard of admissibility of Fed.R.Evid. 401." Gumbs, 718 F.2d at 98 (excluding evidence of other injuries allegedly due to same product).
 102. Here, where plaintiff alleges that her ICH was caused by cerebral vasoconstriction, plaintiff must also prove that the prior events had also been caused by cerebral vasoconstriction. This is especially true given that plaintiff cannot articulate a mechanism by which Parlodel ® causes cerebral vasoconstriction in the first place. Plaintiff has not met her burden; the causal basis of the other events upon which plaintiff's expert witnesses rely is a matter of hypothesis that has not been "established" for purposes of Rule 401 and Gumbs.
 103. Plaintiff's expert witnesses may not rely on evidence of other injuries and other indications because such reliance would be "likely to lead to jury misdecision based on inflamed passions, confusion of issues or the like." Corrigan v. Methodist Hospital, 874 F. Supp. 657, 658 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Fed.R.Evid. 403 (evidence should be excluded if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"); Wolf, 555 F. Supp. at 622 ("the tendency would be for the jury to consider the evidence as proof of product defect, negligence, or causation. . . .").
J. Conclusions of Law Concerning Plaintiff's Experts'
Purported Application of Differential Diagnosis as a
Methodology in Reaching Opinions Concerning Specific
 104. Plaintiff's experts contend that they applied the methodology of differential diagnosis to reach the opinion that Parlodel ® caused plaintiff's ICH. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognizes the application of differential diagnosis for the purposes of determining specific medical causation. Heller, 167 F.3d at 154. However, as Heller also demonstrates, the mere statement by an expert that he or she applied differential diagnosis in determining causation does not ipso facto make that application scientifically reliable or admissible. In Heller itself, the Court affirmed the district court's exclusion of causation opinions based on the purported use of differential diagnosis.
 105. In Heller, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that differential diagnosis would sustain a specific causation opinion if it was "thorough," if it "ruled out other possible causes," and if it was based on "a valid and strong temporal relationship." 167 F.3d at 154. The importance of the temporal relationship depends "on the strength of that relationship." Id. But even an exact temporal relationship and a "proper differential diagnosis" by a "well-qualified physician" would not serve as the foundation for an admissible causation opinion regardless of the circumstances. Id. Accordingly, the Court pointed out that it would "not necessarily [be] error to exclude [the expert's] conclusion as unreliable if [the expert] relied on no scientific studies and the remaining foundation for his conclusion was shaky." Id. at 156. As shown below, this Court concludes that the differential diagnoses offered by plaintiff's experts were "shaky" at best and, in fact, not valid or reliable differential diagnoses.
 106. Heller ruled that, in determining whether a particular differential diagnosis was sufficiently reliable to be admitted, a district court should not demand that the expert rule out "all alternative possible causes." 167 F.3d at 156. Accordingly, this Court does not require plaintiff's experts to show that they have adequately ruled out all alternative possible causes. However, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit does require that "obvious alternative causes" be ruled out. Id. As that Court reminded us in Heller, "where a defendant points to a plausible alternative cause and the doctor offers no explanation for why he or she has concluded that was not the sole cause, the doctor's methodology is unreliable." 167 F.3d at 156 (quoting Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 759 n. 27). Accordingly, this Court must explore the alternative hypotheses posited by defendant's experts and plaintiff's experts' response thereto. If the alternative hypotheses are "plausible," then plaintiff's experts must show that they have been reliably ruled out.
 107. Heller provides specific guidance concerning what it means to reliably rule out a plausible alternative hypothesis:
As we concluded in Paoli [II], a physician need not
conduct every possible test to rule out all
possible causes of a patient's illness, "so long as
he or she employed sufficient diagnostic
techniques to have good grounds for his or her