Before the court*fn1 is the United States' motion for preliminary
injunction. (Doc. 34). The parties have fully briefed the issues, and the
matter is ripe for disposition.
I. Factual Background
Defendant Thurston Bell ("Bell") has fashioned a career by devising and
publicizing ways to avoid paying federal income tax. Bell acknowledges
that he has "dealt with the issue of taxes for eight and a half years on
the edge of what would be seen as legal . . . ." Transcript of November
4, 2002 preliminary injunction hearing ("N.T."), pg. 28. A brief
explanation of Bell's career as a tax protester is appropriate to put the
United States' motion for preliminary injunction in context.
In the 1980s, Dell worked for Save-A.Patriot, "[a]n organization that
believes that American citizens are not liable for income tax." (Doc.
36, Exhibit J, pg. 13). (See also Doc. 36, Exhibit C, pg. 66). As a case
worker at Save-A-Patriot, Bell helped clients "avoid paying taxes or any
number of other things that could happen as a result of not paying
taxes." (Doc. 36, Exhibit J, pg. 17).
When Bell left Save-A-Patriot, he co-founded Tax-gate and created the
taxgate.com website. (Doc. 36, Exhibit C, pp. 16-17). At Tax-gate, Bell
drafted court pleadings and letters to the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") and state taxing agencies on his clients' behalf. (Doc. 36,
Exhibit J, pg. 25). See also id. at Exhibit 19 (letter date January 27,
1998, outlining Bell's tax avoidance argument). Bell charged his clients
for tax advice and for preparation of documents directed to taxing
authorities. (Doc. 36, Exhibit J, pg. 32). (See also Doc. 36, Exhibit K,
pg. 88) (deposition testimony that Bell charged a $1,OOO.OO retainer
before discussing certain tax matters).
Between 1998 and 2000, Bell established the National Institute for
Taxation Education ("NITE"). On the NITE website,*fn2 Bell asserts, "The
National Institute for Taxation Education (NITE) provides income tax
help, solutions, and strategies that work for Citizens of the United
States to legally declare their gross income to be
Zero." (Doc, 36,
Exhibit C, pg. 16). Bell's tax avoidance argument is commonly referred to
as the "Section 861 argument" or the "U.S. Sources argument."
The Internal Revenue Code defines "gross income" as "all income from
whatever source derived . . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 61 (a). Bell claims that
the word "source" in section 61 is defined in the "Source Rules and Other
General Rules Relating to Foreign Income." 26 U.S.C. § 861-865
(emphasis supplied). Section 861 states that certain "items of gross
income shall be treated as income from sources within the United
States . . . ." 26 U.S.C. § 861 (a). According to the
U.S. Sources argument, domestically earned wages of U.S. citizens are not
taxable because such wages are not specifically mentioned in the list of
items of gross income that "shall be treated as income from sources within
the United States." See 26 U.S.C. § 861 (a).
Bell concedes that section 861 itself does not exempt domestically earned
wages of U.S. citizens.*fn3 Nevertheless, he argues that such
wages are not taxable because certain regulations promulgated under
section 861 (i.e. 26 C.F.R. § 1.861-8 (a)(4),
1.861-8(f)(1), and 1.861-8T(d)(2)(ii)(A)) create an applicable exemption.
Bell's clients typically file zero income tax returns with an
"asseveration of claimed income" attached, disputing the gross income
indicated on the taxpayer's W-2 forms. (Doc. 36, Exhibit K, pg. 53). See
also N.T. 59-60. When this method fails, Bell argues that the IRS has
violated his clients' due process rights by not allowing them to
cross-examine their employers regarding the gross income listed on their
W-2 forms. (Doc. 36, Exhibit J, pg. 63). Bell's goal in seeking to
cross-examine employers is to show an absence of gross income according
to the fallacious U.S. Sources argument outlined above. (Doc. 36, Exhibit
J, pg. 63). Bell's methods have secured erroneous tax refunds for
numerous clients. (See, e.g., Doc. 36, Exhibit C, pg. 64-65).
On November 4, 2002, the court held a hearing on plaintiff's motion for
a preliminary injunction. On November 19, 2002, Bell filed a response to
plaintiffs supplemental memorandum of law (Doc. 85), exhibits in support
thereof (Doc. 86), and an additional deposition transcript. (Doc. 87).
II. Legal Standard
Plaintiff seeks preliminary injunctive relief under 26 U.S.C. § 7402.
The court is authorized to grant such relief "as may be necessary or
appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws."
26 U.S.C. § 7402. A preliminary injunction under section 7402 is
governed by the same standard as a preliminary injunction undei Rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. U.S. v. Rosile, 2002 WL 1760861
*1 (M.D.Fla. 2002); U.S. v. Bosset, 2002 WL 1058105 *1 (M.D.Fla. 2002).
The court must evaluate four factors: (1) likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) irreparable harm resulting from a denial of the relief; (3)
the harm to the non-moving party if relief is granted; and (4) the public
interest. Allegheny Energy. Inc. v. DQE. Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d
Cir. 1999) (citing A.C.L.U. of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional
Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc); Rosile,
2002 WL 1760861 *1. As the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief,
the United States bears the burden of proof Mettler-Toledo, Inc. v.
Acker, 908 F. Supp. 240, 245 (M.D.Pa. 1995). "The
injunction should issue
only if the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to convince the
district court that all four factors favor preliminary relief" Merchant
& Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 328, 632-33 (3d
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
In order to prevail on the merits, the United States must establish
that an injunction is "necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of
the internal revenue laws." 26 U.S.C. § 7402. Plaintiff argues that
it is likely to succeed on the merits because "the § 861 Argument is
completely meritless" and because Bell blindly insists on the argument's
validity, "despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary." (Doc. 35 pg.
23). The court agrees with plaintiff.
Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source
derived. . . including (but not limited to). . .
[c]ompensation for services, including fees, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items.
26 U.S.C. § 61 (a) (emphasis supplied).
The Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized the "sweeping scope' of
[section: 61(a)] and its statutory predecessors." C.I.R. v. Schleier,
515 U.S. 323, 327-328 (1995) (citing C.I.R. v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955); United States v. Burke. 504 U.S. 229, 233
(1992); Helvering v. Clifford. 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)). When it define
gross income, Congress intended "to use the full measure of its taxing
power." Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 429. Moreover, it is well-settled that
wages or compensation for services constitute income and that individuals
receiving income are subject to the federal income tax. See, e.g.,
26 U.S.C. § 61 (a)(1); Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. U.S.,
435 U.S. 21, 25 (1978), U.S. v. Connor, 898 F.2d 942, 943-44 (3d Cir.
1990); Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1986).
Bell's U.S. Sources argument is nonsensical. It rests purely on
semantics and takes the regulations promulgated under section 861 out of
context.*fn4 As noted by the Tax Court in Christopher v. C.I.R., 2002 WL
71029 *3 (Tax Ct. 2002);
The rules of sections 861-865 have significance in
determining whether income is considered from sources
within or without the United States. The source rules
do not exclude from U.S. taxation income earned by
U.S. citizens from sources within the United States.
See also Great-West Life Assur. Co. v. United States, 678 F.2d 180, 183
(Ct. Cl. 1982) ("The determination of where income is derived or
"sourced' is generally of no moment to either United States citizens or
United States corporations, for such persons are subject to tax
under I.R.C. * 1 and LR.C. § 11, respectively, on their worldwide
Other jurisdictions which have heard this U.S. Sources argument have
uniformly found it unpersuasive. See, e.g., Loofbourrow v. C.I.R.,
208 F. Supp.2d 698, 709-10 (S.D. Tex. 2002) ("Loofbourrow's argument,
however, is misplaced and takes the regulations out of context."); In re
Clark, 2001 WL 1807509 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that
26 C.F.R. § 1.861-1 to 1.861-8, and 1.861-8T do not exempt U.S.
citizens' domestic income from taxation); Madge v. C.I.R., 23 Fed.Appx.
604, 2001 WL 1414315 *1 (8th Cir. 2001) ("EThhe Tax Court properly
rejected Madge's contention that the income from his business was not
"gross income' under 26 U.S.C. § 61 (a)"); Williams v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 136, 138-139, 2000 WL 230343 (2000) (rejecting claim that income
is not subject to tax because it is not from any of the sources listed in
26 C.F.R. § 1.861-8 (a)).
The regulations cited by Bell — 26 C.F.R. § 1.861-1 to -8 and
26 C.F.R. § 1.861-8T — were promulgated for the purpose of
interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 881. Section 861 "does not define gross
income; it provides which items of gross income shall be treated as
income from sources within the United States, and also provides, at
§ 1.861-8, for the allocation and apportionment of deductions between
statutory groupings of gross income for the purpose of calculating
taxable income" for nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. In re
Clark, 2001 WL 1807509 *6 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 2001). See also Great-West
Life, 678 F.2d at 183-84 n. 8 (describing bifurcated taxing pattern
applicable to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations). To suggest
that these regulations create an exemption for domestic wages of U.S.
citizens is irresponsible and frivolous advocacy. See
26 C.F.R. § 1.861-4 (providing that gross income from sources within
the United States includes compensation for labor or personal services
performed in the United States).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds a substantial
likelihood that the United States will prevail on the merits. Accord
U.S. v. Rosile, 2002 WL 1760861 *1; U.S. v. Bosset, 2002 WL 1058105 *1,
The court also finds that enjoining Bell from selling this frivolous tax
argument is "necessary [and] appropriate for the enforcement of the
internal revenue laws." 26 U.S.C. § 7402. Bell testified that he
intends to continue to promote the U.S. Sources argument. N.T. at 47. On
the NITE website, Bell boasts that the U.S. Sources argument has resulted
in eight "Employer IRS Refunds," three "IRS Abatements," and thirteen
"Individual IRS Refunds/Credits" for his clients. (Doc. 36, Exhibit C,
pg. 65). Every time Bell convinces another individual to file false tax
returns under the U.S. Sources argument, the internal revenue laws are
thwarted. The court will not countenance such impropriety.
B. Irreparable Harm
The United States argues that it will suffer irreparable harm if an
injunction is not issued because processing, investigating, and
correcting the false tax returns filed by Bell's clients "requires
substantial IRS resources." (Doc. 35, pg. 23). Plaintiff also argues
that, while future harm is certain unless the court enjoins Bell, the
timing and magnitude of such harm would be impossible to ascertain.
The Third Circuit has stated that:
In order to demonstrate irreparable harm the plaintiff
must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be
redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following
a trial The preliminary injunction must be the only
way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.
Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Novartis Consumer
Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals
Co., 290 F.3d 578, 595 (3d Cir. 2002) (defining irreparable harm as
"potential harm that cannot be redressed following trial").
Absent injunctive relief, Bell will likely cause the government and law
abiding taxpayers great harm. Due to the nature of Bell's conduct, i.e.
providing harmful tax advice, it is impossible to determine the degree to
which this conduct will injure the United States in the future; one
cannot estimate with any precision the government resources potentially
lost in tracking down the maze of erroneous returns filed by Bell's
clients or the amount of refunds improperly paid to Bell's clients. The
court notes with interest that Bell "ghostwrites" his clients' returns
— his name never appears on the individual 1040 forms or on his
clients' correspondence to the IRS. (Doc. 35, pg. 23 & Doc. 36,
Exhibit J, Exhibits 9, 19 & 29).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court finds that plaintiff has
met its burden to demonstrate irreparable harm. Accord U.S. v. Rosile,
2002 WL 1760861 *1; U.S. v. Bosset, 2002 WL 1058105 *1.
C. Balance of Harms
Plaintiff argues that the threatened injury to the United States
outweighs any injury an injunction will cause defendant, because an
injunction would merely require Bell to comply with the law. Bell, on the
other hand, argues that an injunction would violate his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech. Bell supports his argument with a
miscellaneous collection of Supreme Court and Third Circuit quotes taken
out of context. For example, Bell quotes Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963) and American Library Ass'n. Inc. v. U.S.,
201 F. Supp.2d 401, 479 (E.D.Pa. 2002), stating that "[t]he separation of
legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for sensitive tools.*fn5 The
First Amendment demands the precision of a scalpel, not the
sledgehammer."*fn6 See N.T. at 25. However, both of these cases deal
with regulation of obscenity and neither stands for the proposition that
the First Amendment protects the sale or advocacy of false tax advice.
See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 66 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment requires
that regulation by the States of obscenity conform to procedures that
will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected
expression. . . ."); American Library, 201 F. Supp.2d at 490 (finding the
Children's Internet Protection Act facially invalid).
Despite the inapplicability of the case law argued by Bell, an
injunction prohibiting him from engaging in false speech concerning the
U.S. Sources argument would amount to a prior restraint. See Alexander
v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) ("Temporary restraining orders and
permanent injunctions — i.e.) court orders that actually forbid
speech activities-are classic examples of prior restraints."). Prior
restraints are generally presumed unconstitutional. See Southeastern
Promotions. Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) ("Any system
of prior restraint, however, comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity.' ") However, not all prior
restraints are prohibited. Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
i. Bell's False Commercial Speech
Bell contends that the majority of his speech is political speech, as
opposed to commercial speech. The court disagrees. Commercial speech is
"broadly defined as expression related to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience, generally in the form of a commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods and services." In re Orthopedic Bone
Screw Products Liability Litigation, 193 F.3d 781, 793 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila.,
898 F.2d 914, 933 (3d. Cir. 1990)).
To determine whether speech is "commercial speech" the court must
(1) the speech is an advertisement;
(2) the speech refers to a specific product or
(3) the speaker has an economic motivation for the speech.
Orthopedic Bone Screw, 193 F.3d at 793 (citations omitted). "An
affirmative answer to all three questions provides "strong support' for
the conclusion that the speech is commercial." Id.
Applying this test to the instant case, the court finds that Bell is
engaged in commercial speech. The NITE website (http://www.nite.org)
serves as an advertisement. Indeed, it is an internet version of a
television "infomercial" (See Doc. 36, Exhibit C). The website attempts
to entice the reader to join NITE and to pay Bell for tax advice. (See,
e.g., Doc. 36, Exhibit C, pg. 1) ("Unlike others who peddle arguments
that may sound similar on the surface, our strategies have proven
success, as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) itself (as well as US
Attorneys and Federal Judges) has accepted NITE's arguments as
valid . . . ."). Nearly every page of Bell's NITE website contains some
element of self-promotion.
A basic member of NITE gets "access to the Members Hall*fn7 for
$195.00 . . . renewable yearly for $75." (Doc. 36, Exhibit C, pg. 108)
(ellipses in original). To become a Senior Fellow a member must pay an
additional $3,500.00. (Doc. 36, Exhibit C, pg. 109). The website refers
to certain products for sale (seminars on tape, for example) along with
Bell's fee for each product. (See Doc, 36, Exhibit C, pp. 53-61; Exhibit
K, Exhibit 16).
Clearly, Bell has an economic motive in posting the NITE website. He
admitted at the preliminary injunction hearing that he receives
remuneration from NITE members for the services he provides. N.T. at 46.
Moreover, undisputed record evidence establishes that Bell received
$68,179.50 via internet payments between May 18, 2000, and February 8,
2002. (Doc. 36, Exhibit L). Therefore, the court concludes that Bell's
conduct falls squarely within the definition of commercial speech
Although the First Amendment protects commercial speech generally, it
does not protect false commercial
speech. Castrol. Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,
987 F.2d 939, 949 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is well settled that false
commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment and may be
banned entirely.") (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383
(1977)); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corn. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) ("[T]here can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may
ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it . . . ."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council. Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n. 24 (1976). "[T]he First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech about unlawful activities."
Orthopedic Bone Screw, 193 F.3d at 792 (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 n. 7 (1996)). Moreover, the prior
restraint doctrine does not apply where there has been "an adequate
determination that [the expression] is unprotected by the First
Amendment." Castrol, 987 F.2d at 949 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)).
Accordingly, Bell's false commercial speech is not protected by the
First Amendment. Therefore, an injunction prohibiting Bell from producing
or disseminating false commercial speech would not violate his First
ii. Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action
Bell also argues that an injunction would infringe on his freedom to
engage in political speech, which is non-commercial in nature. The United
States counters that enjoining Bell's non-commercial advocacy of the
U.S. Sources argument would not violate the First Amendment if tailored
to prohibit only incitement to lawless action.
An injunction prohibiting non-commercial speech can pass constitutional
muster if it is narrowly drawn to prohibit only unprotected speech. See
U.S. v. Kaun, 827 F.2d 1144, 1150 (7th Cir. 1987) ("the injunctive order
does not impermissibly infringe upon Kaun's freedom of expression and
freedom of association, because it constrains only unprotected speech").
Non-commercial advocacy of lawless action is not per se unprotected
speech. However, advocacy of law violation can be proscribed "where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis supplied). Injunctions prohibiting
non-commercial advocacy of tax schemes similar to Bell's have been upheld
to the extent that they comply with Brandenburg. See U.S. v. Raymond,
228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000); Kaun, 827 F.2d at 1150-52.
At the hearing on this motion, counsel for plaintiff stated that "[t]he
government is not trying to shut down Bell's website. The government is
asking the court to simply enter an injunction that stops his false
commercial speech, stops incitement to imminent lawless action, and stops
his course of illegal conduct, helping others to evade their taxes."
N.T. at 8. In light of the preceding discussion, the court believes that
such an injunction would pose no threat to Bell's constitutional rights.
Therefore, the court finds that the balance of harms counsels in favor
of enjoining Bell's improper conduct. Accord U.S.
v. Rosile, 2002 WL
1760861 *1; U.S. v. Bosset, 2002 WL 1058105 *1.
D. Public Interest
Plaintiff argues that a preliminary injunction would be in the public
interest because it will slow the spread of the frivolous U.S. Sources
argument, thus saving government resources needed to track down refunds
improperly paid to Bell's clients. Furthermore, an injunction will help
protect Bell's clients from tax penalties resulting from using the U.S.
Sources argument on their tax return forms. (Doc. 35, pg. 24) (citing
U.S. v. Mathewson, 1993 WL 113434 *2 (S.D.Fla. 1993) ("the collection of
taxes certainly serves the public interest . . . .")). The court agrees.
Proper administration of the laws is in the public interest. U.S. v.
Knudson, 959 F. Supp. 1180, 1187 (D.Neb. 1997) ("[T]here is a strong
public interest in assuring the proper and efficient functioning of the
government. This includes the fair administration of federal tax
laws . . . ."). Furthermore, Bell is harming his clients (who often become
the target of IRS sanctions) and all law-abiding taxpayers. See
U.S v. Venie, 691 F. Supp. 834, 839 (M.D.Pa. 1988)
(finding that an injunction is in the public interest when necessary to
stop a person from "placing literally hundreds of taxpayers in financial
difficulty"). Clearly, the public interest is served by enjoining Bell
from further providing harmful tax advice. Therefore, the court finds
that the United States has met its burden for a preliminary injunction
under section 7402.*fn8
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant the plaintiff's motion
for preliminary injunction. An appropriate order will issue.
AND NOW, this 10th day of January, 2003, in accordance with the
accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for
preliminary injunction (Doc. 34) is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that:
1. Thurston Bell and his representatives, agents,
servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in
active concert or participation with him, are
preliminarily enjoined from directly or indirectly, by
means of false, deceptive, or misleading commercial
a. Organizing, promoting, marketing, or selling (or
assisting therein) the tax shelter, plan, or
arrangement known as "the U.S. Sources argument" (also
known as "the section 861 argument") or any other
abusive tax shelter, plan or arrangement that incites
taxpayers to attempt to violate the internal revenue
laws or unlawfully evade the assessment or collection
of their federal tax liabilities
or unlawfully claim improper tax refunds;
b. Further engaging in any conduct subject to penalty
under 26 U.S.C. § 6700, i.e. making or
furnishing, in connection with the organization or
sale of an abusive shelter, plan, or arrangement, a
statement they know or have reason to know is false or
fraudulent as to any material part;
c. Further engaging in any conduct subject to penally
under 26 U.S.C. § 6701, i.e. assisting others in
the preparation of any tax forms or other documents to
be used in connection with any material matte arising
under the internal revenue laws and which they know
will (if so used) result in the understatement of
income tax liability; am
d. Further engaging in any conduct that interferes
with the administration and enforcement of the
internal revenue laws.
2. Bell shall forthwith send a letter to:
a. All persons to whom he gave, sold, or distributed
any materials espousing or related to the U.S. Sources
b. All persons for whom Bell prepared or assisted in
the preparation or drafting of any federal returns or
tax-related documents; and
c. All persons who contacted Bell regarding the U.S.
Sources argument (in paper, via telephone, or through
and inform those persons of the entry of the court's
findings concerning the falsity of Bell's
representations, the falsity of the tax returns based
in whole or in part on the U.S. Sources argument, the
possibility of the imposition of frivolous-return
penalties against them, the possibility that the
United States may seek to recover any erroneous refund
they may have received, and the fact that a
preliminary injunction has been entered against Bell
(and attach a copy of this Order to the letter); and
Bell shall simultaneously serve copies of all such
letters (without attachment) to counsel for the United
States at the address listed on the docket of this
3. Bell shall maintain the NITE website (www.nite.org)
during the pendency of this preliminary injunction
Order, remove from the aforementioned website all
abusive-tax-shelter-promotional materials, false
commercial speech, and materials designed to incite
others to violate the law (including tax laws), and
display prominently on the first page of the website
an attachment of this preliminary injunction
Memorandum and Order.
4. Bell shall mail to counsel for the United States,
at the address listed on the docket of this matter,
one copy of every federal tax return, amended return,
or other document intended for the IRS that he
prepares, or assists in the preparation of, on behalf
of any other person or entity during the pendency of
this preliminary injunction Order. The mailing shall
be made on the same date the document is mailed to or
filed with the IRS.
5. If Bell requires access to any file in the court's
possession in order to comply with this order (e.g.
paragraph 2), Bell shall promptly contact the court's
deputy clerk, Ms. Kimberly McKinney, at 221-3920 to
schedule an appointment for document access.
6. The parties shall file a request for a permanent
injunction hearing within thirty (30) days. If no such
request is filed, the Court will issue an order
preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction.