upheld the constitutionality of PERA in Ellenbogen `principally because
judges retain the right to hire, discharge, and supervise court
personnel'")). Since this authority was not affected by the statute, it
could be applied to court reporters without violating the Pennsylvania
The power of the judiciary to make employment decisions about its own
employees — to hire, to fire, and to supervise — flows
directly from the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in Article
V, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Beckert v. AFSCME, 56
Pa.Cmwlth. 572, 580 (1981) (citing DeChastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18,
20 (1850)); L.J.S. v. State Ethics Commission, 744 A.2d 798, 800-01
(Pa.Cmwlth. 2000). It is the bedrock of judicial independence and the
touchstone of Pennsylvania jurisprudence whenever the court's
independence is at issue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on this
principle in a pair of recent decisions that rejected the jurisdiction of
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") over employment
discrimination claims filed by court employees, a context quite different
from the decisions involving collective bargaining and court employees.
See First Judicial District of Pennsylvania v. PHRC, 727 A.2d 1110 (Pa.
1999) (concluding that directing a court to act or not to act in a
personnel matter is interference with the operation of the courts which is
prohibited by the separation of powers doctrine); Court of Common Pleas of
Erie County v. PHRC, 682 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Pa. 1996) (reasoning that "in
order to carry out the duties delegated to the judiciary by the
Constitution, the courts must retain the authority to select the people
who are needed to serve in judicial proceedings and to assist judges in
performing their judicial duties"). With the principle that Pennsylvania
judges have the authority to select and discharge court employees firmly
in mind, we turn to the statute to determine whether the scope of the
Whistleblower Law includes Judge McFalls and his employees.
The object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate
the intent of the legislature, and every statute shall be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all its provisions. 1 Pa.Const.Stat.Ann.
If called upon to construe this statute under similar facts, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court could find that Judge McFalls was the
plaintiffs' employer for purposes of the Law because he supervised their
employment. Assuming without deciding that the Court would so find, we
nevertheless predict that the Court would conclude that Pennsylvania
judges are not covered by the statute because such an interpretation
conflicts with or negates another provision of the Law.
A careful reading of the enforcement provision of the Whistleblower Law
supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that the
statute be applied to state court judges as employers or to provide a
cause of action to discharged members of their personal staff. For
violations of the statute, § 1425 provides for reinstatement of the
employee, back pay, full reinstatement of benefits and seniority rights.
It further permits an award of costs and attorney fees. These remedies
cannot be enforced against a judge under Pennsylvania law.
Each of the plaintiffs was a member of Judge McFalls' personal staff.
Pennsylvania law has consistently emphasized that only a judge has the
authority to hire, supervise, or discharge such employees. First Judicial
District of Pennsylvania v. PHRC, 727 A.2d 1110 (Pa. 1999); Court of
Common Pleas of Erie County v.
PHRC, 682 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Pa. 1996);
Eshelman v. Commisioners of Berks County, 436 A.2d 710, 712 (Pa.Cmwlth.
1981); Beckert v. AFSCME, 425 A.2d 859, 862 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1981); Bradley
v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 388 A.2d 736, 738, n. 3 (Pa. 1978)
(citing Ellenbogen v. County of Allegheny, 388 A.2d 730, (Pa. 1978)).
Therefore, even if Judge McFalls violated the statute, there could be no
means of enforcing the relief granted by the Act, because the judge has
the exclusive authority to hire or discharge his employees. To decide in
plaintiffs' favor on this issue would require that we predict that the
Pennsylvania courts would interpret the Whistleblower Law so as to be
enforceable against some, but not all, violators. This absurd result
would eviscerate the broad, remedial purpose of the legislation.
The plaintiffs would have us restrict the PHRA decisions to their
facts. They assert that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court only prohibits the
PHRA from adjudicating claims against court employees, and that, in line
with these cases, plaintiffs' claims must proceed because claims brought
under the statute are brought directly in the courts. We recognize that
the inherent power of the judiciary to make employment decisions about
judicial employees has often been raised in the context of whether an
agency can investigate these employment decisions or recommend a remedy,
circumstances which are not presented here. We are confident, however,
that the principle underlying decisions where the Pennsylvania courts
have addressed the sole authority of judges to hire, discharge, and
supervise their own employees, is broad enough to encompass our analysis
of the Whistleblower Law in this case.
Therefore, to give effect to all of the statutory provisions, we
predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that the decision
of a Pennsylvania judge to discharge his employees is not within the
scope of the Whistleblower Law.
Even if the legislature intended the Whistleblower Law to apply to a
state judge's decision to fire members of his personal staff, our review
of Pennsylvania decisions leads to the firm conclusion that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would declare the Whistleblower Law
unconstitutional as applied to the judiciary.
Separation of powers precludes the application of the statute to this
case because judges have the right to hire, discharge, and supervise
their personnel. We will not repeat our analysis of the decisions in
which the Pennsylvania courts uphold a judge's right to make these
personnel decisions. We will simply reiterate that, in Pennsylvania, "it
cannot be doubted that judicial power includes the authority to select
persons whose services may be required in judicial proceedings or who may
be required to act as the assistants of the judges in the performance of
their judicial functions." Eshelman, 436 A.2d at 712 (citing Sweet v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 322 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974). In other
words, "the selection or hiring of judicial assistants is an exercise of
judicial power; and so is their discharge." Beckert, 425 A.2d at 862.
The enforcement provision of the Whistleblower Law provides for
reinstatement of the employee, back pay, full reinstatement of benefits
and seniority rights. Since decisions about hiring and discharging staff
are the sole preserve of the judge, we predict that the Pennsylvania
courts would find the statute unconstitutional as applied to the
judiciary because it violates the separation of powers doctrine.
We have concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find that
the decision of a Pennsylvania judge to discharge his employees is not
within the scope of the Whistleblower Law, and, furthermore, that an
attempt to apply it to the judiciary would be unconstitutional because it
would violate the separation of powers doctrine. Accordingly, we will
grant Judge McFalls' motion to dismiss the claims brought against him in
his personal capacity under the Whistleblower Law.*fn4
B. Defendant McFalls' Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III in his
Official Capacity (CA 01-2294 Doc. 19, CA 01-2329 Doc. 18)
At the outset we note that Count III, which alleges claims under the
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, has not been brought against Judge
McFalls in his official capacity and we need not address it further. The
defendant argues that the claims asserted in Count I are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1),
and fail to state a viable claim under § 1983 and therefore should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs insist that reinstatement, the
relief sought in this count, is prospective relief, and therefore is not
subject to the jurisdictional bar.
Generally, state officials acting in their official capacities are not
"persons" under § 1983, because they assume the identity of the
government that employs them. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). "A suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is no different from a suit against the State itself."
Id. The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to protect a state from
being sued for monetary damages in federal court by its own citizens
without its consent. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
100 (1984). Therefore, an action for damages brought against a state
official in his or her official capacity is usually barred by the
However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar every suit in which a
state official is named as a defendant. In cases where the lawsuit seeks
only prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing violation
of federal law, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), provides a narrow
exception to the Eleventh Amendment defense. "[O]fficial-capacity actions
for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State" and
are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27
(1991) (internal citations omitted). This exception to the jurisdictional
bar applies to cases where the state official continues to violate
federal law, "as opposed to cases in which federal law has been violated
at one time or over a period of time." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,
277-78 (1986); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d
In determining whether plaintiffs' § 1983 claim is barred, Papasan
and Blanciak direct us to look carefully at the nature of the relief the
plaintiffs seek, and to consider the substance, rather than the form, of
the relief requested. Papasan,
478 U.S. at 278; Blanciak, 77 F.3d at
698. Relief that seeks compensation for a past injury by a state
official, even if styled as prospective relief, does not fit within the
narrow rule of Ex Parte Young and is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Id. at 698; Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278; Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
Count I of the Amended Complaints asserts that these claims against
Judge McFalls in his official capacity seek only prospective relief.
Specifically, the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief,
including reinstatement. Count I, Wherefore clauses at ¶ f. Despite the
characterization of this relief as "prospective," we agree with the
defendant that this relief is not intended to halt a present, continuing
violation of federal law. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has concluded plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 698.
Plaintiffs refer us to Melo v. Hafer for the proposition that a claim
for reinstatement against an official in her official capacity is a claim
for prospective relief and therefore is not barred. 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d
Cir. 1990). In that case, the Third Circuit held that plaintiff
employees, who had been discharged by the new Auditor General for reasons
which were allegedly politically motivated, could maintain claims for
reinstatement against the Auditor General in her official capacity under
§ 1983 because those claims were for prospective relief. Id. at 637.
Therefore, under Melo, claims for reinstatement may be considered as
claims for prospective relief.
Melo, however, does not prevent the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims in
this case. In Melo, the Auditor General herself remained in office, and
there were positions in that office to which the plaintiffs could be
reinstated. No such relief is possible here for two reasons. First, Judge
McFalls is no longer in office, and will never hold judicial office in
Pennsylvania again. Secondly, Pennsylvania judges have the exclusive
authority to hire, discharge, and supervise their employees. First
Judicial District, 727 A.2d at 1110. Consistent with the separation of
powers doctrine, we could not order a sitting judge to reinstate employees
he had decided should be discharged. Thus if the nature of the relief
plaintiffs are seeking is actual reinstatement, that is not possible. If
the relief sought is other compensation instead of reinstatement, that
relief is clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
More significantly, Melo does not address the dispositive issue in
these cases, which is that the Amended Complaints do not allege an
ongoing violation of federal law, and the relief sought is not intended
to remedy such a violation. The Amended Complaints simply target Judge
McFalls' past actions — discharging the plaintiffs. Therefore
plaintiffs' claims do not fall within Ex Parte Young.
Plaintiffs further assert that a recent Third Circuit decision, Koslow
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, permits us to grant purely prospective
relief under Ex Parte Young. 2002 WL 1925569 (3d Cir. Pa.). Koslow
concluded that the state had waived its sovereign immunity under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1983, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and therefore the
Eleventh Amendment did not bar claims brought against the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections. Koslow has no bearing on the decision we must
Since plaintiffs have not shown that their discharge was an ongoing
violation of federal law, we find that the claims brought against Judge
McFalls in his
official capacity in Count I are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Since the allegations do not assert an ongoing violation of federal
law, we must conclude that the claims brought against Judge McFalls in
his official capacity in Count I of the Amended Complaint must be
dismissed because the Eleventh Amendment deprives this Court of subject
C. Defendant Allegheny County's Motion to Dismiss (CA 01-2294
Doc. 6 and CA 01-2329 Doc. 6)
The County has moved to dismiss Count II, which alleges a violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Count III, alleging a violation of the
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa.Const.Stat.Ann. § 1421 et seq.
We turn first to the Section 1983 claim.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
The County argues that Count II must be dismissed because it had no
policymaking authority over the Pennsylvania courts, and therefore no
authority over Judge McFalls' decision to fire his staff. The plaintiffs
assert that Allegheny County is liable under § 1983 for Judge
McFalls' decision to discharge them, because the judge was acting as a
policymaking official of the County in matters concerning the employees
assigned to his chambers.
The purpose of § 1983 is to hold "persons," including governmental
entities, liable for official acts which violate an individual's
constitutional rights. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
691-92 (1976). To establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
plaintiffs must show that there was a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and law of the United States, and that the alleged violation
was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 47-49 (1988). Liability under § 1983 may not be
imposed on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-95.
It is well settled that "[m]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches
where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a
course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official
or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to
the subject matter in question." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986).
Therefore, to determine whether a municipality is liable under §
1983, courts must "identify those officials or governmental bodies who
speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor
concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular
constitutional or statutory violation at issue." McMillian v. Monroe
County, 520 U.S. 781, 784-85 (1997) (quoting Jett v. Dallas Independent
School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). Whether an official possesses
final policymaking authority is a question of state law. Pembauer, 475
U.S. at 483.
Count II of the Amended Complaints alleges that Judge McFalls
retaliated against the plaintiffs because they exercised their right
under the First Amendment to speak freely on matters of public concern,
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs contend that Judge
McFalls is a policymaking official of Allegheny County in matters
concerning the employees
assigned to his chambers. Plaintiffs further
aver that the County ratified Judge McFalls' conduct through the
involvement of sheriff deputies and the actions of the Allegheny County
Facilities Coordinator. They claim that the County delegated to Judge
McFalls the authority to take such actions against Plaintiffs and
provided him with unreviewable discretion to fire Plaintiffs.*fn5
The parties do not dispute that Judge McFalls had the final
policymaking authority to discharge the plaintiff members of his staff.
They disagree, however, as to whether a judge on the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County is a policymaker for the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania or for Allegheny County when acting to discharge these
The United States Supreme Court's decision in McMillian guides our
analysis of whether the state or the County had the final policymaking
authority over the decision to fire the plaintiffs. In that case,
McMillian sued the county under § 1983 over allegedly
unconstitutional actions by the sheriff.
The parties agreed that the sheriff was a policymaker for purposes of
§ 1983, but disputed whether he was a policymaker for the county or
for the state of Alabama. Id. at 783.
McMillian emphasized that municipal liability under § 1983 depends
upon whether "governmental officials are the final policymakers for the
local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue." Id. at
785. The Supreme Court held that as to the actions taken against the
plaintiff, the sheriff represented Alabama. The Court explained that
although the county "has no direct control over how the sheriff fulfills
his law enforcement duty, the Governor and the attorney general do have
this kind of control." Id. at 791. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of McMillian's § 1983 claims against the county because the
sheriff was not acting as its policymaker.
The Supreme Court directed that courts look to "the definition of the
official's functions under relevant state law" to determine the function
of a governmental official in a particular area for purposes of liability
under § 1983. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786 (citing Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Doe, 510 U.S. 425, 429, n. 5 (1997)). In doing so, the federal
courts must respect the way a state chooses to structure its government.
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988). In McMillian, the
Supreme Court looked to the Alabama Constitution and the state's courts'
interpretation of the relevant provisions under Alabama law, and
concluded that the sheriff represented the state when acting in a law
enforcement capacity. Under Alabama law, the county had no law
enforcement authority. Thus tort claims brought against sheriffs, based
upon their official acts, constituted suits against the state and not
against the sheriff's county. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 789.
Under Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania trial courts are part of the
Unified Judicial System of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and are
under the direct supervision of the state Supreme
Court. In Pennsylvania, judges retain the right to hire, discharge and
supervise court personnel. Bradley 388 A.2d at 738, n. 3 (citing Ellenbogen
v. County of Allegheny, 388 A.2d 730 (Pa. 1978)). Judges retain this
authority in accordance with the separation of powers embodied in the PA
Constitution. Pa. Const. Art. V, § 1; Callahan v. Pennsylvania,
207 F.3d 668, 669 (3d Cir. 2000); Erie County, 682 A.2d at 1247. See also
First Judicial District, 727 A.2d at 1112 ("holding that "[t]he supreme
court has the sole power and the responsibility to supervise the
`practice, procedure, and the conduct of all courts").
Under Pennsylvania law, then, it is clear that the state and not the
County has authority over the conduct of the courts. Therefore, Judge
McFalls could not have been acting as a policymaker for the County when
he discharged the plaintiffs.
To support their argument that we cannot dismiss their claims against
the County at this juncture, plaintiffs refer us to Brueggman v. Fayette
County, 68 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1303 (W.D.Pa. 1995), and DeFranks
v. Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, 68 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases
(BNA) 1306 (W.D.Pa. 1995), two unreported employment discrimination cases
decided in this district before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision
in First Judicial District was handed down. In these cases, a court
reporter and a probation officer alleged that Fayette County was liable
for sexual harassment by its President Judge under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991. The county argued that it was not liable as an employer as defined
by the statute because the judge was not a county policymaker, and the
district court judge ruled that the question could not be decided on
motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs also cite to Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723
(3d Cir. 1997), in which several employees of a district justice's office
in Dauphin County sued for sex discrimination under Title VII, and the
Court of Appeals determined that the county exercised sufficient control
over these employees to make it a co-employer for purposes of Title VII
These decisions are easily distinguishable from the claims filed
against Judge McFalls. At issue in each of these cases was whether the
county, along with the judiciary, was a joint employer for purposes of
Title VII liability. This is a crucial inquiry under Title VII, which
provides a cause of action only against employers, employment agencies,
and labor organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a), (2(b) and (c).
Indeed, the holding in Graves is limited to Title VII. 117 F.3d at 729
(reversing dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Dauphin County because
the allegations of the complaint, if proven, were sufficient to impose
Title VII liability on the county). The cases before us do not present
Title VII claims, so whether the county is a co-employer under these
decisions is simply irrelevant.
Plaintiffs further argue that Judge McFalls was acting as a policymaker
for the County because the County pays their salaries, provides them with
employment benefits, and provides their workplace. Again, the decisions
cited in support of this position are Title VII decisions, and thus are
not relevant to the issues presented by the cases at bar. In addition,
the fact that the County pays the plaintiffs' salaries has no effect on a
judge's authority to hire and fire his employees. Lehigh County v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 489 A.2d 1325, 1327 (Pa. 1985)
(citing Sweet v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 322 A.2d 362 (Pa.
Furthermore, as McMillian explains, an official may have final
policymaking authority in one area but not in another. 520 U.S. at
785-86. Thus asserting that the County provides the plaintiffs with
indicia of employment could be relevant under Title VII, but has no
bearing on whether the County is liable for the constitutional violations
alleged under § 1983. The Supreme Court has emphatically rejected
such a "categorical, `all or nothing'" approach to municipal liability.
Id. at 785.
We have no difficulty deciding, under Pennsylvania law, that Judge
McFalls was not acting as a policymaker for the County when he discharged
his staff. Judge McFalls' authority to hire, supervise, and discharge his
personal employees came from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. It did not
— and could not — come from the County because the County has
no policymaking authority over the Pennsylvania courts. Accordingly, the
§ 1983 claims alleged against Allegheny County in Count II of the
Amended Complaints shall be dismissed.
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law
Count III of the Amended Complaints alleges claims for retaliatory
discharge against the County under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law.
The County argues it cannot be found liable under the Whistleblower Law
because it was not the plaintiffs' employer. Plaintiffs assert that since
they have pled that they were employed by the County and that Judge
McFalls was a policymaking official for the County, these claims cannot
As we have previously stated, the Law was enacted to protect public
employees. The Law provides that:
No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise
discriminate or retaliate against an employee
regarding the employee's compensation, terms,
conditions, location or privileges of employment
because the employee or a person acting on behalf of
the employee makes a good faith report or is about to
report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or
appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or
43 Pa.Const.Stat.Ann. § 1423(a).
Thus it protects employees who have been discharged from governmental
entities for making a good faith report about wrongdoing to an employer
or appropriate authority. Johnson v. Resources for Human Development,
Inc., 843 F. Supp. 974 (E.D.Pa. 1994).
The statute defines "employer" as "[a] person supervising one or more
employees, including the employee in question; a supervisor of that
supervisor; or an agent of a public body." 43 Pa.C.S.A. § 1422. A
"public body" includes a county. 43 Pa.C.S.A. § 1422(2).
Whether Judge McFalls was a policymaker for the county when he fired
the plaintiffs is a question of law for the Court to decide. We have
concluded that he was not. See infra pp. 10-14. Plaintiffs' Whistleblower
Law claims against defendant Allegheny County must fail because the Law
provides a cause of action only against an employer and, although the
County could incur liability as an employer under the statute in other
circumstances, it has not in this case.*fn6 The County was not the
plaintiffs' employer, and Judge McFalls was not the County's agent. Under
Pennsylvania law, the County had no
authority to hire, supervise, or
discharge the plaintiffs in this case, who were each members of Judge
McFalls' personal staff. Bradley, 388 A.2d at 738, n. 3 (citing
Ellenbogen v. County of Allegheny, 388 A.2d 730, (Pa. 1978)). Judge
McFalls, alone, had that power, and he was not acting as a policymaker or
agent for Allegheny County when he exercised it and discharged his
staff. We find that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the
Whistleblower Law against defendant County, and we will dismiss Count II
of the Amended Complaints as to this claim.
For the reasons set forth above, we will grant defendant Allegheny
County's motions to dismiss the claims brought against it in Counts I and
II of the Amended Complaints (CA 01-2294 Doc. 6 and CA 01-2329 Doc. 6) in
their entirety. We will also grant Judge McFalls' motions to dismiss the
claims brought against him in his official capacity (CA 01-2294 Doc. 19,
CA 01-2329 Doc. 18). Defendant McFalls' motions to dismiss the claims
brought against him in his personal capacity (CA 01-2294 Doc. 10, CA
01-2329 Doc. 9) shall be granted in part and denied in part. Said motions
shall be granted insofar as they seek dismissal of the claims against
Judge McFalls in Count III, as we have concluded that the Whistleblower
Law does not apply to Pennsylvania judges and their personal staff. We
will deny these motions insofar as they seek dismissal of the claims
against Judge McFalls in his personal capacity in Count I.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, to-wit, this 31st day of October, 2002, for the reasons set
forth in the accompanying Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED as follows:
The motions to dismiss filed by defendant Allegheny County (CA 01-2294
Doc. 6 and CA 01-2329 Doc. 6) be and hereby are GRANTED in their
entirety, and Allegheny County be and hereby is dismissed as a defendant
in these actions; the motions to dismiss the claims asserted against him
in his official capacity, filed by defendant H. Patrick McFalls, Jr. (CA
01-2294 Doc. 19, CA 01-2329 Doc. 18), be and hereby are GRANTED in their
entirety; and the motions to dismiss the claims asserted against him in
his individual capacity, filed by defendant H. Patrick McFalls, Jr. (CA
01-2294 Doc. 10, CA 01-2329 Doc. 9), be and hereby are GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART as follows: said motions be and hereby are GRANTED
insofar as they seek dismissal of the claims asserted in Count III; said
motions be and hereby are DENIED insofar as they seek dismissal of the
claims asserted in Count I.