Court also held that Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to "go
beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
Thus, Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed
by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except
the mere pleadings themselves, and it is from this list that one would
normally expect the nonmoving party to make the required showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. See Also, Morgan v. Havir
Manufacturing Co., 887 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.Pa. 1994); McGrath v. City of
Philadelphia, 864 F. Supp. 466, 472-473 (E.D.Pa. 1994).
By their motion, Defendants move for the entry of summary judgment in
their favor on all of the claims raised in the plaintiff's complaint. In
his response thereto, Plaintiff does not dispute that judgment as a
matter of law is properly entered in favor of the John Doe defendant or
as to his claims for municipal liability, false arrest and malicious
prosecution. Indeed, according to the plaintiff's response to defendants'
summary judgment motion, ". . . discovery has narrowed the issues [in
this case] to two: 1) whether defendant Eric D. Ruggeri had probable
cause to arrest the plaintiff without a warrant, and 2) whether defendant
Eric D. Ruggeri used excessive force under the circumstances of this case
in arresting (him)." Consequently, we hereby summarily grant the
defendant's motion and enter summary judgment as to John Doe, West Caln
Township and West Brandywine Township and as to Plaintiff's claims for
false arrest and malicious prosecution against the remaining defendant,
Eric Ruggeri. We therefore now turn to Plaintiff's claims that Officer
Ruggeri arrested him without probable cause and with excessive force.
In order to bring a successful § 1983*fn1 claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) that the challenged conduct was committed by a person
acting under color of state law, and (2) that the conduct deprived the
plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution
or federal law. Olender v. Township of Bensalem, 32 F. Supp.2d 775, 782
(E.D.Pa. 1999), aff'd 202 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1999); Pieknick v.
Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Carter v. City of
Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 1993).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits arrests without probable cause.*fn2
See, Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.
1995). Specifically, that Amendment provides that:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath and affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."
Probable cause to arrest is said to exist where the facts and
circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a reasonable, prudent person in believing that an
offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.
Gerstein v. Pugh,