back pay and interest after the withholding of federal income
tax in satisfaction of the EEOC's remedial order. See Checks
from USPS to Craig S. Ritchie, dated December 14 and December
19, 2000, attached to Document No. 24 ("Ex.P-H").
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with Respect to
Plaintiffs Instatement Claims and a Motion to Attach Plaintiffs
Back Pay Funds on December 29, 2000. On January 12, 2001,
plaintiff filed his Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
the issue of whether the EEOC's Reconsideration Decision is
binding on the USPS. That motion also included a request to deny
or postpone ruling on defendant's motion for summary judgment so
that the parties may engage in formal discovery. The Court will
rule on these motions in turn.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
"If the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law[,]" summary judgment shall be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Supreme Court has
explained that Rule 56(c) requires "the threshold inquiry of
determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in
other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly
can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Therefore, "a motion for summary judgment
must be granted unless the party opposing the motion can adduce
evidence which, when considered in light of that party's burden
of proof at trial, could be the basis for a jury finding in that
party's favor." J.E. Mamiye & Sons, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank,
813 F.2d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson and Celotex
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159, 90
S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (quoting United States v.
Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176
(1962)). However, the party opposing summary judgment "must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986). Therefore, "[i]f the evidence [offered by the nonmoving
party] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). On the other hand,
if reasonable minds can differ as to the import of the proffered
evidence that speaks to an issue of material fact, summary
judgment should not be granted.
IV. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
In this motion, defendant seeks summary judgment on Counts II
through IV of plaintiffs Amended Complaint — those counts
related to plaintiffs claim that he is entitled to instatement
to the position of PTF carrier at the Plymouth Meeting Post
Office or, in the alternative, at the Blue Bell Post
Office.-Specifically, Count II seeks instatement to the position
carrier, Count III alleges discrimination on the basis of
disability with regard to the PTF carrier position, and Count IV
alleges retaliation with regard to the PTF carrier position.
A. Discussion of Applicable Law
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act, the employee bears the burden of
demonstrating "(1) that he or she has a disability; (2) that he
or she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions
of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the
employer; and (3) that he or she was nonetheless terminated or
otherwise prevented from performing the job." Donahue v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir.
If plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to defendant to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs treatment. See Jones v.
School Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). This
is a "relatively light burden." Fuentes v. Perskie,
32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). While the burden of production may
shift under this framework, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53,
101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).
In the event a defendant meets this burden of production, a
plaintiff must present evidence that the reasons offered by the
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination. See Jones, 198 F.3d at 410. A plaintiff may
defeat a motion for summary judgment by pointing to some
evidence — either direct or circumstantial — from which a fact
finder "would reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer's
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of the employer's action." Id. at 413.
See also, Jackson v. Coatesville Area School Dist., 2000 WL
1185375, *5 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 21, 2000).
The plaintiff `must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate
reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder
could rationally find them unworthy of credence and
hence infer that the employer did not act for the
asserted non-discriminatory reasons.'
Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace,