In support of its Summary Judgment Motion, Defendant claims that
Plaintiff was moved into a smaller office for business reasons and that
his termination was a result of his unauthorized use of public funds.
(Def.'s Summ. J. Mot. at 8-9.)
To counter Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff claims that Tegley falsely
accused him of misusing petty cash funds and that the funds in dispute
were spent on buying meals when he worked overtime and on buying supplies
for the office. (Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Summ. J. Mot. at 19.) Plaintiff
contends that his supervisors, including Tegley, approved the
transactions in questions and that it was a long-standing practice of
employees to charge meals to Defendant when they worked late. (Pl.'s
Dep. at 55-58, 113.) In support of his claim, Plaintiff offers affidavits
of two former managers who stated that it was a permitted practice of
Defendant's employees to use petty cash and cash advances for the
purchase of office supplies and meals when they worked on evenings and
weekends and that Plaintiff, as well as other employees, had
authorization to use the funds in such a way. (See Aff. of Paul Janssen &
Robert Pellegrino.) Tegley himself acknowledged that there was no formal
written policy regarding petty cash disbursements when he became
supervisor in 1998 and that new procedures for such disbursements were
not put into place until April 1999, after Plaintiff was terminated.
(Tegley's Dep. at 22; Ann Alker's Dep. at 13-14.) Plaintiff also offers
letters of recommendation written on his behalf by two former supervisors
in March 2000 as evidence that he was a conscientious worker who received
solid annual audit reports. (Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., Exs. C
& D.) Accordingly, the Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact
exists and that Plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence to survive
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
II. PHRA CLAIMS
In addition to his Title VII claims, Plaintiff sets forth claims for
discrimination against Defendant under the PHRA. "Courts have uniformly
interpreted the PHRA consistent with Title VII." Harris, 27 F. Supp. at
576. As Plaintiff's Title VII claims survive Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, his PHRA claims against Defendant survive as well.
An Order follows.
AND NOW, this day of August 2001, upon consideration of Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (docket #12) and Plaintiff's Opposition
thereto (docket #13), IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part as follows:
1) The Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
ADA claim is GRANTED;
2) The Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
ADEA claim is GRANTED;
3) The Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
Title VII claim is DENIED;
4) The Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's
PHRA claim is DENIED.