United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
May 22, 2001
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
JAMES RUFUS MCCOY, JR.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Dalzell, J.
The sentencing hearing we conducted this day involved a technical but
important question of the Sentencing Guidelines' application that our
Court of Appeals has yet to address. Specifically, the question has to do
with the interplay of the so-called safety valve of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2
with the "specific offense characteristics" provisions of U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(b)(6). As will be seen, this issue is quite consequential to this
defendant, who turns sixty-one in eight days.
James Rufus McCoy on January 5, 2001 pleaded guilty to Count 3 of the
Indictment, which charged him with manufacture of cocaine base in a
school zone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860. According to the
Probation Office's calculation in the Presentence Investigation Report
("PSI"), pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2, the base offense level for
McCoy is 30, which is predicated on the 22.85 grams of crack that McCoy
cooked, plus 2 levels for cooking the cocaine at a location within 1,000
feet of a public school (PSI ¶ 21). Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1, McCoy receives a three level reduction for his timely expression
of acceptance of responsibility. Lastly, the Probation Officer applies
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(6) because McCoy meets the five criteria set
forth in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, thereby decreasing his total offense level
by two levels (see PSI ¶ 22).
The Government takes issues with this last step. Specifically, it
contends that no aspect of the "safety valve" provided by § 5C1.2
should apply, and that therefore the proper total offense level should be
27, with a range of 70-87 months, rather than the 60-71 month range the
Probation Officer calculated (as supplemented by the application of the
mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 860). See PSI ¶¶ 69-70.
For the reasons that follow, we overrule the Government's objections to
the Probation Officer's calculation.
Application of § 2D1.1(b)(6)
United State Sentencing Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(6), which falls under
the "specific offense characteristics" section for drug offenses, states
that "[i]f the defendant meets the criteria set forth in subdivisions
(1)-(5) of § 5C1.2 (Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimum
Sentences in Certain Cases) and the offense level determined above is
level 26 or greater, decrease by 2 levels." In turn, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2
In the case of an offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841, § 844, §
846, § 960, or § 963, the court shall impose a sentence in
accordance with the applicable guidelines without regard to any statutory
minimum sentence, if the court finds that the defendant meets the
criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5) set forth verbatim below:
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal
history point, as determined under the sentencing
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible
threats of violence or possess a firearm or other
dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do
so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious
bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as
determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not
engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as
defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing
hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the
Government all information and evidence the defendant
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part
of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or
plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant
or useful other information to provide or that the
Government is already aware of the information shall
not preclude a determination by the court that the
defendant has complied with this requirement.
The Government does not dispute that McCoy meets these five
characteristics. The Government maintains, however, that because McCoy
pleaded guilty to a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860, he is not eligible
for the 2 level reduction in § 2D1.1(b)(6), since § 860 is not
one of the offenses listed in the first paragraph of § 5C1.2. The
Probation Office responds that although McCoy would not be eligible for a
§ 5C1.2 "safety valve", this is analytically distinct from his
eligibility under § 2D1.1(b)(6), which merely references some
subparts of § 5C1.2, and does not include all the other limitations
contained in § 5C1.2.
Specifically, the Government argues that § 2D1.1(b)(6) should only
apply when the "safety valve" provided in § 5C1.2 also obtains.
The Government cites in support Judge Katz's recent Memorandum in
United States v. Ortiz, 100 F. Supp.2d 295, 299 (E.D.Pa. 2000).
In Ortiz, the defendant had pleaded guilty to, inter alia,
21 U.S.C. § 860, the offense to which McCoy pleaded here, and the
probation officer had refused to give him the 2 offense level reduction
pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(6) even though Ortiz met the five criteria in
§ 5C1.2.*fn1 Disposing of this objection, Judge Katz said:
Ortiz argues that because he is not a manager or
supervisor, he qualifies for a two-level decrease in
his offense level. In order to receive this downward
adjustment, a defendant must have a pre-adjustment
offense level of at least 26 and meet the "safety
valve" criteria set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.
See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(6). However, section 5C1.2
only applies to certain enumerated drug offenses: it
does not apply to one of the offenses to which Ortiz
pled guilty, distribution of a controlled substance
within 1000 feet of a school in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 860. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2; cf.
United States v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 105, 108-09 (3d
Cir. 1996) (holding that relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553
(f), the statutory safety valve provision, is not
available to defendants convicted of a violation of
21 U.S.C. § 860 because that offense is excluded
from the list of offenses to which the statutory
safety valve applies). Accordingly, Ortiz cannot
receive a two-level safety valve downward adjustment
to his offense level.
Ortiz, 100 F. Supp.2d at 299.
Ortiz is the only case directly on point that the Government cites. The
Government goes on to argue that its claim is buttressed by the fact that
our Court of Appeals has found that 18 U.S.S.G. § 3553(f), the
enabling safety valve statute, does not apply to violations of
21 U.S.C. § 860. In this regard, the Government cites United States
v. McQuilkin, 78 F.3d 105, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1996), which Judge Katz
cited, and United States v. Watterson, 219 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2000), in
which the panel held that the upward adjustment for a school zone drug
offense (pursuant to § 2D1.2) did not apply where the defendant
wasn't charged under 21 U.S.C. § 860, even though the offense had in
fact taken place inside a school zone. These two decisions, the
Government maintains, shows that our Court of Appeals views the
Guidelines provisions for 21 U.S.C. § 841 and § 860 as being
completely distinct; thus, as allowing McCoy a 2 level lower adjustment
pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(6) would "mix" the Guidelines as to these
offenses, it is impermissible.
The Government also notes that although § 2D1.1(b)(6) does not
reference the introduction to § 5C1.2, § 2D1.1(b)(6)'s "apparent
purpose . . . is to state that when the `safety valve' applies to a drug
count, there should be an additional 2-level reduction." Gov't.'s
Sentencing Mem. at 5. The Government goes on to note that there is
nothing in the Guidelines' commentary for either section to suggest that
the Commission intended § 2D1.1(b)(6) to apply if the safety valve
did not. Finally, the Government contends that applying the §
2D1.1(b)(6) reduction to 21 U.S.C. § 860 would negate the 2 level
upward adjustment provided in § 2D1.2.
The Probation Officer argues that § 2D1.1(b)(6) does not require
that McCoy satisfy the "safety valve" requirements and instead simply
references the five conditions. He also notes that other Circuits have
made the safety valve available to defendants whose offenses were not
specifically included in § 5C1.2. See, e.g., United States v.
Mertilus, 111 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 1997).
There is no question that the "safety valve" provided in
18 U.S.C. § 3553 and § 5C1.2 cannot apply to McCoy because he
pleaded guilty to 21 U.S.C. § 860. This was the plain holding of
McQuilkin, which relied, in so holding, on (1) the observation that
§ 860 was not one of the specifically enumerated provisions and (2)
application of the canon of construction that inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, McQuilkin, 78 F.3d at 108. The question is whether
McQuilkin carries the day for the Government.
As noted above, Judge Katz's opinion in Ortiz held that it does.
Our research found no other case in our Circuit that addressed the
problem before us.
With great deference to Judge Katz's reasoning in Ortiz, we come to
another conclusion. Ortiz held that in order to receive the grace of
§ 2D1.1(b)(6), a defendant must meet § 5C1.2 in toto. Looking at
the language of § 2D1.1(b)(6), the Sentencing Commission was at pains
to simply appropriate the five criteria from § 5C1.2, without
necessarily adopting anything else associated with § 5C1.2. If the
Commission wanted to have that 2 level adjustment apply only to those
defendants eligible for relief under § 5C1.2, it could readily have
said so in just a few words. But it did not do so.
For similar reasons we find unconvincing the Government's arguments (1)
that we should reject the application of § 2D1.1(b)(6) here because
there is nothing in the Guidelines to suggest that it was meant to apply
if the safety valve didn't, and (2) that § 2D1.1(b)(6)'s "apparent
purpose" was to give an additional break to those eligible for the safety
valve.*fn2 These arguments seem to stem from the initial supposition
that § 2D1.1(b)(6) is somehow related to the safety valve, and is not
just borrowing language from it. But this is a supposition that decides
Again, the bare language of § 2D1.1(b)(6) merely borrows the five
§ 5C1.2 criteria. It does not tie § 2D1.1(b)(6) to the presence
or absence of the "safety valve", which is set forth in the introductory
paragraph to § 5C1.2, a paragraph that § 2D1.1(b)(6) does not
mention or incorporate.
We also find wanting the Government's complaint that the application of
this adjustment negates the 2 level upward adjustment for being in a
school zone. This contention is simply beside the point. It is perfectly
consistent for the Commission to give 2 extra levels with one hand, but
then take away 2 levels with the other if the defendant meets the rather
stringent set of five criteria that are set forth in § 5C1.2. It is
hardly every drug defendant who could meet these, so the fact that one
who does meet them essentially "gets away with" selling in a school zone
for sentencing purposes should not trouble us too much.
Finally, we cannot accept the Government's argument based on the
relationship between the Guidelines provisions for § 841 and §
860. As Watterson demonstrates, our Court of Appeals takes seriously the
difference between being charged with 21 U.S.C. § 860 (as McCoy was)
and being charged with 21 U.S.C. § 841, even if that violation of
§ 841 occurs in a school zone. Of particular note is that our Court
of Appeals maintains this distinction despite that the mandatory minimum
that applies in this case (and that applied in Watterson) in fact comes
from § 841, since § 860 tells us to apply either a one year
mandatory minimum (in § 860) or the mandatory minimum from §
841, if it is greater. That is, the statutes themselves are quite
Thus, we could see the following argument as resulting from the
Government's logic: (1) McCoy pleaded to 21 U.S.C. § 860;
(2) the offense level for § 860 comes from § 2D1.2*fn3;
therefore (3) § 2D1.1, including the 2 level downward adjustment in
§ 2D1.1(b)(6), is simply inapposite to the calculation of our offense
level here, since we know we must keep § 860 sentencing separate from
§ 841 sentencing, and § 2D1.2 is the Guidelines section for
§ 860. Moreover, the argument would continue, if we look at the
"statutory provisions" listing for § 2D1.1, we note that it does not
include § 860, while § 860 is one of the statutory provisions
listed for § 2D1.2.
This hypothesized argument does not work. Section 2D1.2 provides
the base offense level for those convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 860.
However, the base offense level is the only thing included under §
2D1.2. There are no other provisions; most notably, there are no
"specific offense characteristics".
Conversely, in § 2D1.1(b), there are six "specific offense
characteristics", including § 2D1.1(b)(6), which is at issue here.
"Characteristic" adjustments include:
• 2 level increase for use of a dangerous weapon
• 2 level increase (or increase to level 26) for
use of certain aircraft
• 2 level increase if object was to distribute in
• 2 level increase for certain methamphetamine
manufacture or importation
• 2 level increase for unlawful discharge or
handling of toxic substance
• 2 level decrease for meeting § 5C1.2 criteria
Thus, it would seem only logical that to the extent that any of these
adjustments apply to 21 U.S.C. § 860, then they all must apply,
including § 2D1.1(b)(6). Therefore, the only way the Government's
"structure of the guidelines" argument could work would be if the
Government would concede that it would not apply, for example, §
2D1.1(b)(1) to give an adjustment upward if McCoy had a gun, or §
2D1.1(b)(3) to give an adjustment upward if McCoy had been manufacturing
drugs destined for a prison. But such a claim, even were the Government
to make it, would seem perverse since it would be exempting school-zone
drug manufacturers from many upward adjustments simply because they were
in a school zone.
Hence, we conclude that the § 2D1.1(b) adjustments in general are
applied to 21 U.S.C. § 860 criminals, and thus § 2D1.1(b)(6) is as
well. There is nothing in the language of § 2D1.1(b)(6) to suggest
that the Commission was doing anything other than borrowing, for
its own ends, the five criteria from § 5C1.2. Its relation to that
"safety valve" provision ends there. Simply because McCoy is not
eligible for a safety valve departure thus does not disqualify him
from the 2 level downward adjustment under § 2D1.1(b)(6).
United States v. Mertilus, 111 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 1997) squarely
supports this proposition. It held that § 2D1.1(b)(6)*fn4 "does not
limit consideration of the two-level reduction to the enumerated
offenses in section
5C1.2" and "does not limit the application of the five factors in section
5C1.2 to the crimes listed therein," Mertilus, 111 F.3d at 874.
We therefore will overrule the Government's objection.
AND NOW, this 22nd day of May, 2001, upon consideration of the
Government's objection to paragraph 22 of the Presentence Investigation
Report, and of the parties' memoranda, and after the sentencing hearing
this day, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum,
it is hereby ORDERED that the Government's objection is OVERRULED.