The opinion of the court was delivered by: Joyner, District Judge.
This is an employment discrimination case brought by Plaintiff Joyce
B. Ferreri ("Plaintiff") against her former employer, Defendant Mac
Motors, Inc. ("Defendant"). In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant's termination of her employment violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"); Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title
VII"); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 623, et
seq. ("ADEA"); and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 48 P.S. §
951, et seq. ("PHRA"). In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
committed a breach of contract and violated the Pennsylvania Wage Payment
and Collection Law, 43 P.S. § 260.1, et seq. ("WPCL"). Defendant now
moves for summary judgment. For the reasons below, we will grant
Defendant's Motion on the federal law claims and decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
The facts of this case are straight-forward. Defendant is an auto-parts
company. In 1985, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant to work as a
telemarketer, a position she held until she was terminated in 1998. The
stated reason for Plaintiffs termination was "excessive absence."
Plaintiff forthrightly admits that throughout her 13 year employment
with Mac Motors, she had difficulty arriving to work on time. (Pl.Dep. at
65, 120-22). Plaintiff blames "99%" of her late arrivals on traffic
congestion. (Id. at 120). She further states that, despite the obvious
and consistent traffic problems she encountered, she was never able to
figure out a way to get to work on time while in Defendant's employ.
(Id. at 121-22).
Mac Motors did not have an official, written attendance policy in place
for the first several years of Plaintiffs employment. As a result, on the
occasions that Plaintiff was late, she would be informally confronted by
her supervisor and reminded of the need to be to work on time.
Unfortunately, these informal efforts were unsuccessful, and Plaintiffs
tardiness began to worsen in late 1994 and 1995. As a result, Plaintiffs
current manager, Mark Boruta ("Boruta"), issued her a written notice on
December 28, 1995 regarding the excessive "amount of time that [she was]
missing from work." (Def.Ex. C). After Plaintiff s tardiness did not
improve, Boruta and William Boyk ("Boyk"), President of Mac Motors, met
with her in February 1996 to re-emphasize the importance of arriving to
work on time. (Pl. Dep at 199-200; Boyk Dep. at 43). Several months
later, after still no improvement in Plaintiffs punctuality, Boyk and
Bortita removed Plaintiff from several of her sales accounts because of
her continual lateness. (Def.Ex. E). Despite that action, Plaintiff
continued to struggle getting to work on time and after being late for a
company meeting in August 1996, she was suspended for two days. (Def.Ex.
In March 1998, Mac Motors instituted a formal, written attendance
policy and distributed it to all employees. The policy regarding tardiness
Definition: An employee will be considered to be tardy
if he punches the time clock more than 5 minutes after
his scheduled start time, or if he is more than 5
minutes late punching in after lunch break.
If an employee is late 3 times in a 30 day period he
or she will be issued a verbal warning. If the
employee is late I more time within the next 30 days
after the verbal warning he will be issued a written
reprimand. If he is late again within 30 days after
the written reprimand he will be suspended for 1 day
without pay. If he is late again within 30 days after
the one day suspension he will receive a 3 day
suspension. If he is late again within 30 days of the
3 day suspension he will (at the discretion of the
management) be subject to termination of his
employment with Mac Motors.
Plaintiff was more than five minutes late to work on March 6, 18, and
31, 1998, for which she received a verbal warning pursuant to the new
policy. (Def.Ex. I, J). Plaintiff was late again on April 17, 1998 and,
consequently, received a written reprimand on April 24, 1998. (Id.).
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was late yet again, which resulted in her
receiving a one-day suspension on May 4, 1998. (Def.Ex. J.). Within
several weeks, Plaintiff arrived late for work again, this time resulting
in a three-day suspension as of June 9, 1998. (Def.Ex. K).
Unfortunately, Plaintiffs tardiness problem still did not improve; she
was late on at least another five occasions between July 1998 and
September 1998. After the last set of incidents, Plaintiff received a
second three-day suspension on September 11, 1998. (Def.Ex. L). Plaintiff
protested the discipline in writing, but nevertheless served out her
suspension and returned to work on September 17, 1998.
Upon Plaintiffs return to work, Boruta sent her a memorandum that
formally responded to her earlier protests about the suspension. The
September 20, 1998 memorandum rejected Plaintiffs arguments and restated
the need for her to arrive to work on time. (Def.Ex. M). After receiving
Boruta's memorandum, Plaintiff called out sick from work the next two
days, September 21 and 22, 1998, and then called off work twice more over
the next two weeks. Plaintiff asserts that on each occasion she had a
migraine headache and, therefore, called off work per Boruta's previous
instructions. (Pl.Dep. at 387-88; Pl.Resp. at 4-5). Notwithstanding ...