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December 20, 2000


The opinion of the court was delivered by: McCLURE, District Judge.



On February 25, 2000, plaintiff Robert G. Ernest, proceeding pro se, commenced this action with the filing of a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, Montour County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff claims entitlement to monthly income benefits for disability under a policy issued by The Paul Revere Life Insurance Co. (Paul Revere) in conjunction with a collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff's union and his former employer, Textron, Inc. (Textron).*fn1 Specifically, plaintiff claims that he is totally disabled due to acute bronchial spasm and occupational bronchitis, rendering him unable to work in his occupation as "Excello machine operator."

The case was removed to this court by notice of removal filed by defendant Paul Revere on March 20, 2000 on the ground that the agreement constitutes a plan subject to the terms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

Now before the court are plaintiff's motion requesting this court to "apply the de novo standard of review and make a final judgment," and cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant defendants' motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).



Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). . . [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is `entitled to judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motions and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. He or she can discharge that burden by "showing . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Issues of fact are genuine "only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find for the non-moving party." Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Material facts are those which will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. Anderson at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 393; White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988).

If the moving party satisfies its burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment, the opposing party must do more than raise some metaphysical doubt as to material facts, but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle at 393 (quoting, inter alia, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).


The facts at hand are, for the most part, not in dispute.*fn2 Plaintiff is a former employee of defendant Textron. As a benefit of his employment, plaintiff received one or more employment benefits, including a group long-term disability benefit under Textron's group policy with Paul Revere. According to the policy, benefits are payable only if the claimant becomes "totally disabled."*fn3

On October 31, 1995, plaintiff submitted to Paul Revere an Employee's Statement for Disability Benefits. In his statement, plaintiff claimed to be totally disabled due to acute bronchial spasm and occupational bronchitis, rendering him unable to perform in his capacity as Excello machine operator.

On November 26, 1995, plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Norman Ekberg, signed and submitted to Paul Revere an Attending Physicians' Statement that listed plaintiff's primary diagnosis as "sarcoidosis, stage II, and occupational bronchitis." Dr. Ekberg indicated that the plaintiff could not tolerate "exposure to inhaled vapors, dusts, [or] volatile agents," but reported that "patient may work in an atmosphere free of bronchial irritating substances with no limitation on physical activity."

After reviewing plaintiff's statement, Paul Revere's Customer Care Specialist, Jean Mantolesky, informed plaintiff that the medical documentation submitted was insufficient to support his claim of total disability and that additional information was necessary in order to reach a decision. Subsequently, on February 1, 1996, Paul Revere received a letter from Dr. Mark Guilfoose confirming the diagnosis of occupational bronchitis. Dr. Guilfoose reported that plaintiff was disabled from occupations that would expose him to environments containing "bronchial irritating substances such as industrial solvents and oils."

On February 2, 1996, Paul Revere referred plaintiff's file to Sharon Elliot, Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant. Elliot recommended review of plaintiff's file by a medical consultant and also contacted an ergonomist, who suggested the use of a prescribed respirator.

On February 6, 1996, Fred Lewis, Textron's Human Resources Manager, provided Mantolesky with a list of jobs held by plaintiff while employed at Textron and information as to whether or not plaintiff was exposed to coolant or cutting oil.*fn4 Lewis also indicated that Textron had been tested for oil mist on several occasions, with results well below the permissible exposure limit set by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).*fn5

On February 20, 1996, Dr. Michael Theerman completed medical review of plaintiff's claim file. According to Dr. Theerman, plaintiff was precluded from working in a dusty, smokey or solventladen environment. Dr. Theerman concluded that plaintiff could not perform his occupation as Excello machine operator unless plaintiff was able to wear a respirator the entire day. Dr. Theerman also commented that if the job of tool and gauge inspector could be performed in a "clean room" and "not on the shop floor" then that job would not be precluded. On February 21, 1996, Mantolesky contacted Textron and spoke with Jodi Black, Human Resources Assistant, who verified that tool and gauge inspection was done in a separate and clean room without exposure to bronchial irritants.

On March 5, 1996, Paul Revere denied plaintiff's claim for long-term disability benefits, finding that plaintiff was not totally disabled under the terms of the policy. Specifically, benefits were denied because the medical evidence did not substantiate limitations that would preclude the plaintiff from performing the duties of his occupation if reasonable accommodations were made. Paul Revere concluded that plaintiff's use of a prescribed respirator would be a reasonable accommodation that would not preclude him from performing his occupation. Additionally, plaintiff could perform the reasonably related occupation of tool and gauge inspector without being exposed to coolant or cutting oil. Paul Revere informed plaintiff of his right to appeal its decision.

Paul Revere received notice of plaintiff's appeal from a letter dated March 29, 1996. Included was a second claim form and an Attending Physicians' Statement of Disability from Dr. S. William Snover who diagnosed plaintiff as having "chronic, mechanical low back pain." Dr. Snover indicted that plaintiff was not totally disabled due to the above diagnosis. Also provided was a second statement from Dr. Snover diagnosing plaintiff with "repetitive motor disorder, carpal tunnel syndrome, right hand." Again, Dr. Snover indicated that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome was not totally disabling. Additionally, plaintiff provided Paul Revere with a copy of a letter from Dr. Ekberg, dated March 25, 1996, in which Dr. Ekberg discussed the effectiveness of the respirator recommended by Paul Revere in its denial letter to plaintiff. Specifically, Dr. Ekberg stated that the ...

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