would negate the state courts' determination that plaintiff's
constitutional rights were not violated.
On February 19, 1998, the Family Court Division of the Court of
Common Pleas for the County of Philadelphia ("Court of Common
Pleas") issued a final protection order in Daily v. Daily,
stating in part that "defendant, Louis G. Daily, shall refrain
from abusing, harassing, and/or threatening the plaintiff
Madeline G. Daily or placing her . . . in fear of abuse in any
place where she . . . may be found."*fn7 Ex. A. Pl. Am. Comp. at
1 (Daily v. Daily, Jan. Term 1998, No. 8351, (Phila.CCP, Feb.
19, 1998) (Robinson, J.). The Court of Common Pleas also ordered
that "defendant is enjoined and prohibited from living at,
entering, attempting to enter or visit the residence [of Madeline
G. Daily] . . . and the plaintiff [Madeline G. Daily] is granted
exclusive possession and control of the premises." Id. The
order also provided for additional relief in that defendant
(Louis Daily) was to pay counsel fees in the sum of $750.00 and
$1,200.00 in lost wages to plaintiff (Madeline Daily). The Court
of Common Pleas' February 19, 1998 order was to remain in full
force and effect through February 18, 1999.
After plaintiff appealed the Final Protection Order, Judge
Robinson issued an opinion further explaining the Final
Protection Order and requesting that the court's order of
February 19, 1998 be affirmed.*fn8 See Ex. B Pl. Am. Comp.
(Daily v. Daily, Jan. Term 1998, No. 8351 (Phila.CCP). Judge
Robinson addressed plaintiff's contention that the PFA act is
unconstitutional in that it violates the Constitution of
Pennsylvania and the Constitution of the United States. Judge
Robinson found that plaintiff "fails to specify what provision of
either Constitution violates the [PFA] Act. The provisions of the
[PFA] Act have been examined by the appellate courts on a number
of occasions and been upheld." Id. at 5-6 (citing Eichenlaub
v. Eichenlaub, 340 Pa. Super. 552, 490 A.2d 918 (1985) (lack of
jury trial for criminal contempt upheld); Commonwealth v.
Zerphy, 332 Pa. Super. 388, 481 A.2d 670 (1984) (double
jeopardy); Boyle v. Boyle, 12 Pa.D. & C.3d 767 (1979) (due
Plaintiff attaches to his motion the opinion of the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania ("Superior Court") affirming the Court of
Common Pleas' decision. The Superior Court also addressed
plaintiff's constitutional arguments. First, the Superior Court
rejected plaintiff's contention that the PFA proceedings are
criminal in nature. While the Superior Court acknowledge that
"[w]e have characterized PFA proceedings as `quasi-criminal.' . .
. Nevertheless, we have rejected attempts to invoke the panoly of
constitutional rights afforded criminal defendants." Ex. C Pl.
Am. Comp at 7 (Daily v. Daily, No. 734 Phila. 1998, at 7
(Pa.Super. 1998)). The Superior Court stated that "[w]e have
explained that the PFA act is `not, nor was meant to be, a
statute penalizing past criminal conduct. Rather, the primary
goal of the act is not retrospective punishment but advance
prevention of physical and sexual abuse.'" Id. (quoting Snyder
v. Snyder, 427 Pa. Super. 494, 501, 629 A.2d 977, 981 (1993)).
Next, the Superior Court addressed the six separate
constitutional arguments raised by plaintiff. First, the Superior
Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to invoke the Fourth
Amendment because the plaintiff has not been subject to a search
or seizure. See id. at 7-8. Second,
the Superior Court held that plaintiff's claim that the PFA act
violates his procedural due process guarantees is meritless
because the Court has previously held that the procedures
established by the PFA act satisfy the constitutional guarantees
of due process. See id. at 8 (citing R.G. v. T.D.,
448 Pa. Super. 525, 529, 672 A.2d 341, 343 (1996)). Third, the
Superior Court dismissed plaintiff's claim that his Sixth
Amendment rights were violated stating that "assuming arguendo
that indigent PFA defendants are entitled to appointed counsel,
appellant has not argued or proven his indigence. Moreover,
appellant was represented by paid counsel in the hearings below
and never requested appointed counsel. Accordingly, we conclude
that this claim was waived." Id. Fourth, the Superior Court
held that plaintiff's claim, that he was entitled to a jury trial
because of the amount in controversy, lacked merit. Plaintiff's
contention that his right to a jury trial was denied was waived
because he failed to timely demand a jury trial. See id. Fifth,
the Superior Court rejected plaintiff's contention that the
$1,950.00 award for Madeline Daily's lost wages and counsel fees
was an unconstitutionally excessive fine. The $1,950.00 amount
was not a fine, but rather a damage award between private parties
and therefore, the constitutional proscriptions against excessive
fines are inapplicable. See id. at 9 (citing Browning-Ferris
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60, 109 S.Ct. 2909,
106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989); Geffen v. Baltimore Markets, 191 A. 24,
28, 325 Pa. 509 (1937)). Finally, the Superior Court rejected
plaintiff's assertion that the PFA act is administered in a
fashion that discriminates against the male gender, violating
constitutional guarantees of equal protection. The Superior Court
reasoned that "[t]he fact that women are more likely to seek PFA
relief does not suggest that men are treated disparately when
they seek relief. . . . As appellant's offered evidence does not
support a finding of discriminatory administration, his claim
lacks merit." Id. at 10. On April 7, 1999, plaintiff's petition
for allowance of an appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was denied. See Ex. D Pl. Am. Comp. (Daily v. Daily, No. 633
E.D. Allocatur Docket 1998 (Pa. 1999)).
The claims plaintiff raises in this lawsuit were all addressed
in the state court actions, therefore, entertaining this federal
claim would be equivalent to an appellate review of the state
courts' decisions. In this lawsuit, plaintiff raises three counts
based on a violation of his due process rights, one count
alleging a deprivation of his equal protection rights, one count
asserting a denial of his right to a jury trial pursuant to the
Seventh Amendment and one count for violation of this Fourth
Amendment right against illegal seizure.*fn9 As evidenced above,
all of these allegations were directly addressed by the state
courts. Furthermore, in plaintiff's response to defendants'
motion to dismiss he "admits that his constitutional claims in
the instant case are identical to those made in the state
courts." Pl. Resp. at 3. Therefore, this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction and plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed.
In the absence of any supportable federal claims, I decline to
exercise pendant jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.
See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
728-29, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
For the reasons stated above, I will grant defendants' motion
AND NOW, this day — of April, 2000, I ORDER defendants'
motion to dismiss (docket entry # 17) is GRANTED. This
case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.