The opinion of the court was delivered by: Lowell A. Reed, Jr., Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Engrid Bullock ("Bullock") filed this lawsuit
alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 955 et seq.
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, Bullock alleges that she was
terminated from her position with the Children's Hospital of
Philadelphia as the Department Head Secretary for the Social Work
Department because of her race, sex, age, ethnicity, and national
Presently before the Court is the motion of defendant the
Children's Hospital of Philadelphia ("the Hospital") for summary
judgment (Document No. 17), the response and the reply thereto.
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because
Bullock has failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, the motion will be granted.
Engrid Bullock is an African American woman who was born on
November 24, 1945. Bullock was hired by the Hospital in 1990 as
Department Head Secretary in the Home Care Department. In 1994,
Bullock obtained the position of Department Head Secretary for
the Social Work Department at the Hospital, were she worked until
she was terminated on April 11, 1997.
In March of 1996, the Hospital hired William Tietjen as the new
Director of the Social Work Department. Shortly after Tietjen
arrived, he began reorganizing the social work department. At the
time, there were three departmental secretaries, all of whom were
African American. There was one Department Head Secretary,
Bullock, as well as two Level II secretaries. Tietjen determined
that two secretaries would be sufficient. Tietjen retained
Bullock as the Department Head Secretary and consolidated the
other two Level II secretary positions into one. The secretary
whose position was eliminated was permitted to apply for and
obtained a position in another department at the Hospital as a
Department Head Secretary.*fn2
Bullock received favorable evaluations prior to 1996. In 1994
and 1995, her performance rating was meets expectations (ME).
(Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Plt.Mem."), Exh. C.). Her performance rating
for 1996 was expectations not achieved (ENA). (Id.).
Specifically, Bullock did not met expectations with respect to
the first area listed under Job Specific Standards. The duties
specified in the first category relate general secretarial duties
such as typing and preparing correspondence. The written comment
is: "inconsistent attention to quality of prepared work, often
resulting in re-work. Specific improvement needed in the
attention of detail on multi-step projects, accuracy in
calculations, proofing for content and spelling and
follow-through on projects." (Def.Mem., Exh. E). With respect to
another category having to do with answering phones and providing
information, Tietjen noted that there was a "variation in
courtesy/tone easily detected when stressed or distracted."
(Id.). Nevertheless, Bullock was rated as meeting expectations
in this category. With respect to the category relating to
performance of reception activities and assisting customers,
Bullock was rated as not meeting expectations. The written
comment is: "the interpersonal skill essential to this dept. head
secretary position, especially under conditions of high volume,
multiple requests and changing priorities, have not been
demonstrated in a consistent and effective manner." (Id.).
Finally, Bullock met expectations with respect to categories
having to do with maintaining departmental accounts and acting as
the timekeeper for the department. In her deposition, Bullock
testified that she did not think that Tietjen was intentionally
lying in his evaluation of her, but rather that she thought
Tietjen believed she was not meeting expectations. (Def. Mem.,
Exh. A, at 106, 123-27).
As a result of her failure to meet expectations and consistent
with Hospital policy, Tietjen and Dolores Vorters, the Social
Work Department Supervisor, developed and implemented a Personal
Improvement Plan (PIP). The PIP set forth specific areas in which
Bullock was to improve. The PIP was initially scheduled to expire
after sixty days on February 10, 1997. However, the PIP period
was extended an extra thirty days because Bullock missed a number
of days during the PIP period as a result of a death in her
immediate family. Bullock testified that during the PIP period,
she was under the impression that she was meeting expectations,
although she kept doing things the same as always. (Plt. Mem.,
Exh. B, at 120-21). However, at the conclusion of the PIP period,
Tietjen determined that Bullock had not performed satisfactorily.
Bullock was then given thirty days with which to apply for and
secure a job elsewhere in the Hospital. Bullock was unable to
secure other employment in the Hospital and was terminated on
April 11, 1997. Bullock was replaced by Tracee Sigler, an African
American woman who was born on August 27, 1970.*fn4
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c), summary judgment
may be granted when, "after considering the record evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). For a dispute to be "genuine,"
the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
If the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to "do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party may not
rely merely upon bare ...