Republican candidates win election to Congress. Id. at 5982.
140. The primary means by which Triad assisted in the election
of conservative candidates was by overseeing millions of dollars'
worth of advertising placed by these two nonprofit organizations.
Id. at 6301.
141. Citizens for Reform and Citizens for the Republic spent a
combined total of between $3 million and $4 million on
advertising in 29 races. Id. at 6304.
142. Like other groups running so-called issue advertisements
in the 1996 campaign, Triad carefully avoided the words "vote
for," "support," or "defeat," in the advertisements it funded,
but otherwise attacked the positions, ideology, and frequently,
the character of candidates. The advertising created by Triad
focused on no single set of issues. It more closely resembled
negative attack advertising aired by an opposing candidate. The
candidates benefiting from the advertising were the same
candidates for whom Triad had solicited contributions and advised
on campaign and fundraising strategy. Id. at 6304.
143. The sole purpose of the advertising was to influence
voters in favor of conservative Republican candidates in those
races. Id. at 6301.
144. Bank records reviewed by the Committee on Governmental
Affairs revealed that two secret trusts together contributed
$2.34 million to Citizens for Reform and Citizens for the
Republic, over 83 percent of the total money received by the
organization. Triad's attorneys publicly confirmed that Triad
entered into written agreements to keep the identity of funding
sources secret. Id. at 6309.
145. Triad succeeded in pouring millions into televised
advertisements designed to attack particular candidates in
hotly-contested races, while concealing the identities of the
individuals and companies that provided the moneys. Id. at 6313.
146. In 1996, The AFL-CIO announced its plans to spend $35
million to counter the Republican "Contract with America." Id. at
147. In 1996, the AFL-CIO spent about $25 million on media
advertising in 44 congressional districts. Id.
148. The majority of the AFL-CIO-funded issue ads aired during
the 1996 election cycle criticized Republican House freshmen who
won office in 1994. Id.
149. In April of 1996, a coalition of 32 business groups called
The Coalition: Americans Working for Real Change, spent $5
million on issue ads and mailed two million letters to members.
Annenberg Study at 28-29 [JEx. 29]. The Coalition raised funds
from its member groups, including $1 million from the National
Restaurant Association. Id.
150. In 1995 and 1996, Coalition for Our Children's Future
("CCF") ran a series of "issue ads" on such subjects as Medicare
and the balanced budget. In August 1995, CCF received a $500,000
donation from the National Republican Congressional Committee,
part of the RNC. Additional money for the issue ads was raised by
RNC Chairman Barbour and Speaker Gingrich. Among the donors were
major Republican contributors, including large corporations.
Minority Report at 5981 [JEx. 21].
151. In 1995 alone, CCF spent $3.18 million on advertisements
supporting the Republican positions on the Balanced Budget
Amendment and Medicare. Even after the demise of the Republican
Balanced Budget legislation prior to the government shut-down in
1995, CCF continued to air advertising in key congressional
races. Id. at 6772.
152. The purpose of CCF was to raise funds from corporate
interests to fund a media campaign in support of Republican
legislation on the balanced budget and Medicare reform. Id. at
153. After a very active fundraising campaign through the
summer of 1995,
CCF commenced its advertising campaign. Between August and
December 1995, CCF funded four waves of advertising totaling at
least $3.18 million. The advertisements aired during this period
include a Medicare advertisement featuring one Senator, a
Balanced Budget ad featuring a second Senator, an advertisement
entitled "Meet Priscilla," which focused on the federal debt and
the need for a balanced budget for the future, and a fourth
advertisement urging support for the Republican Medicare plan.
Id. at 6774.
154. A memo produced by a Stevens & Co. employee contains a
list of media markets where CCF's 1995 advertising aired. The
memo shows that ads were targeted to air in particular
congressional districts, many of which were the districts of
vulnerable Republican freshman. Id. at 6775.
155. Shortly before the November 1996 election, the RNC gave
$4.6 million to Americans for Tax Reform, $650,000 to the
National Right to Life Committee, and $600,000 to the American
Defense Institute. This direct payment to tax-exempt
organizations is an unprecedented amount. Id. at 5976.
156. Americans for Tax Reform-the largest recipient of RNC
funds-used this money to conduct a massive issue advocacy"
campaign aimed at helping the Republicans. Id. at 5978-79.
157. Shortly before the November election, RNC Chairman Barbour
acknowledged, in effect, that the RNC's contribution to Americans
for Tax Reform made it possible for the party to circumvent the
campaign finance laws. At an October 1996 press conference,
Barbour was asked about the RNC's $4.6 million transfer to ATR
and he made the following statement:
You'll see in our FEC report . . . that
we've made contributions to a number of
organizations that are like-minded,
share our views, promote our ideas.
[W]hen we do advocacy, no matter what
we do, we typically have to pay for it,
either totally with FEC dollars or a
mixture of FEC and non-FEC dollars. . . .
[W]e often find ourselves in the
position where we cannot match up non-FEC
funds with enough FEC funds.
So, when we came to that point, we
decided we would contribute to several
groups who are like-minded and whose
activities we think, while they're not specifically
political, we think are good for
the environment for us. Id. at 5979.
158. The FEC has instituted no civil actions under
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6)(A) with regard to any issue advertisements aired
during the 1996 election cycle. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
Mariani v. United States (M.D.Pa. Mar. 12, 1999) at 16-17 [PSEx.
159. In 1998, FEC auditors investigated the alleged
coordination between the Clinton and Dole campaigns and their
respective national party committees on issue ads during the 1996
election cycle. The auditors ultimately recommended that the
campaigns be required to repay $7 and $17.7 million,
respectively, of federal matching funds. See FEC Agenda Document
No. 98-85, "Report of the Audit Division on Clinton/Gore `96
Primary Committee, Inc." at 72 (1998); FEC Agenda Document No.
98-87, "Report of the Audit Division on the Dole for President
Committee, Inc. (Primary)" at 112 (1998); FEC Agenda Document No.
98-88, "Report of the Audit Division on the Dole! Kemp `96 and
Dole/Kemp Compliance Committee, Inc. (General)" at 61 (1998)
160. The Commission unanimously rejected the recommendation of
the auditors. "Statement of Reason of Vice Chairman Darryl R.
Wold and Commissioners Lee Ann Elliott, David M. Mason and Karl
J. Sandstrom On The Audits of `Dole For President Committee,
Inc.' (Primary), `Clinton/Gore `96 Primary Committee, Inc.,'
`Dole/Kemp `96, Inc.' (General), `Dole/Kemp `96 Compliance
Committee, Inc.' (General), `Clinton/Gore `96 General Committee,
Inc.,' and `Clinton/Gore `96
General Election Legal And Compliance Fund'" (June 24, 1999)
V. NATIONAL AND STATE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS COOPERATE
TO SPEND LARGE SUMS OF SOFT MONEY lN CONNECTION
WITH CAMPAIGNS FOR FEDERAL OFFICE
161. National party "issue advocacy" advertising is often
bought by state parties but funded by national party committees,
who transfer the funds needed to the state parties. These
transfers allow a far higher percentage of soft money to be used
to pay for the advertising, under the different allocation
formulas applicable to state parties. FEC Statement of Material
Facts II at ¶ 369 [PSEx. 2]; Herrnson Dep. at 111 [JEx. 36].
162. Much of the party money used to finance issue advocacy
campaigns originates at the national level and is transferred to
state party committees. Herrnson Statement at 43 [JEx. 17].
163. By transferring large sums to the state or local level,
national parties can also avoid effective disclosure. Under
federal regulations, the committees are only required to report
the amounts transferred to other committees; they do not have to
account for how these funds were ultimately spent. Herrnson Dep.
at 113-114 [JEx. 36].
164. During the 1996 elections, soft money enabled the national
parties to wage a coordinated campaign that supplemented, and in
some cases replaced, the voter mobilization efforts of
presidential and other candidates. The national committees assist
their candidates' campaigns by distributing both hard and soft
money to state parties that they use to finance voter
mobilization drives and party-building activities. The DNC
transferred more than $76 million, roughly $11 million more than
its Republican counterpart. Most of these funds were distributed
in accordance with the strategies of their presidential
candidates. Herrnson Statement at 21 [JEx. 17]; FEC Statement of
Material Facts II at ¶ 66 [PSEx. 2].
165. In election years, the national party committees transfer
more soft money to state and local party committees in states
with closely contested races for federal office. Joint Stip. ¶
166. During the 1996 election cycle, the national party
committees reported transferring a combined $14.3 million in soft
money to state and local party committees in California, an
important battleground state in the Presidential election. FEC
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking at 37727 [JEx. 39].
167. During the 1996 election cycle, the national party
committees reportedly transferred a combined sum of $325,332 to
state and local party committees in New York, where polls
indicated that President Clinton had a substantial lead. Id.
168. During the 1996 election cycle, the RNC transferred funds
to state Republican party committees, who used soft money to
publish and pay for issue advocacy advertisements critical of
President Clinton and/or supportive of Senator Robert Dole. Huyck
Decl. at ¶ 4 [JEx. 7]
169. State Democratic Party committees generally received funds
from the DNC in order to pay for the broadcast of issue
advertisements. Sandier Decl. ¶ 5 [JEx. 8].
170. A memorandum dated March 18, 1996 apparently from the
RNC's Political Director Curt Anderson to RNC Chairman Haley
Barbour regarding "Ballot Allocation of States" stated, in part:
"The following chart clearly demonstrates what we already know,
that any media we place in the target presidential states should
be placed through state parties. The average ballot allocation in
the top 17 target states is 37% federal-63% non-federal, this
obviously contrasts very well with our 65% federal — 35%
non-federal allocation Some have voiced concern that buying through
the state parties could result in a
loss of control on our part. There is absolutely no reason to be
concerned about this. As was demonstrated in our efforts recently
in the CA and OR special elections, our field staff is fully able
to insure that state parties make good on any arrangement we make
with them. This is simply a book keeping hassle, but not in
anyway [sic] a reason not to proceed." March 18, 1996 Memorandum
from "Curt" to "the Chairman" [JEx. 163]; FEC Statement of
Material Facts II at ¶ 389 [PSEx. 2].
171. A memorandum dated May 24, 1996 from the Republican
National Finance Committee's Al Mitchler to RNC Finance Chairman
Howard Leach, Team 100's Tim Barnes and other RNC personnel
stated: "Over the next two weeks, we are going to have to raise
$4 million [handwritten correction from $2 million], minimum, in
soft money that has to be transferred to the CA State Party. If
this money does not come from CA donors, then we must have donors
from other states agree to be listed as a major donor in
CA. . . . Let me stress how critical it is that this money be
raised and assigned as quickly as possible so that we can get on
the air and stay on the air for the next three months in CA.
Anyone who is going to give $50,000, $100,000, or $200,000 should
be looked at as a potential major donor for the state of CA." May
24 1996 Memorandum from Al Mitchler to Howard Leach, et al. [JEx.
162] (emphasis in original); FEC Statement of Material Facts II
at ¶ 403 [PSEx. 2].
VI. DONORS RECEIVE ACCESS IN EXCHANGE FOR LARGE SOFT MONEY
DONATIONS AND CANDIDATES BENEFIT FROM RAISING IT
A. Large Donors Obtain Access to Officeholders and Candidates
172. Soft money donations have resulted in donors getting
access to elected federal officials and to candidates for federal
elective office. Joint Stip. ¶ 107; Affidavit of Daniel H.
Murray, Mariani v. United States ("Murray Aff't") ¶ 14 [JEx. 2].
Herrnson Statement at 57 [JEx. 17]; FEC RNC Mem. at 35 [PSEx. 3];
Minority Report at 4573 [JEx. 21];.
173. The success of contributors in affecting policy depends on
the quality and extent of the access they gain. Large
contributors, especially if they are repeat contributors,
inevitably gain a special or privileged access. Repeated giving
establishes deep and enduring relationships with public officials
and party committees, relationships formed and enhanced by face
to face conversations and the social familiarity of the
"occasions" to which the parties invite contributors. The access
of those contributors is also often reinforced by the skilled and
experienced lobbyists they employ. It is very common, for
example, for the PAC of a union, a corporation, or an association
to coordinate its contributions with the goals and strategies of
the lobbyists of its parent organization.
174. Most of the largest contributors to the party committees
customarily have received more access to a member than
individuals who contributed only $1,000, or average constituents
who gave little or not at all. FEC Statement of Facts I at ¶ 162
[PSEx. 1]; Declaration of Former Senator Timothy E. Wirth, FEC v.
CRFCC ("Wirth Decl.") ¶ 1 [JEx. 10].
175. Contributions help contributors gain access and have their
phone calls taken. And access can influence action, since the
totality of the information a Member has is significantly
affected by which people gain access to the Member. FEC Statement
of Facts-I at ¶ 168 [PSEx. 1]; Declaration of Leon Billings, FEC
v. CRFCC ("Billings Decl.") ¶ 13 [JEx. 11].
176. Small contributions are typically raised using direct-mail
and telemarketing solicitations, which do not require personal
contact between the party and its contributors. FEC Statement of
Material Facts II at ¶ 62 [PSEx. 2]; Herrnson Statement at 1
177. Daniel H. Murray served from 1982-1995 as a government
relations specialist for Sprint, GTE and BellSouth Corporations.
Murray Aff't ¶ 3 [JEx. 2]; Joint Stip. ¶ 65.
178. Mr. Murray assisted these companies and their PACs in
selecting candidates and political groups for financial support
through both hard and soft money. Murray Aff't ¶ 3 [JEx. 2];
Joint Stip. ¶ 66.
179. This support was offered in order to gain access to and
build relationships with lawmakers and their staffs, including
efforts to gain the opportunity to persuade them to support or
oppose legislation that was of interest to his employers. Murray
Aff't ¶ 3 [JEx. 2]; Joint Stip. ¶ 67.
180. From the point of view of the individuals Mr. Murray's
employers were financially supporting, no difference was
perceived between hard and soft money. Murray Aff't ¶ 3. No
recipient ever asked that Mr. Murray try to give more of either
hard or soft money as opposed to the other. Murray Aff't ¶ 3
181. On the basis of the financial support his employers
provided to the Democratic and Republican parties, Mr. Murray had
the opportunity to serve on the Democratic Business Council of
the DNC, the Advisory Council of the Democratic Leadership
Council, the 1988 and 1992 DNC Convention Site Selection
Committees, the Democratic Senate Campaign Committee Leadership
Circle, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Annual
Dinner Committee, the Republican Senate Campaign Committee Annual
Dinner Committee, and steering committees for many House and
Senate campaigns. Murray Aff't ¶ 4 [JEx. 2].
182. As part of his current work as a government relations
consultant, Mr. Murray develops legislative plans designed to
foster relationships between a given client and key legislators
in order to advance the client's legislative goals. Murray Aff't
¶¶ 5-6 [JEx. 2]; Joint Stip. ¶ 68.
183. Mr. Murray also develops a parallel political financial
support plan in which he advises his clients as to which federal
office-holders (or candidates) they should contribute to and in
what amounts, in order to best use the resources they are able to
allocate to such efforts to advance their legislative agendas.
Murray Aff't ¶ 7 [JEx. 2]; Joint Stip. ¶ 69
184. Such plans include soft money contributions to political
parties and interest groups associated with political issues.
Murray Aff't ¶ 7 [JEx. 2]; Joint Stip. ¶ 70.
185. "In recent years, contributions of soft money . . . has
proven to provide excellent access to federal officials and to
candidates for federal elective office. Since the amount of soft
money that an individual, corporation or other entity may
contribute has no limit, soft money has become the favored method
of supplying political support." Murray Aff't ¶ 14 [JEx. 2]; FEC
Statement of Material Facts II at ¶ 283 [PSEx. 2].
186. As a lobbyist, Daniel Murray would, where appropriate,
arrange meetings between employees of his corporate clients and
executive and legislative staff members. Murray Dep. at 69-70
187. If a client had been a regular contributor to a party, and
Mr. Murray did not have a relationship with an official whom that
client sought to contact, Mr. Murray would sometimes "call the
Senate or House Campaign Committee and say, `I really need an
appointment to see Senator X or Congressman X,' and they
would . . , arrange those meetings." Murray Dep. at 70 [JEx. 37].
188. Daniel Murray described the development of a campaign
contribution plan to serve a client's legislative agenda as
You know how much the PAC has and
you know how much the company will
spend in soft money and then you decide
the priorities of where you are going to
give the money during the campaign.
On the House side they are always up
for re-election, but some of the Senators
would be out of the cycle. There is only
one-third up in any particular two year
period. But if they were Chairman of a
major committee, it didn't matter where
in the cycle they were.
So, you would lay out your plan that way
and make sure to attend fund-raising
events or even host fund-raising events
and gather people from the telecommunications
industry or whatever. It
would be a steering committee type operation.
You would contact their fund-raiser
and say we would like to do something
for Senator X or the Majority
Leader, whatever, and you usually got a
very favorable response and went forward.
Murray Dep. at 76-77 [JEx. 37].
189. According to Mr. Murray, this access translates into
opportunities to discuss issues and obtain information from the
candidates, officials and staff. Id. at 35.
190. Membership on not just one committee but on "a series of
them" begets lobbyists or donors membership in additional
committees, like the Republican and Democratic Site Selection
Committees, as well as the opportunity to participate in
formulating policy papers. Murray Aff't ¶¶ 14-15 [JEx. 2]; Murray
Dep. at 59 [JEx. 37].
191. One benefit available to large contributors is the
opportunity to give input on policy issues through the drafting
of "white papers." The drafting process entails gathering
representatives of contributors from a certain industry along
with party and/or government officials so that those present can
share their views about issues. Murray Dep. at 104 [JEx. 37] Once
a white paper was written, it would be distributed under DNC
letterhead "as a DNC white paper." Id. at 107.
192. At some party fund-raisers, donors may select the
officeholder(s) with whom they wish to be seated. Such donors
often select officeholders with committee memberships relevant to
their business interests. FEC RNC Mem. at 38 [PSEx. 3].
193. Large donations to party committees may actually provide a
more efficient means of gaining access to legislators and
regulators than smaller donations directly to the candidates,
since a single large party donation can buy the opportunity to
attend party events involving and make connections with many of
the party's key office holders during party events. FEC RNC Mem.
at 39 [PSEx. 3].
194. Parties are allowed to collect large, individual soft-money
donations. Fundraisers attempt to cultivate big donors by,
for example, providing them and their guests an opportunity to
meet public officials at special events. Joint Stip. ¶ 109.
195. Political parties and candidates play to the motives of
individual and group donors when they organize fund-raising
events. For this reason, the parties provide their big donors
with the opportunity to meet with high-ranking officials who are
in the strongest position to influence public policy. These
individuals include the president (or a party's presidential
candidate), cabinet members, congressional party leaders,
committee chairs, or other well-known policy entrepreneurs. FEC
Statement of Material Facts II at ¶ 116 [PSEx. 2]; Herrnson
Statement at 55 [JEx. 17].
196. The parties enlist the help of elected officeholders and
high-ranking political appointees in their fund-raising efforts
because contributors respond to these officials' appeals. The
opportunity to be briefed by, meet with, or talk to a high-ranking
official is a major draw for many who make contributions
to the parties. Contributors who are motivated by material
incentives, for example, usually want access to political
decision makers who are in a position to influence the
environment in which their organizations conduct their business.
FEC Statement of
Material Facts II at ¶ 206 [PSEx. 2]; Herrnson Statement at 57
197. In recent years, both major parties have offered soft
money donors access to elected leaders in exchange for
contributions. White House officials and congressional leaders
have been asked to appear at fundraisers, participate in
party-sponsored policy briefings, attend weekend retreats with donors,
and play a role in other small group meetings. Elected Officials
have even been recruited by the party committees to solicit soft
money donations from potential contributors, especially from
their own financial supporters and others with whom they have a
relationship. Federal officeholders have thus assisted their
parties in raising funds for issue advocacy advertising, voter
registration, election day turnout drives, and other activities
that directly benefit their own campaigns for office. FEC
Statement of Material Facts II at ¶ 221 [PSEx. 2]; CED Report at
27 [JEx. 23].
198. Most party committees rely on their office holders and
candidates to raise funds, hard and soft, for the party. Raising
large donations often requires powerful officeholders and party
officials to solicit donors personally. FEC RNC Mem. at 26 [PSEx.
199. Party committees gain a significant portion of their total
revenue from major donor programs with a large soft money
component. FEC Statement of Material Facts II at ¶ 117; January
27, 1996 Letter from Nancy Brinker re Team 100 Contributions for
1994 [JEx. 92]; February 27, 1996 Letter from Nancy Brinker to
Linda Wachner [JEx. 93]; 1997 Team 100 Summary Report [JEx. 94];
FEC RNC Mem. at 36 n.39 [PSEx. 3].
200. The extensive, personal involvement of high-ranking
federal officials is a necessary component of raising soft money
from major donors. FEC Statement of Material Facts II at ¶ 186
[PSEx. 2]; Shays Decl. ¶ 12 [JEx. 5]; Bumpers Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 [JEx.
3]; Meehan Decl. ¶ 6 [JEx. 4]; Simon Decl. ¶ 4 [JEx. 9]; Kolb
Decl. ¶ 8 [JEx. 16].
201. Former Senator Tim Wirth has stated that when he was a
Senator he would from time to time introduce large donors to the
national party committees. The Democratic Party was then the
majority party in Congress and often these donors making large
contributions to the party wanted to become acquainted with party
leaders. The introductions also served as a mechanism for donors
to meet chairmen of important congressional committees, such as
the House Ways and Means Committee and the House Armed Services
Committee. Democratic leaders, such as Representative John D.
Dingell, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, and
former Representative Tony Coelho, House Majority Whip, hosted
dinners for large party donors to dine with Democratic Members of
Congress. Former Representative Coelho also formed a House
campaign committee called something like the "Chairman's Circle,"
which hosted dinners which supported the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee. Wirth Decl. ¶ 14; FEC Statement of Facts I
at ! 163 [PSEx. 1].
202. The Democratic national campaign committees sometimes
asked Sen. Wirth to meet with large donors to the party whom he
had not met before. At the party's request, he met with the
donors. He understood that the donors' goal in making the large
contributions was often to have occasional meetings with
prominent Democratic congressional leaders to press their
positions on legislative issues. On these occasions, sometimes
all the Senator knew about the donor would be the issue in which
he was interested and that he was a donor to the party. Wirth
Decl. ¶ 15 [JEx. 10]; FEC Statement of Material Facts II at ¶ 197
203. There are a number of factors that contribute to an
industry's power and influence in Washington, including the
amount of soft money it donates and the
amount of money it spends on lobbying. FEC Statement of Material
Facts II at ¶ 268 [PSEx. 2].
204. Groups that follow access strategies are likely to be most
responsive to fundraising appeals by incumbents, especially
high-ranking members of the executive branch and legislators who chair
committees or subcommittees, occupy party leadership positions,
or are policy entrepreneurs with influence over policies that are
of importance to the groups. FEC Statement of Material Facts II
at ¶ 266 [PSEx. 2]; Herrnson Statement at 54 [JEx. 17].
205. Consultant Daniel Murray advised his business governmental
relations clients to join the Democratic Business Council for
$15,000 annually in order to have access to "Party and political
leaders." Murray Aff't ¶ 8 [JEx. 2]. Substantial contributions
also "invariably lead" to invitations to special political events
involving members of Congress and the Executive branch, as well
as appointments to advisory panels. Id. ¶ 12; FEC Statement of
Material Facts II at ¶ 280 [PSEx. 2].
206. The reason many large donors give the party so much money
is to build and maintain relationships with the party's
candidates and officeholders, with the ultimate purpose of
influencing policy in a way that favors their business interests.
FEC RNC Mem. at 26-27 [PSEx. 3].
207. Both office holders and party fund-raisers have sometimes
explicitly conditioned access to government officials on
financial support for their party. FEC RNC Mem. at 30 [PSEx. 3].
B. Donors Give in Order to Obtain Access and Influence Over
Candidates and Officials
208. Many major donors give soft money for the purpose of
influencing federal elections. FEC Statement of Material Facts II
at ¶ 114 [PSEx. 2]; April 30, 1999 Letter from J. Patrick Rooney
to Jim Nicholson [JEx. 91].
209. The act of making a contribution can have other motives,
including influencing the way a member votes, maintaining access
so one could try to influence a Member's vote, and maintaining
access to influence the development of legislation even before a
vote. FEC Statement of Material Facts II at ¶ 262 [PSEx. 2].
210. There is often a symbiotic relationship between
contributors and candidates. A contributor gives to have the
opportunity to influence a Member, and the Member is willing to
provide this opportunity in order to raise more money. FEC
Statement of Facts I ¶ 694 [PSEx. 1]; Rozen Decl. ¶ 11 [JEx. 13].
211. Soft money donors sometimes explicitly link their
donations to their legislative goals. In a 1996 letter to RNC
Chairman Haley Barbour, one donor stated: "Dear Haley: As a [RNC
major donor program] Team 100 Member, I am seeking your help in
sharing our grave concerns with the Republican leadership
regarding the Senate's federal mental health parity mandate
(attached to the VA/HUD appropriations bill). We at New York Life
are opposed to this provision. . . ." FEC RNC Mem. at 28 n.21
212. Major donors can even use the threat to cut off donations
to induce the party leadership to abandon legislation contrary to
their business interests. For example, in a 1995 letter to RNC
Finance Chairman Howard Leach an MCI official stated:
As I am sure you are aware, [MCI CEO
Bert] Roberts has been a life long supporter
of Republican positions and values,
but events over the last several
months have changed his views dramatically.
6 The telecommunications legislation
currently pending before congress
written and supported by the Republican
leadership is extremely bad for
MCI, its employees, and its stockholders.
I am sure you can understand that,
in Mr. Roberts' present frame of mind, a
contribution to the RNC is out of the
question. However, if events change, I
am sure Mr. Roberts will reconsider this
FEC RNC Mem. at 28 n.21 [PSEx. 3].
213. Companies that are directly affected by the federal
regulations, such as those involved in national defense or
tobacco products, have reason to believe that they must
participate in the soft money system in order to succeed. FEC
Statement of Material Facts II at ¶ 275 [PSEx. 2]; Hassenfeld
Decl. ¶¶ 19-20 [JEx. 14].
214. Parties have told prospective donors that they should
donate because their business competitors have. FEC Brief at 33.
215. A 1998 internal RNC memorandum to Chairman Nicholson
discussed a planned fundraising call to Jack Pellicci, Vice
President of Oracle Corporation, about joining the RNC's Team 100
major donor program:
You met with Jack in March. Mel Sembler
has given up on Oracle because
their decision-maker, Ellison, is a Democrat.
You should follow up with Jack
regarding their contribution to the
RNC. You should mention that Microsoft
joined earlier in the year.
This document contained a handwritten note indicating that a
voicemail ["VCML"] had been left: "hope you'll join T-100 —
`Netscape and Microsoft have' . . ." FEC RNC Mem. at 33 n.34