goes, and "stepped into the shoes of the state." Pl.'s Br. at 14.
However, we find that private action which allegedly violates a
state law cannot, by that violation, create "state action." Cf.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (holding that "private
misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be
attributed to the State"); Denchy v. Education and Training
Consultants, 803 F. Supp. 1055, 1061 n. 7 (E.D.Pa. 1992) ("If we
were to accept plaintiffs' argument that . . . noncompliance with
[the Pennsylvania School Code] is tantamount to state action,
then any violation of a state statute or regulation by an
independent contractor of a governmental entity would give rise
to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This simply cannot
be the case.").
We also find nothing in the Pennsylvania statute to suggest
that the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended to confer state
agency powers on health care providers who either follow or
violate the statute. The statute does not create enough
"interdependence" between the Commonwealth and the defendants to
render them "joint participants" in the challenged activity. And
there cannot be a "close nexus" between the Pennsylvania statute
and the defendants' decisions because those decisions allegedly
violated the very statute that plaintiff alleges conferred state
agency powers on these defendants. There thus can be no close
nexus between the Commonwealth and the allegedly unlawful acts of
the defendants here.
We therefore find that defendants' responsibilities under, and
alleged violation of, the Pennsylvania statute do not render them
state actors, regardless of which test we employ. Plaintiff has
alleged nothing which would warrant a finding of state action in
this matter. We note that former Chief Judge Lord and Judge
Newcomer reached the same conclusion, without the guidance of the
Lugar trilogy, years ago. See Cardio-Medical Assocs. v.
Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 536 F. Supp. 1065, 1091 (E.D.Pa. 1982)
(Lord, C.J.) (holding that CCMC and its employees were not state
actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus
test); Holton v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 419 F. Supp. 334,
339-42 (E.D.Pa. 1976) (Newcomer, J.) (same), rev'd on other
grounds, 560 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1977).
Accordingly, we will dismiss Dr. Klavan's Fourteenth Amendment
IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), we may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if we have
"dismissed all claims over which [we] had original jurisdiction."
Before Congress adopted the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
the Supreme Court had held in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs that
"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the
state claims should be dismissed as well." 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86
S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).
While Dr. Klavan's situation cries out for prompt and
definitive judicial resolution, we nevertheless decline to
exercise our discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction
statute precisely because of the gravity of his case. A federal
court mindful of its limited jurisdiction should be reluctant to
decide fundamental issues of public policy, especially a
state's public policy. Excruciating and profound as these
issues are in Dr. Klavan's case, a federal court should not
interpose itself to decide them when the only warrant to do so is
the slim jurisdictional reed of § 1367.
We therefore decline to exercise our jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
AND NOW, this 16th day of August, 1999, upon consideration of
the defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (docket
entry nos. 6, 7, and 10), plaintiff's response thereto, and the
reply brief of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center, Nora
Marden, and Joan K. Richards, and for the reasons stated in the
Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED;
2. Count I is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted;
3. The Court having declined to exercise its jurisdiction as to
the remaining Counts of the complaint, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to their reassertion in state court;
4. The petition of defendant James E. Clark to join in the
motion of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center and Joan K.
Richards to dismiss the complaint (docket entry # 9) is GRANTED
5. The petition of defendant Nora Marden to join in the motion
of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center and Joan K. Richards
to dismiss the complaint (docket entry # 13) is GRANTED AS
6. The petition of defendant James E. Clark to join in the
motion of defendant Richard Malamut to dismiss the complaint
(docket entry # 14) is GRANTED AS UNOPPOSED;
7. The motion of defendants Sat P. Arora and Alan Barman to
extend the time to join the motions of co-defendants (docket
entry # 16) is DENIED AS MOOT; and
8. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case statistically.