The opinion of the court was delivered by: McCLURE, District Judge.
On April 12, 1999, petitioner Michael Edwards commenced this action
with the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Edwards alleged that he was subject to a
deportation order entered on January 14, 1999. He was detained
thereafter, and a bond was denied on February 2, 1999, when an
immigration judge determined that Edwards was subject to mandatory
detention under "INA Section 236(c)." Edwards argued that this
determination is in error and that be therefore is entitled to relief
under § 2241.
Previously, the court issued a memorandum and order denying Edwards'
constitutional challenge to § 236(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (c), and
dismissing the petition otherwise for lack of jurisdiction under §
236(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (e). Edwards v. Blackman, 1999 WL 350122
(M.D.Pa. May 27, 1999).
Before the court is Edwards' motion for an extension of time in which
to move for reconsideration of that memorandum and order. Also, the
American Civil Liberties Union Immigrants' Rights Project (ACLU-IRP) has
requested the court's consideration of a letter brief in support of
"The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco
v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2895, 90 L.Ed.2d 982 (1986).
"Therefore, a court may properly grant a party's motion for
reconsideration in any of the following circumstances: `(1) the
development of an intervening change in the law, (2) the emergence of new
evidence not previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear
error of law or prevent a manifest injustice.'" In re TMI Litigation
Cases Consolidated II, 922 F. Supp. 997, 1008 (M.D.Pa. 1996) (Rambo,
C.J.; quoting Cohen v. Austin, 869 F. Supp. 320, 321 (E.D.Pa. 1994);
citations omitted in In re TMI). The granting of a motion to reconsider
is an extraordinary remedy and a court should not do so when the motion
is merely a re-styling or rehash of issues previously presented.
McConocha v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio, 930 F. Supp. 1182,
1184 (N.D.Ohio 1996). A court should consider neither new evidence nor a
new legal theory which could have been presented on the original motion,
taking into account due diligence. Id. Mere disagreement with the court
is a ground for an appeal, not a motion for reconsideration. Id.
With this standard in mind, we examine separate but related questions:
(1) whether Edwards has set forth a sufficient basis for
reconsideration; and (2) whether that basis warrants additional time for
a motion and brief. Alternatively, Edwards asks the court to consider his
motion for an extension of time as a motion for reconsideration.*fn1
Edwards first points out, in rather rude language, that this court is
alone in concluding that it lacks habeas jurisdiction to entertain a
claim under § 236. We are unaware of any legal requirement that we
join a majority of courts when making a decision.
In the same context, Edwards points out that our holding is contrary to
Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), in which the Third Circuit
held that district courts retain jurisdiction under § 2241 to
entertain constitutional and statutory challenges to final orders of
deportation. The Sandoval decision was issued before the Supreme Court
opinion in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S.
___, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999)*fn2 Since the holding and the
rationale of the latter opinion are contrary to Sandoval, we adhere to
the Supreme Court's view. That is, the plain language of § 242(g) of
the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (g), bars judicial review in federal
district courts of decisions by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.
In arguing that this is the only court that has ruled that it is
without jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to a decision to detain an
alien pursuant to § 236(c), Edwards ignores Maldonaclo v. Fasano,
1999 WL 343423 (S.D.Cal. May 21, 1999). In that case, the Board of
Immigration Appeals denied the petitioner's appeal, after which he filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.*fn3 Judge Whelan applied the
Supreme Court's rationale in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee, 525 U.S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 943, that the extent of any
assertion of subject matter jurisdiction is subject to "the unmistakable
zipper clause" of INA § 242(b)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(9).
Maldonado at *3 That provision consolidates "[j]udicial review of all
questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of
constitutional and statutory provisions, . . ." arising in any proceeding
under the INA within judicial review of a final order under the INA.
Maldonado at *4 (quoting § 242(b)(9)). Thus, any factual, legal, and
constitutional questions, no matter how they are raised (including by
habeas corpus) are included. Id.
Although dicta, we note that Judge Whelan added:
The statute also reflects the timing of judicial
review. By stating that judicial review is available
"only . . . of a final order," the statute
"postpones judicial review of removal proceedings
until the entry of a final order." American-Arab,
[525 U.S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 951] (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Significantly, this clause may divest
federal courts of jurisdiction to review interim
administrative determinations, such as agency
actions concerning bail and parole. The Eleventh
Circuit has reached this conclusion, holding that
INA § 242(b)(9) strips federal courts of
jurisdiction to review claims of aliens against whom
removal proceedings have been instituted until the
conclusion of administrative proceedings. Richardson
v. Reno, 162 F.3d 1338, 1373 (11th Cir. 1998). . . .
Maldonado at *4 (emphasis added). Since review of a final order is
subject to review only by petition for review in a Court of Appeals, ...