457 U.S. 830, 842, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982)). Thus,
defendants Vedder and Laidlaw are entitled to summary judgment because
they are not state actors.
Moreover, plaintiff also asserts that Vedder, Laidlaw, and the Airport
Officials conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff claims that the Airport Officials, specifically defendant
Lynch, forced Laidlaw to terminate plaintiff because of his race and
disability, and in retaliation for filing the previous grievances. Pl.'s
Compl. ¶ 16-18; Pl.'s Dep. at 30, 38, 54, 86-97.
Conspiracy with a state actor will subject a private party to liability
under § 1983, provided that the state actor played a significant role
in the alleged deprivation of rights suffered by the plaintiff. Rourke
v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 100, 104 (E.D.Pa. 1988), aff'd,
909 F.2d 1477 (3d Cir. 1990). "Agreement is the sine qua non of a
conspiracy. As the Third Circuit has explained, to allege a civil
conspiracy for purpose of § 1983, the plaintiff must aver `a
combination of two or more persons to do a criminal act, or to do an
unlawful act by unlawful means or for an unlawful purpose.'" Spencer v.
Steinman, 968 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (E.D.Pa. 1997) (citing Ammlung v. City
of Chester, 494 F.2d 811, 814 (3d Cir. 1974)). "It is not enough that the
end result of the parties independent conduct caused plaintiff harm or
even that the alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious
parallelism." Id. "[Nor is it] enough to show that the private actors and
the state actors might have had a common goal or acted in concert unless
there is a showing that they directed themselves toward an
unconstitutional action by virtue of a mutual understanding or
agreement." Chicarelli v. Plymouth Garden Apartments, 551 F. Supp. 532,
539 (E.D.Pa. 1982) (citing Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co.,
644 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1980)).
The only evidence plaintiff produced regarding the alleged conspiracy
was the March 31, 1998 letter from Lynch to Vedder. In the letter, Lynch
enclosed the complaint from Baselice, and asked Vedder to "provide [him]
with a written letter of response as soon as possible." Ex. D to Airport
Officials' Mot. for Summ. J.*fn10 This evidence is insufficient to show
that there was an agreement or mutual understanding between Laidlaw and
the Airport defendants to violate plaintiff's civil rights. As a result,
summary judgment will be granted in favor of defendants Vedder and
Laidlaw on plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
4. Airport Defendants.
As discussed, plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to show that
the Airport Officials conspired with Laidlaw to violated plaintiff's
constitutional rights. The uncontradicted evidence shows that Laidlaw,
not the Airport Officials, terminated plaintiff. Other than pointing to
the letter from Lynch wrote to Vedder, plaintiff has failed to produce
any evidence of a conspiracy. See Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United
States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 1981) (concluding that
complaint containing general allegations of conspiracy to deprive person
of constitutional rights cannot withstand summary judgment). Plaintiff
has not produced any evidence which shows that the Airport Officials,
alone or in concert with Laidlaw, took any action which violated
plaintiff's constitutional rights. Moreover, the evidence of record shows
that the Airport Officials had never met, seen, nor spoken with plaintiff
time prior to this lawsuit. Thus, summary judgment will be granted.
In addition, plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to show that
the City fired plaintiff or took any action which violated his
constitutional rights, pursuant to a policy or custom of the City. A
municipality can be held liable under section 1983 for implementing an
official policy, practice or custom "`when execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts
or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983.'" Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, Pa., 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir.
1984) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). "A plaintiff
must identify the challenged policy, attribute it to the city itself, and
show a causal link between execution of the policy and the injury
suffered." Losch, 736 F.2d at 910. Plaintiff has failed to identify any
policy or custom, and thus summary judgment in favor of the City will also
be granted on plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
C. "Wrongful Termination" and Other State Law Claims.
Having dismissed plaintiff's Title VII and ADA claims against Laidlaw
for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies, and granted summary
judgment on plaintiff's Title VII, ADA and § 1983 claims against all
remaining defendants, the Court will exercise its discretion, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c), and will decline supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff's state law claims. Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster,
45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995).
D. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend his complaint to add new
defendants and a new cause of action. Specifically, plaintiff seeks to
amend the complaint to add an "unfair representation" claim against the
Teamsters Local Union No. 115, John P. Morris, the Secretary- Treasurer
of the Union, and Ernie Harris, a Business Agent for the Union. These
allegation are against new parties and do not, as alleged, state new
claims against the original defendants.*fn11 Since the Court has
dismissed all of the claims in the original complaint as to each of the
original defendants, there is nothing pending before the Court.
Therefore, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion to amend as moot.*fn12