The opinion of the court was delivered by: Munley, District Judge.
Before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
defendant is Albert D. Janerich, M.D., individually and t/a Albert D.
Janerich, M.D. & Associates; and the plaintiff is Dorothea Best. For the
following reasons, the defendant's motion is granted.
The plaintiff alleges as follows: In May of 1994, the defendant hired
the plaintiff as a physician's assistant. Plaintiff Best alleges that
Mark Lacey, a male physician's assistant previously hired by the
defendant, received a substantially higher salary for substantially equal
work. Defendant subsequently terminated the plaintiff on January 19,
1996. The plaintiff in her complaint alleges discrimination pursuant to
the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d) and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. § 955(a) and retaliation
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.A. §
215(a)(3) and the PHRA, 43 P.S. § 955(d). The defendant subsequently
filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that the moving party
is entitled to summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits,
if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56. A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence might
affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986). "Facts that could alter the outcome are material facts."
Cherlton v. Paramus Rd. Of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 197 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1022, 115 S.Ct. 590, 130 L.Ed.2d 503 (1994). "Summary
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,'
that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at
Initially, the moving party must show the absence of a genuine issue
concerning any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
329, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). All doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against
the moving party, and the entire record must be examined in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,
862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bodie, 682 F.2d 436
(3d Cir. 1982). Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, the
nonmoving party "must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly
supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106
S.Ct. at 2514, Mere conclusory allegations or denials taken from the
pleadings are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment once
the moving party has presented evidentiary materials. Schoch v. First
Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990). Rule 56 requires the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, where a
party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at
2552. "The moving party is `entitled to judgment as a matter of law'
because the nonmoving party has failed to make sufficient showing on an
essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of
proof." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. After a thorough examination of the
matter sub judice, we are compelled to grant the defendant's summary
We find that the plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to sustain
her claims for discrimination pursuant to the EPA and/or the PHRA. The
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d) states as follows:
(d) Prohibition of sex discrimination
(1) No employer having employees subject to any
provisions of this section shall discriminate,
within any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a
rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees of the opposite sex in such establishment
for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and which are performed under similar working
conditions, except where such payment is made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than
sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage
rate differential in violation of this subsection
shall not, in order to comply with provisions of
this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any
See EPA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(d) (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act provision against sex discrimination states in
pertinent part as follows:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice,
unless based upon a bona fide occupational
qualification, or in the case of a fraternal
corporation or association, unless based upon
membership in such association or corporation, or
except where based upon applicable security
regulations established by the United States or the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
(a) For any employer because of the . . . sex . . .
of any individual to refuse to hire or employ, or to
bar or discharge from employment such individual, or
to otherwise discriminate against such individual
with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, if the
individual is the best able and most competent to
perform the services required . . .
See PHRA, 43 P.S. § 955 et seq. Viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the court finds that the plaintiff cannot
establish that the defendant violated ...