a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When
the moving party does not bear the burden of persuasion at
trial, as is the case here, its burden "may be discharged by
`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court —
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case." Id. 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has filed a properly supported motion,
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of the [nonmoving] party's
pleading," id., but must support its response with affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Schoch v. First
Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990).
To determine whether summary judgment is appropriate, I must
determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists. An
issue is "material" only if the dispute "might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law." See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine" only "if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." See id. The standard thus "mirrors the
standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a)." Id. 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the
evidence favoring the nonmoving party is "merely colorable,"
"not significantly probative," or amounts to only a
"scintilla," summary judgment may be granted. See id. 477 U.S.
at 249-50, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct.
1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Of course, "[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing
of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not
those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505;
see also Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.,
974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Moreover, the "evidence of
the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Big Apple BMW, Inc., 974 F.2d at
1363. Thus, my inquiry at the summary judgment stage is only
the "threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need
for a trial," that is, "whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. . . .
In order to bring a successful § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate (1) that the challenged conduct was committed by a
person acting under color of state law, and (2) that the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law. See
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68
L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250,
1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Carter v. City of Philadelphia,
989 F.2d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 1993). Olender makes the following
claims against each of the defendants under § 1983: denial of
his right of access to the courts; violating his right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure; denial of his right
to counsel when being questioned by police.