On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civ. No. 94-01914)
Before: Greenberg, Alito, and Godbold,* Circuit Judges *Honorable John C. Godbold, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Greenberg, Circuit Judge
(Filed: December 21, 1998)
Appellants John S. Dunn, Jr. and Dennis Farley, officers of the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, appeal from a final judgment entered on a jury verdict against them in favor of appellee Kenneth W. Fultz, a Department employee. Fultz asserted a First Amendment retaliation claim in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the alleged retaliation being in response to his conduct in having brought an action entitled Fultz v. Davis, D.C. Civ. No. 90-00779 ("Davis"), in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In Davis, Fultz successfully challenged his dismissal in 1988 by the Department of Environmental Resources, the predecessor to the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. As a matter of convenience, we refer to both Departments interchangeably as Department. In particular, in this case Fultz charged that upon his reemployment, as a result of Davis Dunn, the Department's Chief of Employee Relations and Training, deprived him of his seniority, thus causing him to lose a later promotion to a position as Park Operations Manager I. Fultz asserted that Dunn took this action on behalf of himself and Farley, the Director of the Department's Bureau of Personnel, and thus we do not differentiate between the appellants in this opinion. The appellants denied that Dunn acted to retaliate against Fultz, and at and after the trial unsuccessfully sought a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
On this appeal the appellants assert that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, or, alternatively, to a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. Inasmuch as Dunn reemployed Fultz in accordance with a civil service rule which afforded him no discretion to make a decision that would have preserved Fultz's seniority, we hold that, as a matter of law, Dunn, and thus Farley, did not retaliate against Fultz. Consequently, we will reverse the judgment of the district court as well as all orders and judgments granting Fultz monetary damages or equitable relief and will remand the case to the district court to vacate all such orders and judgments. Moreover, the district court on the remand should enter a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Dunn and Farley. Our Disposition of the appeal makes it unnecessary for us to consider the appellants' request for a new trial.
Fultz appeals from orders which stayed execution on the judgment without requiring the appellants to post a supersedeas bond, and which deferred an award of attorney's fees pending Disposition of the appellants' appeal. We have consolidated the two appeals. In view of our Disposition of the appellants' appeal, we will dismiss Fultz's appeal, which clearly is moot as he no longer has a judgment in his favor and cannot recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as he is not a prevailing party. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 21, 115 S.Ct. 386, 389 (1994).
In 1988, the Department fired Fultz from his position as a state park manager after 24 years of employment, in part for running a boat storage business without the Department's knowledge. In various fora, Fultz argued that the Department fired him without procedural due process and, in 1990, he filed the Davis action in the district court against the Department and two of its officials, other than Dunn or Farley, challenging his termination. In Davis, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, but on appeal on July 15, 1991, we reversed, as we held that Fultz had not received the pre-termination hearing required by Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985). Thus, we ordered the defendants to reinstate Fultz to his position. We further provided that the district court could consider additional relief on remand. Significantly, however, we permitted the Department to refile charges against Fultz on the basis of a constitutionally adequate hearing. See Fultz v. Davis, Nos. 90-6039 and 91-5058, slip op. at 14 (3d Cir. July 15, 1991). Thus, our opinion was a procedural victory for Fultz but in no way exonerated him from the Department's misconduct allegations against him.
On May 29, 1992, Fultz and the Department reached a settlement agreement before trial on the remand in Davis. The agreement stated that Fultz acknowledged his error in engaging in the boat storage business and that he regretted his activity. On the other hand, the Department agreed not to re-file charges against him and, as particularly germane here, the Department agreed to "re-employ Fultz in the capacity of Park Superintendent IV with re-employment to commence June 15, 1992," "to provide [Fultz] with 40 days annual leave and 135 days of sick leave," and to pay $75,000 to Fultz "in settlement of his claims." The agreement further provided that the defendants would "purge [Fultz's personnel] file with respect to matters investigated or charged in 1988." Significantly, the agreement did not mention seniority.
Dunn, who was not a party in Davis, was responsible for implementing the settlement agreement. The Department reemployed Fultz in the Bureau of State Parks in Harrisburg at an appropriate rank and pay level. To comply with the settlement agreement provision requiring the purging of Fultz's personnel file, Dunn deleted the word "terminated" from Fultz's computer personnel record and substituted the benign term "voluntary resignation" to describe the break in Fultz's work history from 1988-1992. It is undisputed that upon his reemployment the Department did not credit him with seniority for his employment prior to his 1988 ...