The opinion of the court was delivered by: DITTER
Plaintiff, a former professional baseball umpire, brings this action against various baseball associations claiming, inter alia, that he was the victim of "reverse discrimination" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.1 Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.
For the reasons that follow, I will grant defendants' dispositive motions as to plaintiff's Title VII claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
For purposes of the defendants' motion to dismiss, I have accepted as true the following allegations in the plaintiff's complaint:
Craig Compton began his career as a professional minor league baseball umpire in 1984. (Compl. P 14). Initially making the calls as a Class A minor league umpire, Compton was periodically promoted from Class A to Class AA to Class AAA -- Class AAA being the highest minor league level. (Id. PP 14-23). Frequently, Compton was named umpire crew chief, a position assigned to the most qualified of umpires. (Id. P 23(a)). Throughout his eleven-year career, Compton umpired numerous minor league all-star and playoff games and was praised for his ability on several occasions. (Id. PP 23, 23(c), 23(h), 24). Despite his expressed aspirations to umpire in the major leagues, Compton was not selected to be a major league umpire. (Id. P 25). On October 27, 1994, the American Association of Professional Baseball Clubs (American Association) and the National Association of Professional Baseball Clubs (National Association) unconditionally released Compton, explaining that neither the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs (American League) nor the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs (National League) wanted to hire him to umpire in the major leagues. (Id. P 26). This release ended Compton's career as a professional umpire and "finally determined that [he] would never be employed as an umpire in major league baseball." (Id.).
On January 20, 1995, a representative of the American League contacted Compton and requested that he return to umpire during the 1995 American League spring training and regular season. (Id. P 28). Compton umpired all of spring training as well as five regular season games. (Id. P 29). On May 2, 1995, the American League unconditionally released Compton from further employment for no good cause. (Id. P 30). On November 9, 1995, Compton filed a complaint against the defendants alleging discrimination based on his status as a white male with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC). (Id. P 3). After exhausting his administrative remedies, Compton brought this federal-court action. (Id.).
In count I, Compton alleges that the defendants have engaged in an unlawful employment practice and continuing policy of discrimination against white males and thus have violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), by failing to hire or promote him, firing him, and otherwise discriminating against him because of his race. Count II is a parallel state-law claim alleging violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). In count III, Compton asserts a breach of contract claim, in count IV, he claims he was wrongfully discharged with specific intent to harm, and in count V, Compton alleges that the defendants have committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, in count VI, Compton alleges that the defendants' actions in failing to hire white males constitute an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the common law of Pennsylvania.
A. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
In considering the defendants' motion to dismiss, I must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief may I dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). However, I do not have to accept as true any conclusory allegations. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1997). Ordinarily, I may not grant a motion to dismiss on the basis of an untimely filing; however, if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the applicable statute of limitations has expired, I must dismiss the complaint. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) ("While the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) indicates that a statute of limitations defense cannot be used in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an exception is made where the complaint facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of the pleading."). In addition, the plaintiff has attached various exhibits to his complaint. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c), I may consider them when deciding this motion.
In deciding these particular arguments, I have not considered the affidavit or exhibits attached to the defendants' motion, nor have I considered Compton's affidavit in support of his opposition brief.