In 1996, Plaintiff lost $ 33,000 in wages ($ 2750/month X 12 months). Plaintiff earned $ 3,360 as a security guard and $ 8500 from his engraving business. Tr. 9/22/97 at 47. We will therefore award Plaintiff $ 21,140 ($ 1,761.67 a month) in back pay for 1996 ($ 33,000 [wages] - $ 3,360 [security guard] - $ 8,500 [engraving]).
In 1997, at the time of this opinion, Plaintiff lost $ 29,562.50 ($ 2,750/month X 10.75 months) in wages. Plaintiff has earned approximately $ 1,920 as a security guard and $ 6,200 from his engraving business. Tr. 9/22/97 at 47-48. We will therefore award Plaintiff $ 21,442.50 ($ 1,994.65 a month) in back pay for 1997, up until the date of this decision ($ 29,562 [wages] - $ 1,920 [security guard] - $ 6,200 [engraving]).
Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to $ 50,550.81 in back pay as of today's date ($ 21,442.50  $ 21,140  $ 7,968.31 ).
3. Front Pay
Plaintiff is not entitled to front pay in light of the fact that he will be reinstated in his old job. However, in the event that the City cannot reinstate the Plaintiff immediately, he shall be entitled to receive his full salary and benefits, at a rate no less than what he would be entitled to had he been rehired by the City on February 11, 1995, while he is waiting to be reinstated.
4. Compensatory Damages
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for "future pecuniary losses, pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of employment [sic] of life and other nonpecuniary losses allowable." Complaint at 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) allows a court to award compensatory damages when a Defendant intentionally discriminates against a Plaintiff on the basis of Plaintiff's disability. We decline, however, to award Plaintiff compensatory damages in this case. We do not find that Plaintiff will suffer any future pecuniary loss-- especially in light of our order that he be reinstated to the fire department. We also find that any pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life is not the fault of the City, but is the Plaintiff's own fault for abusing drugs and for forging prescriptions in violation of the criminal law. So, while we will grant Plaintiff back pay, we decline to reward the Plaintiff for his own mistakes that led to his embarrassment, inconvenience and suffering.
5. Punitive Damages
Plaintiff has asked for punitive damages in his complaint. We will not provide Plaintiff punitive damages because he is not entitled to them since the Defendant, City of Allentown, is a municipality. "It is undisputed that under the ADA punitive damages are not available against a government agency." Curran v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13813, 1997 WL 587371, *1 (E.D. Pa. September 5, 1997); see also Waring v. City of Philadelphia, 1996 WL 208348, *1, *3 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)(plaintiffs are entitled to seek punitive damages "against a respondent (other than a government, government agency, or political subdivision)")(emphasis added).
Plaintiff also seeks prejudgment and postjudgment interest. The decision to award prejudgment interest is "committed to the sound discretion of the district court." Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1530 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1103, 109 S. Ct. 3151, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1015 (1989). The award of prejudgment interest is appropriate in ADA cases. See Corbett v. National Products Company, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6425, 1995 WL 284248, *1, *5 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1995). We conclude that the Plaintiff should receive prejudgment interest on his back pay. "[Plaintiff] has been out of pocket this money because of [the City's] wrongdoing. Fairness requires him to be made whole with the addition of interest." Id.
Like the court in Corbett, we believe that the appropriate measure of prejudgment interest is set forth in the postjudgment interest statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Corbett, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6425, 1995 WL 284248 at *5; see also Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 747 F. Supp. 1118, 1133-34 (D.N.J. 1990). The rate furnished by that statute is the 52 week T-Bill rate. We will calculate the interest based the most recent T-bill rate at the time of judgment.
See Corbett, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6425, 1995 WL 284248 at *5. Interest will be based on the amount of back pay that accrued for each of the months between June of 1995 (when Plaintiff began to mitigate damages) and today.
Based on our calculations, we will award Plaintiff $ 3175.90 in prejudgment interest. Plaintiff shall also be entitled to postjudgment interest at 5.42%.
7. Attorney's Fees
Plaintiff qualifies as the prevailing party pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k). Plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
In conclusion, we find that the Defendant intentionally discriminated against the Plaintiff in violation of the ADA. We will order that the Defendant reinstate the Plaintiff as a firefighter consistent with the terms and conditions discussed in this opinion. We further award Plaintiff $ 50,550.81 in back pay and $ 3,175.90 in prejudgment interest. Postjudgment interest will be awarded at 5.42%. We do not award Plaintiff front pay, unless the Defendant fails to rehire Plaintiff immediately. In that case, Defendant will pay Plaintiff, until he is rehired, the full salary that he would be entitled to had he been rehired by the fire department on February 11, 1995. We will not award compensatory or punitive damages. Plaintiff shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k).
An appropriate order follows.
AND NOW, on this 21st day of November, 1997, upon consideration of the evidence presented during trial on September 22, 1997; Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions, of Law and the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed October 14, 1997; Defendant, City of Allentown's, Response to Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Counter Statement of Facts and Conclusions of Law filed October 27, 1997; Defendant, City of Allentown's, Brief filed October 27, 1997; Defendant, City of Allentown's Brief filed October 27, 1997; Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Counterstatement of facts filed November 4, 1997; and Plaintiff's Rebuttal to Defendant's Brief filed November 4, 1997, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED, consistent with the preceding Decision, which is incorporated herein by reference, that the Defendant, City of Allentown, reinstate the Plaintiff, David B. Herman, to the Allentown Fire Department immediately, subject to the following conditions:
[a] Plaintiff shall be reinstated to his former position as a firefighter with a salary of not less than the amount he would have otherwise earned in this position had he been reinstated on February 11, 1995, plus all benefits for an employee in that position today. Plaintiff shall have the same seniority that he would of had if he had been rehired on February 11, 1995. If the Plaintiff wishes to have pension credits for the period after February 11, 1995, he shall be required to make the employee contributions to the pension fund as required by the pension plan.
[b] Plaintiff will discuss with and get approval from Dr. Ralph Stolz [or another doctor authorized by the City] before taking any prescription drug.