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October 9, 1997


Appealed From No. MSD 94-40350. Common Pleas Court of the County of Butler. Judge HANCHER.

Before: Honorable Joseph T. Doyle, Judge, Honorable Bernard L. McGINLEY, Judge, Honorable Charles A. Lord, Senior Judge. Opinion BY Judge McGINLEY.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mcginley


FILED: October 9, 1997

Raphael Victor Mashuda (Mashuda) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County (trial court) that dismissed his appeal from a one-year suspension of his operating privilege pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code (Code), 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1). *fn1

By official notice dated September 14, 1994, the Department of Transportation (DOT) informed Mashuda that his operating privilege was to be suspended for one year as a result of his refusal to submit to chemical testing on August 21, 1994. Mashuda appealed his suspension to the trial court pursuant to Section 1550(a) of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1550(a).

At a de novo hearing, Mashuda did not testify. Butler Township Police Officer Matthew Pearson (Officer Pearson) testified that he responded to a one-vehicle accident on Route 422 at approximately 8:57 P.M. Officer Pearson arrived at the scene and found Mashuda, the operator of a 1994 Harley Davidson motorcycle, and an unidentified passenger. Officer Pearson stated that "when I approached Raphael Mashuda, I had asked which way he was driving at the time of the accident . . . [and] he had stated west then quickly said east . . . ." Notes of Testimony, January 6, 1997, (N.T.) at 6; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 6. Officer Pearson noticed that Mashuda's breath smelled of alcohol and that "when I would ask him a question and he would reply, he would kind of cover his mouth and look away from me . . . he wouldn't make eye contact with me." N.T. at 7; R.R. at 7. Mashuda was arrested and transported for the administration of a breathalyzer test.

At the police station, Officer Pearson requested Mashuda to submit to a breathalyzer test and explained that pursuant to the implied consent law his license would be suspended for one year if he refused. Mashuda agreed to submit to the test. Mashuda did not supply an adequate amount of breath on his first and second attempt on the breathalyzer machine. Mashuda then informed Officer Pearson that "he was in some pain and that he couldn't do the test." N.T. at 11; R.R. at 11. Mashuda was transported to a local hospital.

At the hospital, Officer Pearson requested Mashuda to submit to a blood test and was again explained the implied consent law. Officer Pearson stated Mashuda "would try to stall" and that Mashuda said he "didn't have to sign it [the refusal form for blood] right now, that he had to think about it." N.T. at 12; R.R. at 12. After ten minutes, Officer Pearson stated that this is your last opportunity [and] if you do not sign, you'll be marked a refusal." N.T. at 13; R.R. at 13. Mashuda refused to submit to the blood test and his refusal was noted.

The trial court dismissed Mashuda's appeal, concluding:

In this present situation, in addition to Defendant's refusal to sign the form, Defendant's conduct exhibited a refusal of the consent that was previously given. Defendant had an initial breathalyzer test administered which he was unable to complete. The Officer repeated the implied consent warnings and requested a blood test. Defendant orally agreed to the blood test, but once the form was presented to him he hesitated and stalled. Defendant then refused to take the test when he was told it would be his last opportunity before it constituted a refusal. Defendant did not express any confusion or factors that would indicate that the subsequent decision was only with regards to the consent form, and not a refusal of the test itself. This lack of unqualified and unequivocal assent to the test is sufficient to warrant the suspension of Defendant's driver's license. Any contrary finding would frustrate the purpose of the law.

Opinion of the Trial Court, January 23, 1997, at 4-5.

On appeal Mashuda contends that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not tantamount to a refusal to submit to a blood test and that the trial court erred by determining that his overall actions constituted a refusal. *fn2

Our scope of review in a driver's license suspension case is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law and whether the court's findings are supported by competent evidence. Wheatley v. Department of Transportation, 104 Pa. Commw. 171, 521 A.2d 507 (Pa. Commw. 1987). In cases involving the suspension of a driver's license for a refusal to submit to chemical testing, DOT must prove: 1) that the licensee was placed under arrest for driving under the influence; 2) that he was requested to submit to chemical testing; 3) that he was informed that a refusal to submit to such testing would result in a suspension of his operating privileges; and 4) that the licensee refused to ...

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