motivated by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'" W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 501 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338, 91 S. Ct. 1790 (1971)). Plaintiff's claim must fail at the outset because the conspiracy alleged by the plaintiff is not motivated by class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.
Here, age is the only potential class that the plaintiff has cited as a reason for the defendant's alleged deprivation. However, distinctions based on a person's status as a minor are not invidious. Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1973)(citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 27 L. Ed. 2d 272, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970)).
This is so for at least for two reasons. First, distinctions between minors and adults are less likely than other distinctions to be irrational or arbitrary because they distinguish between groups of people with different legal rights and responsibilities. Second, unlike the case with race or sex, minority is, of course, cured by the passage of time. Those discriminated against on the basis of youth therefore suffer only a temporary disability. See Felix v. Milliken, 463 F. Supp. 1360, 1373 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (21-year-old drinking age not a violation of equal protection).
In conclusion, because plaintiff has not pointed to facts which support every element of his claim of class-based invidious discrimination, summary judgment against the plaintiff is appropriate on his claims arising under section 1985. Accord Smith v. Walsh, 519 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D. Conn. 1981)("Alleged conspiracies based on a person's status as a minor do not state a cause of action under section 1985.").
The defendants have demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute on plaintiff's claims of violations of his due process rights, equal protection of the laws and freedom of association.
The defendants have also demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims. Therefore, judgment is entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff.
AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 1997, after consideration of defendants Mario Mele, Joseph M. Hoeffel III, Jon D. Fox, Montgomery County Board of Commissioners, Montgomery County Board of Elections and Michael H. McAdoo's motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 61), and defendant Thomas C. Egan's motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 63), and the plaintiff's response thereto (doc. nos. 67 & 66, respectively), it is ORDERED that the motions are GRANTED, it is further ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered for the defendants and against the plaintiff for the reasons stated in the Memorandum issued by the Court this day.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.