The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOYNER
On July 16, 1996, Plaintiff Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") instituted this declaratory judgment action against Defendants Attoy Davis, Jamillah Harris, Nate Jones, Rashida King, and Darryl LaBrew. Allstate seeks a judgment declaring that it has no obligation, contractual or otherwise, to provide certain benefits to Defendants under an auto insurance policy it issued to Ms. Polly Anne Holland ("Holland"). Defendants Harris, Jones, King, and LaBrew failed to appear, answer, or otherwise defend this suit and default judgment was entered against them accordingly. Before the Court is Allstate's Motion for Summary Judgment against the lone remaining Defendant, Attoy Davis ("Davis"). For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted in favor of Allstate for Count II, the uninsured motorist provision, and denied for Count III, the first party medical and wage loss benefits provision.
At all times relevant to this action, Holland owned a 1983 Honda Accord insured under an automobile insurance policy (the "Policy") issued by Plaintiff Allstate. Allstate is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Northbrook, Illinois. All Defendants, including Davis, are citizens of Pennsylvania.
On the morning of November 16, 1994, Holland drove into her place of employment, the Willow Grove Naval Air Station, with an individual named Ernest Bernard ("Bernard"). Though she had known Bernard for approximately just one month, Holland gave Bernard permission to use her car to retrieve some personal items out of his van, which had broken down in Philadelphia. Bernard was supposed to return to pick Holland up from work when she got off at 4:00 p.m. When Holland loaned Bernard her car, she did not explicitly give Bernard permission to lend her car to anyone else, nor did she specifically prohibit him from doing so.
Bernard did not return to pick Holland up from work that day. At approximately 10:30 or 11:00 that evening, when Holland still had not heard from Bernard, she called the Plymouth Township Police and reported the car stolen. Around 3:00 a.m. the following morning, Holland received a phone call from the police notifying her that her car had been involved in an accident. The occupants of the car at the time of the accident were Defendants Davis, Harris, Jones, King, and LaBrew. Either LaBrew or Jones was driving the vehicle when the accident occurred and Davis was allegedly injured. Holland did not know any of the occupants of the car, nor had she ever met them.
After Davis allegedly put Allstate on notice that "he may make a claim for uninsured motorist benefits and/or a claim for medical and/or wage loss benefits pursuant" to the Policy, Allstate filed this declaratory judgment action. (Pl.'s Mem. at 3).
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, reveal no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact, but to determine whether there exist any factual issues to be tried. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). The presence of "a mere scintilla of evidence" in the nonmovant's favor will not avoid summary judgment. Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). Rather, we will grant summary judgment unless "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In making this determination, all of the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 256. Once the moving party has met the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must establish the existence of each element of its case. J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir. 1990)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986)).
II. Application of the Standard to this Case
As noted supra, Davis allegedly intends to make claims under two separate provisions of the Policy: the uninsured motorist provision and the first party medical benefits and/or wage loss benefits provision. Count II of the Complaint addresses the uninsured motorist provision and Count III concerns the first party benefits provision. Davis is not ...