means merely that a citizen suit brought under HSCA must necessarily be brought under Section 1115. Id. It in no way suggests that citizen suits are the only private causes of action available under HSCA. Unlike the claims raised in Counts III, IV, and V, a HSCA citizen suit under Section 1115 is brought by "a person who has experienced or is threatened with personal injury or property damage as a result of a release of a hazardous substance . . . to prevent or abate a violation of this act. . . ." 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6020.1115(a). Redland Soccer Club has no bearing on the claims brought by M&M.
The controlling case on this question is, therefore, Smith v. Weaver, 445 Pa. Super. 461, 665 A.2d 1215 (1995), in which the Superior Court ruled that private causes of action exist under Sections 702 and 1101 of HSCA. Id. at 471-75, 665 A.2d at 1220-21. We may properly exercise jurisdiction over Counts III, IV, and V.
D. Common-Law Indemnification and Contribution (Count VI)
Count VI advances common-law claims for indemnification and contribution. Eberton argues that these claims are preempted by CERCLA, and that Count VI fails to state a claim for indemnification or contribution.
Common law claims for contribution are preempted by CERCLA. In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1117 (3d Cir. 1997). M&M's contribution claims must therefore be dismissed.
While Reading discusses the preemption of common-law claims for contribution and restitution, it does not address indemnification claims. We find nonetheless that indemnification claims such as those advanced by M&M here are also preempted by CERCLA. Count VI seeks to recover the cost of remediation from the Property's prior owners. (Am. Compl. at 17). While this claim is couched as one for "indemnity and/or contribution," id., this non-contractual indemnity claim is in reality merely another attempt to obtain contribution. Such a claim is, like M&M's common-law claim for contribution, preempted by CERCLA. See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92-93 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Pretty Prod., Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1488, 1495-96 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Allied Corp. v. Frola, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13343, 1993 WL 388970, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 1993).
Because M&M's common-law claims for contribution and indemnity are preempted by CERCLA, Count VI must be dismissed as to all Defendants.
E. Misrepresentation (Counts VII and VIII)
In Counts VII and VIII, M&M raises claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. Eberton argues that these claims must be dismissed, as the Environmental Contingency in the Purchase Agreement will prevent M&M from establishing justifiable reliance.
Justifiable reliance is an essential element of a claim for either fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation. Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 471 Pa. 404, 408, 370 A.2d 366, 367-68 (1977). Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 411 Pa. Super. 347, 358-59, 601 A.2d 825, 831 (1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Assoc., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 85, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1984);
The Environmental Contingency expressly provides that:
If BUYER closes on this Agreement, it acknowledges and represents (which shall survive closing hereunder) that it does so based on its own investigation and not on reliance of any statement or representation of or through SELLER regarding any matter or condition, including without limitation, any environmental condition, and BUYER accepts the property in "AS IS" condition.