Appeal from the Order entered July 2, 1996, docketed July 3, 1996, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Civil Division at No. 91-SU-5405-02S. Before BRILLHART, J.
Appeal from the Decree, June 24, 1996, of the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Civil Division at No. 91-SU-5405-02D. Before BRILLHART, J.
Appeal from the Order entered August 27, 1996, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Civil Division at No. 91-SU-5405-02S. Before BRILLHART, J.
Before: Cavanaugh, Popovich and Olszewski, JJ. Opinion BY Popovich, J.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Popovich
These consolidated appeals are from the divorce decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County on June 24, 1996, Dkt. No. 549 HBG 1996, the order of equitable distribution entered on July 2, 1996, Dkt. No. 542 HBG 1996, and the order directing the parties to comply with the order of equitable distribution entered on August 27, 1996, Dkt. No. 744 HBG 1996. *fn1
At Dkt. No. 549 HBG 1996, appellant claims that the lower court erred when it bifurcated the divorce and equitable distribution claims and entered the divorce decree. At Dkt. Nos. 542 HBG 1996 and 744 HBG 1996, appellant claims the lower court did not have jurisdiction to enter either the order of equitable distribution or the order enforcing the order of equitable distribution due to her pending appeal from the divorce decree. Upon review, we affirm the divorce decree at Dkt. No. 549 HBG 1996, and quash the appeals at Dkt. Nos. 542 HBG 1996, and 744 HBG 1996.
Appellee filed for divorce on November 8, 1991 and amended his complaint on June 10, 1993. On August 22, 1994, both parties filed affidavits of consent pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(c). Also, on August 22 and 23, 1994, a hearing was held before a divorce master regarding equitable distribution of the marital property. The master filed his Report and Recommendation on March 31, 1995. *fn2 On May 30, 1995, alleging the existence of new evidence which would affect the value of the marital residence, appellant filed a motion requesting that the trial court remand the case to the divorce master for further consideration. A hearing was held before the divorce master on December 5, 1995, to consider whether there were sufficient grounds to warrant a remand and reopening of the case. The divorce master filed his report and recommendation on April 2, 1996, in which he concluded that no adequate grounds existed to warrant a reopening of the record in this case. There were no exceptions filed to the master's decision.
During the period between May of 1995, and April of 1996, while appellant's motion to remand to the master was under consideration, appellee continued to pay spousal support, which was more lucrative for appellant than the divorce master's recommended alimony payments. On May 16, 1996, appellee filed a petition for special relief seeking credit towards his recommended alimony payment for the excess spousal support which he paid while awaiting resolution of appellant's motion for remand to the master. *fn3
On June 6, 1996, appellee filed a petition to bifurcate the divorce from the economic issues and asked the trial court to enter a final decree of divorce in order for his alimony obligation to commence. The trial court held a hearing regarding appellee's petition on that date, during which appellant objected to bifurcation claiming the court had not gathered sufficient information to weigh the advantages and disadvantages which would result from granting the petition. Relying on the master's two reports, the fact that no timely exceptions had been filed to either report and the fact that both parties had filed affidavits of consent, the trial court felt there were no factual (economic) issues to be resolved except appellee's petition for special relief which was scheduled for a hearing on August 19, 1996. As a result, the court entered an order bifurcating the divorce proceeding from the economic issues on June 10, 1996, and entered a decree of divorce on June 24, 1996. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the divorce decree on July 1, 1996.
On July 2, 1996, the trial court entered an order adopting the master's report and recommendation and directing that equitable distribution of the marital property should commence accordingly. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this order on July 8, 1996.
On August 27, 1996, appellee submitted a petition for enforcement to the trial court in which he indicated that appellant had refused to comply with the trial court's order of equitable distribution of the marital property. At this time, the trial court again ordered the distribution of the marital property to commence. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this order on September 11, 1996.
Appellant initially contends the divorce decree should not have been entered because the trial court was required to hold a hearing before bifurcating the divorce from any economic issues. To support this position, appellant relies on Wolk v. Wolk, 318 Pa. Super. 311, 464 A.2d 1359 (1983) and Mandia v. Mandia, 341 Pa. Super. 116, 491 A.2d 177 (1985). Both of these cases state that the trial court's decision to bifurcate the divorce from any economic issues is discretionary as long as it is the result of a reflective examination of the individual facts of each case. "So long as the trial Judge assembles adequate ...