applying to him. Further, the policy states that "serious misconduct" may result in immediate termination. Defendant reasonably might have, but not necessarily, concluded that plaintiff engaged in "serious" misconduct.
Defendant contends that Pennsylvania law does not recognize a claim for breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from the termination of an at-will employment relationship. See Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Whelan v. Careercom Corp., 711 F. Supp. 198 (M.D.Pa. 1989); Engstrom v. John Nuveen & Co., 668 F. Supp. 953 (E.D.Pa. 1987). Courts, however, have concluded that at-will employment contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Pennsylvania law. See EEOC v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 874 F. Supp. 92, 96 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Somers v. Somers, 418 Pa. Super. 131, 613 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Pa.Super. 1992). The claims in those cases, however, did not arise from a termination of the at-will employee. The Court in Green concluded that the general principle articulated in Chestnut Hill and Somers does not apply in termination cases because "there is no bad faith when an employer discharges an at-will employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, as long as no statute or public policy is implicated." Green, 887 F. Supp. at 803. Plaintiff, however, has asserted statutory and public policy violations. On the other hand, the public policy exception applies only where there is no available statutory means of vindicating the policy in question. See Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1984) (wrongful discharge and breach of contract claims); Bruffett v. Warner Comm., Inc., 692 F.2d 910, 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1982) (breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims); Kinnally, 748 F. Supp. 1136 at 1146 (wrongful discharge claim). It does appear that statutory remedies are provided to vindicate the type of violations alleged by plaintiff.
Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress may be barred by the exclusivity provision of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 1 et seq. ("WCA"). See 77 P.S. § 481(a); Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc., 514 Pa. 32, 522 A.2d 548, 551 (Pa. 1987) (no intentional tort exception to the exclusivity clause of the WCA); Dugan v. Bell Tel. of Penn., 876 F. Supp. 713, 723-24 (W.D.Pa. 1994); Doe v. William Shapiro, Esq., P.C., 852 F. Supp. 1246, 1254 (E.D.Pa. 1994); Gilmore v. Manpower, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 197, 198-99 (W.D.Pa. 1992); McMahon v. Impact Systems, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5835, 1992 WL 95920, *2 (E.D.Pa. April 15, 1992); Sibley v. Faulkner Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10292, 1990 WL 116226, *7 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 7, 1990). Defendant also correctly notes that conduct in the employment context will rarely rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811, 112 L. Ed. 2d 23, 111 S. Ct. 47 (1990); Stouch v. Brothers of Order, 836 F. Supp. 1134, 1145-46 (E.D.Pa. 1993).
Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be barred by the WCA. See Dugan, 876 F. Supp. at 723-24. Also, it does not appear that plaintiff, who clearly did not witness an accident injuring a close relative, suffered distress as a result of a breach by defendant of a distinct preexisting duty of care or sustained any physical injury. See Green, 887 F. Supp. at 801-02; Armstrong v. Paoli Mem'l Hosp., 430 Pa. Super. 36, 633 A.2d 605, 609 (Pa.Super. 1993), appeal denied, 649 A.2d 666, 538 Pa. 663 (Pa. 1994).
Where all federal claims are disposed of before trial, however, any supplemental state law claims are ordinarily dismissed. See Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995); Lovell Mfg. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 843 F.2d 725, 734 (3d Cir. 1988); Downey v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 946 F. Supp. 1141, 1159 (D.N.J. 1996); Litz v. City of Allentown, 896 F. Supp. 1401, 1414 (E.D.Pa. 1995); Cooper v. City of Chester, 810 F. Supp. 618, 625 (E.D.Pa. 1992); Heller v. CACL Fed. Credit Union, 775 F. Supp. 839, 843 (E.D.Pa. 1991). The merits of at least some of plaintiff's state claims are arguable and their resolution may require a more intricate analysis and application of state law involving the dedication of further court resources. Accordingly, the court will dismiss plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice to reassert those claims which, upon reflection, he may deem it appropriate to pursue in the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
Plaintiff has not presented evidence from which one reasonably could find incredible and unworthy of belief defendant's stated reason for his termination that after conducting an investigation into allegations plaintiff loaned money to subordinates for a fee, Ms. Angelone concluded, however, correctly or incorrectly, that the charge was true. Plaintiff has not otherwise presented competent evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that his Italian ancestry, his ancestry plus gender, his diabetes, or his or his wife's eligibility for employee health benefit plan payments played an actual and determinative role in his termination.
Accordingly, judgment will be entered for defendant on plaintiff's federal claims. The John Doe claims will be dismissed, and plaintiff's supplemental state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice. An appropriate order will be entered.
AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 1997, upon consideration of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's response thereto, consistent with the accompanying memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED and JUDGMENT is ENTERED in the above action for defendant and against plaintiff on his federal claims, plaintiff's state law claims against defendant are DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and all of plaintiff's claims against defendant "John Doe Corporation" are DISMISSED ; and, accordingly the above action is closed.
BY THE COURT:
JAY C. WALDMAN, J.