Appeal From Order June 29, 1995, Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division, Bucks County, No. 95001646-05-2. Before GARB, J.
Before: Cavanaugh, J., Cirillo, P.j.e., Popovich, J., Johnson, J., Hudock, J., Ford Elliott, J., Saylor, J., Eakin, J., and Schiller, J. Cirillo, P.j.e, files a Dissenting Opinion in which Ford Elliott, J., joins. Opinion BY Cavanaugh, J.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Cavanaugh
We quash this appeal. In recognition of our Disposition, we relate only so much of the history and facts as are necessary to explain our position. Appellant/Plaintiffs are Waldman, Madric, & Febles who are principal officers and employees of appellant Prelude, Inc. Defendants are Barbary Coast,II, Inc. and M. Dolores Jorcyk its only shareholder, as well as attorneys-at-law Rubini and Scheetz and Williams & Scheetz, P.C., a law firm. Appellees are the lawyer and law firm defendants.
Appellants leased a restaurant and bar and, by addendum, a liquor license in New Hope, Pennsylvania from Jorcyk and Barbary Coast who owned the facility and held the liquor license. With the professional assistance of attorney Rubini, appellants thereafter entered into an agreement of sale with Jorcyk & Barbary to purchase the real estate, the bar and restaurant business and liquor license. Several months later, Scheetz and Williams and Scheetz undertook representation of the lessee/purchasers as successor to Rubini.
A dispute arose, and lessor-sellers successfully pursued an action in ejectment. Lessee-purchasers presently assert that the illegality of the purported transfer of a pecuniary interest in a liquor license was never made an issue in the ejectment action by their attorneys to their economic harm and loss.
In the present suit, the ejected lessees sued Jorcyk and Barbary Coast,II with counts of unjust enrichment, conversion, indemnification and fraud and the attorney defendants who were charged with counts of "professional negligence, malpractice."
The attorney defendants filed preliminary objections which were granted and the amended complaint as to Rubini, Scheetz and Williams and Scheetz was dismissed with prejudice.
This appeal is from the order dismissing the complaint as to the three attorney defendants. The attorney defendants have moved to quash the appeal. Argument on the quashal motion was heard in conjunction with argument on the appeal before this court en banc on November 26, 1996.
It is clear that the subject order, which dismissed the claims against three of the five defendants and did not extend to the surviving defendants, is not a final appealable order. Pa.R.A.P. 341 Final Orders; Generally, provides:
(a) General Rule. Except as prescribed in subdivisions (d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of an administrative agency or lower court.
(b) Definition of Final Order. A final order is ...