III. Named Driver Exclusion
Defendant Brooks also argues that the named driver exclusion Keenan executed is invalid, even under Pennsylvania law. First, Brooks argues that State Farm should be estopped from using the driver exclusion as a defense because State Farm's failure to put Mancuso's exclusion on the insurance card amounts to fraud. Second, Brooks argues that the endorsement that excluded Mancuso is ineffective and does not cancel the policy that Keenan previously executed. Third, Brooks argues that he is a third party victim and should receive payment from State Farm even if Mancuso is not covered. Finally, Brooks argues that State Farm is estopped from claiming that it is not liable for Brooks' losses since it is representing Mancuso and Keenan in a state court action.
With respect to Brooks' first argument, we note that there is nothing in Pennsylvania law that requires State Farm to put the named driver exclusion on the insurance card. Indeed, Pennsylvania law requires only a few items to appear on the face of an insurance card, none of which include named driver exclusions, 31 Pa. Code § 67.24 (1997). Furthermore, Brooks cannot direct us to any such requirement. In fact, Pennsylvania law requires the name of the insured to appear on the card only if the person is self-insured. Id. at § 67.24 (b)(4). Clearly, the law could have mandated such a requirement for all insurance cards if that were deemed necessary. Without such a requirement, we cannot say that State Farm's failure to include the driver exclusion on the insurance card amounts to fraud such that State Farm should be estopped from asserting its defense to liability. See also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Netz, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3845, No. CIV.A. 91-6944, 1993 WL 89766 (E.D.Pa., March 29, 1993) (estoppel argument only binds the parties to agreement).
In support of his second argument that the endorsement is ineffective, Brooks argues that it is unclear (a) whether Keenan's old policy remained in effect until the accident date, (b) whether the old policy was cancelled and a new policy was issued to include the endorsement, (c) whether Keenan's policy was renewed to include a clause excluding Mancuso as a driver of Keenan's car (d) whether Keenan gave new consideration for the reduced coverage proposed by State Farm, and (e) what was the intent of the contracting parties.
We find that the endorsement clearly states that the old policy is to be cancelled and a new policy issued with the exclusion. Furthermore, the effective date of the new policy, according to the policy's declarations page, is May 20, 1995, well before the accident at issue in this case. In addition, Keenan paid for her new policy and therefore there was consideration. Finally, the intent of the endorsement is clear; it plainly states that the new policy will include the new endorsement and that State Farm has no liability of any kind under any of the policies if the motor vehicle is operated by Mancuso. Therefore, Brooks' arguments fail.
Brooks' next argument is that he is a third party victim and therefore he is entitled to coverage. In support of this argument, Brooks cites cases which are either based on New Jersey statutory law or which concern a court's interpretation of a policy's level of coverage so that victims can recover for the full extent of their loss. In this case, there is no policy that covers Mancuso's accidents when he drives Keenan's car so we cannot liberally construe the extent of its coverage.
Finally, we note that State Farm is representing Keenan and Mancuso under a reservation of rights in the state court action and that therefore this fact does not bar State Farm from disclaiming liability in this action. See e.g. Brugnoli v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 284 Pa. Super. 511, 426 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. Super. 1981); St. Leger v. American Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 870 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (letter to insured from insurance company reserving rights allows company to defend insured until it becomes clear that liability is outside the scope of insurance policy's coverage).
Since Keenan executed a named driver exclusion that expressly excluded Mancuso from the scope of her motor vehicle's insurance coverage, State Farm is not liable for losses arising out of an accident occurring while Mancuso was driving. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 5th day of February, 1997, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, said motion is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
J. Curtis Joyner, J.