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BROPHY v. CHASE MANHATTAN MORTG. CO.

December 5, 1996

DONALD J. BROPHY and JOAN B. BROPHY, Plaintiffs,
v.
CHASE MANHATTAN MORTGAGE CO. and WILLIAM BOWEN, Defendants.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: BRODY

MEMORANDUM

 Anita B. Brody, J.

 December 5, 1996

 Before me is defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs Donald Brophy and Joan Brophy ("the Brophys") allege that the defendant Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation ("Chase Manhattan") and its agent, defendant William Bowen ("Bowen"), violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq., the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq., the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. § 201 et seq., and Pennsylvania tort law by misrepresenting the terms and charges of a Veterans Affairs, fixed rate, thirty (30) year mortgage for the purchase of residential real estate. I will grant defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the Brophys' claim under RESPA and TILA, and I will dismiss all remaining claims under state law.

 I. Facts

 On June 8, 1995, the Brophys applied for a thirty (30) year fixed-rate mortgage from Chase Manhattan to purchase residential real estate. In connection with their application the Brophys were given two documents, one a "Good Faith Estimate" and the other a Regulation Z Disclosure ("Initial Regulation Z Disclosure"). Under "Items Payable in Connection with Loan," the Good Faith Estimate estimated the Loan Origination Fee would be $ 886.38, which represented one (1) percent of the loan. The Good Faith Estimate showed a zero ($ 0.00) figure as the amount for the Loan Discount, indicating that none would be payable. Furthermore, under the section entitled, "Items Required by Lender to be Paid in Advance," the Mortgage Insurance Premium was estimated to be $ 1,738. *fn1" Good Faith Estimate dated June 8, 1995. On June 12, 1995, the Brophys signed the Good Faith Estimate and the Initial Regulation Z Disclosure and returned them to Chase Manhattan. *fn2"

 When the Brophys settled on July 31, 1995, Chase Manhattan gave them a Settlement Statement and a final Regulation Z Disclosure ("Final Regulation Z Disclosure") detailing the actual charges and fees that the Brophys were required to pay. The Settlement Statement listed a Loan Origination Fee of $ 1,902.02, a Loan Discount of $ 885.07, and a FA Funding Fee of $ 2,607. Settlement Statement dated July 31, 1996. In other words, the Loan Origination Fee which was estimated at $ 886.38 was now $ 1,902.02; the FA Funding Fee estimated at $ 1,738 was now $ 2,607; and the Loan Discount that was estimated at zero ($ 0.00) was now $ 885.07. *fn3" The annual percentage rate, 7.5 percent, did not vary from the time the good faith estimates were made on June 8, 1995, until the time of settlement on July 31, 1995. Good Faith Estimate dated June 8, 1995; Mortgage Note dated July 31, 1995.

 II. Discussion

 The Brophys claim that Chase Manhattan and Bowen violated RESPA, TILA, the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade and Consumer Protection Act, and state tort law by misrepresenting the charges they would incur at settlement for the mortgage on their home.

 A. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA")

 The Brophys contend that the defendants did not comply with the statutory disclosure requirements of RESPA because the defendants failed to provide them with a good faith estimate of the charges that they were likely to incur in connection with the settlement of their mortgage. The Brophys claim that the disclosures they received from the defendants were inaccurate and misleading and thereby violated the requirements of 12 U.S.C.A. § 2604(c) of RESPA *fn4" and the applicable regulation, Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(c). *fn5" The defendants respond that the Brophys do not state a claim under RESPA because no private right of action exists under § 2604.

 The primary source of a private right of action is the text of the statute itself. American Telephone and Telegraph v. M/V Cape Fear, 967 F.2d 864, 866 (3d Cir. 1992). Section 2614 of RESPA, the only provision of the Act that provides for a private right of action, states:

 
Any action pursuant to the provisions of section 2607 or 2608 of this title may be brought in the United States district court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction . . .

 12 U.S.C.A. § 2614. Thus, § 2614 provides for a private right of action for claims brought under § 2607 (prohibits the giving or accepting of fees, kickbacks, or a portion, percentage, or split of the charges for settlement services with others who did not perform those services) and § 2608 (prohibits the seller from requiring the buyer to purchase title insurance from any particular title company) but does not provide for such a right under § 2604, the section the Brophys claim the defendants violated.

 "The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in 'the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.'" United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 103 L. Ed. 2d 290, 109 S. Ct. 1026 (1989) (citation omitted). "Courts presume that Congress expressed its legislative intent through the ordinary meaning of the words it chose to use, and if the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the words ordinarily is regarded as conclusive." In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1119, 1123 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Since the statute specifically provides for a private right of action under specific sections -- but not § 2604 -- a private right of action should not be implied under § 2604. The ...


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