methamphetamine (but not the domestic items) had been removed.
There was also substantial evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant facilitated the goals of the conspiracy by allowing materials which he knew were for the manufacture of methamphetamine to be stored in a locker over which he had control during the life of the conspiracy. There was evidence for his control of the locker. The rental agent described the man who had rented the locker as having the same general characteristics as the defendant. A handwriting expert testified that the defendant probably had signed and initialed the lease. One of the contact telephone numbers on the lease was one the defendant had used in the past. That telephone number was listed at an address on Hoffman Street in Philadelphia where the defendant had once lived. At the time of the conspiracy, two automobiles were registered to Adrian Mastrangelo at the Hoffman Street address. They were seen parked on Neshaminy Valley Drive, across the street from the apartment in which the defendant was living, and he was seen driving one of them. The address given for the elusive renter, Raymond Burgos, was in the same apartment complex. The locker appeared to have been rented so as to hide the identity of the renter. Finally, there was the videotaped evidence that the defendant had keys to the storage locker and evidently knew the access code to the facility. This evidence, taken as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant controlled the locker in which materials for the conspiracy were stored and that he attempted to hide the fact that he had rented it.
In addition, there was evidence that the defendant facilitated the conspiracy in another way: by assisting his son in transporting the government methylamine to the storage locker on August 7, 1993. The son appeared to be suspicious of the surveillance van in front of Garage G, and father and son took what appeared to be counter-surveillance activity on the way to the storage locker. While this evidence may not have been sufficient to support the defendant's participation in the conspiracy by itself, it is another piece that goes to make up the total, and I must determine "whether all the pieces of evidence against the defendant, taken together, make a strong enough case to let the jury find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Coleman, 811 F.2d at 807 (quoting U.S. v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840, 841 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 939 (1957).
Finally, there was substantial evidence of the defendant's preparation for flight after the residences of co-conspirators were searched and he found the storage locker had been emptied, and of his subsequent disappearance.
The defendant started to transfer his assets the same day he discovered the materials had been removed from the storage locker; his telephone was cut off shortly after the discovery; and by the time the indictment issued, the defendant had dropped out of sight. He thereafter discussed surrender with an attorney, but did not surrender, and had to be tracked down. This flight, and the preparation for it, may be taken as evidence of the defendant's guilt.
I conclude the evidence that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and its goals and knowingly facilitated those goals in one or more ways during its lifetime is sufficient to support the jury's finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant was willfully a member of the conspiracy, that he shared in the "unity of purpose" of his co-conspirators. The evidence supports the finding that the defendant knowingly allowed a storage locker over which he had control to be used to store materials for the conspiracy; the evidence that he knowingly helped his son transport the government's methylamine to storage locker H-16 strengthens that finding.
After reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, in answer to the question "whether all the pieces of evidence against the defendant, taken together, make a strong enough case to sustain the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," I conclude that they do. U.S. v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1087).
2. Outrageous Conduct of the Government.
The second ground the defendant offers for acquittal is that the indictment should have been dismissed because of the government's outrageous behavior. This argument was presented in a pre-trial motion. A decision was postponed until all evidence was presented at trial, but the motion was not decided. I now rule that the government's behavior was not of such a nature as to require dismissal of the indictment. The outrageous conduct on which the defendant bases this part of his motion for acquittal is two-fold: the government's handling of the evidence and its testimony before the Grand Jury.
a. Loss or Destruction of Evidence.
First, the defendant argues that the government's loss or destruction of many items of physical evidence violated his due process rights in that he was unable to examine them and determine their exculpatory value. I will now consider my ruling above in light of Supreme Court decisions setting out the test to apply in determining whether the failure to preserve evidence rises to a due process violation.
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988). The test was devised in the context of the government's deliberate destruction of evidence, but it can also be considered with respect to its loss of evidence in that there was a failure to preserve evidence the defendant claims is important to his defence.
Most importantly, the destruction of the evidence must be in bad faith. In Trombetta, arresting officers failed to preserve breath samples from people they suspected of drunken driving once breath analysis tests of the samples had been completed. The Court noted that
authorities in this case did not destroy respondents' breath samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny. In failing to preserve breath samples for respondents, the officers here were acting "in good faith and in accord with their normal practice." The record contains no allegation of official animus toward respondents or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.