consistent with Goldberg's assertions made at the time (although inconsistent with his current assertions) that he was not indigent, but in fact possessed considerable assets.
14. Goldberg's threats, therefore, were coupled with the apparent ability to accomplish physical harm to counsel through the agency of a third party hired by Goldberg for such purpose.
15. As a consequence of the threats made by Goldberg, Lunsford was placed in fear of his own life and in fear for the safety of his family.
16. Because of the fear in which Goldberg had placed Lunsford, Lunsford did not feel capable of representing Goldberg consistent with his duties of both competence and loyalty.
17. The court allowed Lunsford to withdraw following Lunsford's oral motion to do so.
18. Goldberg's conduct was intended to, and did, disrupt and obstruct the proceedings in this court.
19. The court allowed Goldberg to challenge the factual basis for allowing Lunsford to withdraw, although after the withdrawal was permitted.
20. This court's error in not holding a hearing before allowing Lunsford to withdraw does not alter the fact that Goldberg acted to obstruct the administration of justice.
21. Goldberg also has been given an opportunity to challenge the factual basis for a finding of obstruction in the threat to Lunsford by the court's order of July 18, 1996, which specifically informed Goldberg that conduct related to the first trial was considered by the court to apply to the sentence to be imposed after the second guilty verdict.
22. On June 14, 1994, Goldberg represented to the court that officials at USP-Lewisburg had interfered with his access to the law library and to witnesses by separating him from his housing unit and general population inmates.
23. Actually, when Goldberg was returned to USP-Lewisburg on June 13, 1994, he overheard the time at which the marshals would be transporting him to court in the morning, so that his separation was a reasonable, standard security precaution because such information can be used in an escape attempt. See N.T. 6/14/94 at 225-226.
24. The misrepresentation was material because it was made to obtain court intervention in housing and access to facilities to permit Goldberg to represent himself.
B. Second Trial
1. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment of conviction which followed the first trial of this case on October 16, 1995, and remanded to this court for further proceedings. United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092 (3d Cir. 1995).
2. Although reversing the judgment, the Third Circuit affirmed our finding that there was not good cause to substitute counsel and delay the first trial. Id. at 1098-1099.
3. Supporting our finding that good cause for the substitution did not exist was a finding that motions which Goldberg insisted be filed by Lunsford were without merit. Id. at 1098 (citing United States v. Goldberg, 855 F. Supp. 725, 730-732 (M.D. Pa. 1994)).
4. On November 24, 1995, the court received from Goldberg a letter indicating that he was "pending possible eye surgery" and requesting that a writ for his return for the second trial be deferred for an indefinite period. Record Document No. 93.
5. The same letter indicated that Goldberg wanted counsel appointed to represent him, and that the firm of Rieders, Travis, Mussina, Humphrey & Harris would be acceptable to Goldberg.
6. Members of the Rieders, Travis firm had been involved in cases involving serious charges against USP-Lewisburg inmates in which the inmates were acquitted. See United States v. Vasquez, 889 F. Supp. 171 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (inmate charged with murdering another inmate; acquittal after jury trial in which Jeffrey C. Dohrmann, Esquire, an associate of Rieders, Travis, represented the defendant); United States v. Gambina, 4:CR-92-0093 (M.D. Pa.)(USP-Lewisburg inmate and wife charged with conspiring to effect escape of inmate; acquittal of both defendants after jury trial in which Ronald C. Travis, Esquire, of the Rieders, Travis firm represented inmate's wife).
7. The court declined to continue generally a criminal matter, and directed Goldberg to complete a financial affidavit for the purpose of appointing counsel. Goldberg was provided with a blank form of the financial affidavit. Order of Court dated November 30, 1995 (record document no. 94).
8. No financial affidavit having been received from Goldberg, the court continued jury selection from January 3, 1996, to February 14, 1996, and scheduled a hearing with respect to:
(a) whether Goldberg qualified financially for the appointment of counsel;
(b) if not, whether Goldberg would elect to retain counsel or to proceed pro se ;