The opinion of the court was delivered by: HUYETT
Plaintiffs M. Drew and Brenda A. Brown and Defendant American Motorists Insurance Company have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' Motion will be DENIED and Defendant's will be GRANTED.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A. BREACH OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
Interpretation of an insurance policy is a matter for the Court, rather than for the jury. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 834 F. Supp. 854, 856 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Whether a particular loss is within a policy's coverage is a question of law that may be decided at the summary judgment stage. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Barthelemy, 836 F. Supp. 231, 235 (M.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 33 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1994). As discussed below, Plaintiffs' claim falls outside the coverage provided by the policy issued by Defendant.
1. The Pollution Exclusion
Plaintiffs' claim for damage to their house falls squarely within the pollution exclusion clause, which was quoted above at footnote 1. The Court is required to give effect to clear and unambiguous language in an insurance policy, as that language most accurately manifests the intent of the parties. Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 802, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2034, No. 4329 Phila. 1994, 1996 WL 338810, at * 2 (Pa. Super. June 20, 1996). A term is unambiguous unless "reasonable people, considering it in the context of the entire policy, would honestly ascribe different meanings to it." Allstate, 834 F. Supp. at 857. The Court is not to torture policy language to create ambiguities. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 521, 524 (3d Cir. 1981).
Plaintiffs argue that the noxious fumes that made their home unlivable were not "pollutants" under the pollution exclusion because the fumes came from an over-the-shelf product, used in an everyday activity. Essentially, Plaintiffs' position is that a common sense understanding of the term pollutants, as reasonably understood by Plaintiffs, does not include the fumes here.
Whether or not fumes from a household product would commonly be understood as a pollutant is not the issue, however. The term pollutant is defined in the policy to include solid, liquid and gaseous irritants and contaminants, including fumes and vapors. This definition is clear and unambiguous, and includes the fumes that Plaintiffs claim caused them sufficient irritation to make them vacate their home. See Madison Constr. Co., 678 A.2d 802, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2034, 1996 WL 338810, at *3 (finding fumes from commonly used sealant a pollutant under similarly worded pollution exclusion). Where a term is clearly and unambiguously defined in a policy, the Court will not substitute a common definition of the term for the definition contained in the policy. American States Ins. Co. v. Nethery, 79 F.3d 473, 475-76 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing to substitute common ...